{"id":37909,"date":"2018-03-16T06:00:48","date_gmt":"2018-03-15T19:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=37909"},"modified":"2018-03-15T11:43:10","modified_gmt":"2018-03-15T00:43:10","slug":"chinas-quest-political-control-military-supremacy-cyber-domain","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-quest-political-control-military-supremacy-cyber-domain\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s quest for political control and military supremacy in the cyber domain"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

The People\u2019s Republic of China seeks to contest information dominance (\u5236\u4fe1\u606f\u6743) and discursive dominance (\u8bdd\u8bed\u6743) in cyberspace. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), cybersecurity is integral to comprehensive state security<\/a> (\u56fd\u5bb6\u5b89\u5168). That\u2019s distinct from \u2018national\u2019 security in that it focuses on preserving stability and legitimacy to ensure the regime\u2019s survival. Xi Jinping has said that \u2018without cybersecurity, there is no state security\u2019.<\/p>\n

In this concept of cybersecurity, information security and control take priority. Indeed, for the CCP, threats to cyber sovereignty (\u7f51\u7edc\u4e3b\u6743) are seen as existential in nature. For that reason, the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively building its capabilities to engage in \u2018military struggle\u2019 (\u519b\u4e8b\u6597\u4e89) in the cyber domain.<\/p>\n

The CCP has long believed itself to be engaged in an ideological contest in cyberspace. It has sought to counter foreign \u2018hostile forces\u2019 (\u654c\u5bf9\u52bf\u529b) through censorship and propaganda. It blames those influences for popular protests that have overthrown authoritarian governments, as in the Arab Spring.<\/p>\n

Tellingly, a research centre with the Cyberspace Administration of China has written, \u2018If our party cannot traverse the hurdle represented by the internet, it cannot traverse the hurdle of remaining in power<\/a> for the long term.\u2019<\/p>\n

So far, China has defied initial, utopian expectations for the future of the internet. Instead, the CCP has sought to reshape and harness the internet as a tool to enhance its social control, while still allowing a vibrant digital economy to thrive within certain parameters.<\/p>\n

Xi Jinping articulated the objective for China to become a \u2018cyber superpower\u2019 (\u7f51\u7edc\u5f3a\u56fd), to be not only the world\u2019s largest nation in cyberspace, but also the most powerful. His own consolidation of power has included gaining absolute control over the PLA, in line with Mao\u2019s maxim that the \u2018Party commands the gun\u2019.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s 2015 national defence white paper on military strategy\u2014which included the PLA\u2019s commitment \u2018to remain a staunch force for upholding the CCP\u2019s ruling position\u2019 and to preserve \u2018social stability\u2019\u2014also called for the PLA to \u2018expedite the development of a cyber force\u2019 and to enhance its capabilities in \u2018cyberspace situation awareness\u2019 and cyber defence. The stated objectives of these forces are \u2018to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security\u00a0and social stability\u2019.<\/p>\n

At a basic level, the PLA\u2019s approach to employing military cyber forces should be understood as another piece in China\u2019s strategy of \u2018active defence\u2019 (\u79ef\u6781\u9632\u5fa1). In essence, that means, \u2018We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counter-attack if attacked.\u2019<\/p>\n

When applied to the cyber domain, this logic implies that offensive operations at the tactical and operational levels would be consistent with a defensive orientation at the strategic level.<\/p>\n

At the strategic level, the question of what constitutes an \u2018attack\u2019 is likely to be decided according to political and ideological factors, particularly in cyberspace. According to an authoritative text on information operations, the PLA should emphasise active defence if facing a \u2018formidable enemy\u2019, but might pursue an \u2018active offensive\u2019 against a weaker enemy in order to achieve rapid battlefield information superiority.<\/p>\n

PLA concepts of cyber conflict are informed by Chinese strategic culture. For the US and most Western militaries, there\u2019s a clear distinction between \u2018peace\u2019 and \u2018war\u2019. In contrast, the PLA appears to place these along a spectrum. In the Science of military strategy<\/em>, PLA thinkers discuss the dynamics of military struggle in the cyber domain, highlighting the functional \u2018integration\u2019 of peacetime and wartime in cyberspace.<\/p>\n

The PLA\u2019s official dictionary of military terminology defines military struggle as \u2018the use of military methods in order to advance the struggle among nation states or political groups to achieve a definite political, economic or other objective; the highest form is warfare\u2019. This concept has Marxist and Maoist antecedents consistent with the CCP\u2019s tradition of combined political and military struggle. That includes its history of political warfare that today provokes concerns about Beijing\u2019s interference in democracies.<\/p>\n

Notably, the PRC\u2019s pursuit of a national strategy of military\u2013civil fusion (\u519b\u6c11\u878d\u5408) not only seeks to leverage synergies between commercial and defence developments, but also intends to take advantage of civilian personnel in defence and force development. The Science of military strategy<\/em> argues that:<\/p>\n

In light of the ambiguous boundaries between peacetime and wartime in cyber countermeasures, and the characteristic that military and civilian attacks are hard to distinguish, persist in the integration of peace and war [and] in military\u2013civil integration; in peacetime, use civilians to hide the military; in wartime, the military and the people, hands joined, attack together \u2026.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Central Military\u2013Civil Fusion Development Commission, under the leadership of Xi Jinping himself, established the Cyberspace Security Military\u2013Civil Fusion Innovation Centre<\/a> (\u7f51\u7edc\u7a7a\u95f4\u5b89\u5168\u519b\u6c11\u878d\u5408\u7a7f\u5fc3\u4e2d\u5fc3). Qihoo 360, a major cybersecurity enterprise, will lead<\/a> the centre. The new centre will seek to improve national cyber defences and could even explore the creation of \u2018cyber militia and teams\u2019.<\/p>\n

Looking forward, the PLA sees space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic domain as critical \u2018strategic frontiers\u2019 (\u6218\u7565\u8fb9\u7586) and the \u2018commanding heights\u2019 (\u5236\u9ad8\u70b9) of future warfare. In particular, the PLA is concentrating on \u2018information operations\u2019 (\u4fe1\u606f\u4f5c\u6218) that include cyberwarfare, electronic warfare and psychological warfare.<\/p>\n

Traditionally, core aspects of PLA strategic thinking have included the focus on seizing \u2018information dominance\u2019 (\u5236\u4fe1\u606f\u6743) through strikes against key nodes in an adversary\u2019s command and control systems using integrated information and firepower assaults. Unsurprisingly given the perceived dominance of offensive attacks in this domain, the PLA is believed to prefer seizing the initiative through a first strike (\u5148\u53d1\u5236\u4eba).<\/p>\n

Increasingly, the PLA considers cyber capabilities a critical component in its overall integrated strategic deterrence posture, alongside space and nuclear deterrence. PLA thinkers highlight that \u2018blinding\u2019, \u2018paralysing\u2019 and \u2018chaos-inducing\u2019 methods of deterrence in cyber, space and other domains will \u2018probably possess even more ideal deterrence outcomes\u2019.<\/p>\n

The establishment of the Strategic Support Force (\u6218\u7565\u652f\u63f4\u90e8\u961f) in 2015 integrated the PLA\u2019s space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities in order to enhance its capability to achieve dominance in these new commanding heights of future warfare.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The People\u2019s Republic of China seeks to contest information dominance (\u5236\u4fe1\u606f\u6743) and discursive dominance (\u8bdd\u8bed\u6743) in cyberspace. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), cybersecurity is integral to comprehensive state security (\u56fd\u5bb6\u5b89\u5168). That\u2019s distinct from \u2018national\u2019 …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":772,"featured_media":37912,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,391,2138],"class_list":["post-37909","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-cyber","tag-cybersecurity"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina\u2019s quest for political control and military supremacy in the cyber domain | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-quest-political-control-military-supremacy-cyber-domain\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China\u2019s quest for political control and military supremacy in the cyber domain | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The People\u2019s Republic of China seeks to contest information dominance (\u5236\u4fe1\u606f\u6743) and discursive dominance (\u8bdd\u8bed\u6743) in cyberspace. 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