{"id":38042,"date":"2018-03-22T11:00:06","date_gmt":"2018-03-22T00:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=38042"},"modified":"2018-03-22T10:23:08","modified_gmt":"2018-03-21T23:23:08","slug":"al-qaeda-3-0-turning-face-near-enemy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/al-qaeda-3-0-turning-face-near-enemy\/","title":{"rendered":"Al-Qaeda 3.0: turning to face the near enemy"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

After the deaths of Osama bin Laden and several other leaders in 2011 and 2012, followed by the rise of Islamic State, many considered al-Qaeda \u2018a spent force\u2019. But in an important brief<\/a>, (with an expanded version<\/a> for the Lowy Institute), leading terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman argues that Ayman al-Zawahiri has used the past seven years to rebuild al-Qaeda. So while counterterrorism specialists have celebrated the rolling up of Islamic State\u2019s \u2018caliphate\u2019, al-Qaeda\u2019s resurgence shows that much work remains to be done.<\/p>\n

Zawahiri cut his teeth in Egypt\u2019s jihadi culture\u2014he was arrested at 15, joined the Muslim Brotherhood and later led Egyptian Islamic Jihad\u2014but he\u2019s no charismatic leader. Following the death of Osama bin Laden and the rise of the Islamic State, Zawahiri opted to focus on three key objectives.<\/p>\n

Survival<\/strong>: In 2011, al-Qaeda faced irrelevancy. It lacked an operational space and existed at the mercy of the Afghan Taliban. That may explain why Zawahiri swore<\/a> allegiance to Mullah Mansour, Mullah Omar\u2019s successor, in 2015. When Mansour was killed in a US drone attack and Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada became the new leader of the Taliban, Zawahiri pledged allegiance to him. That allowed Zawahiri to remain hidden somewhere along the Afghan\u2013Pakistan border.<\/p>\n

Reorientation<\/strong>: In the 1990s and 2000s, as al-Qaeda was asserting itself on the global stage as the premier Salafi\u2013jihadi terrorist group, its ideology and action inspired tremendous bloodletting, especially among Muslims. By the 2010s, Zawahiri recognised the limited value of that approach and reoriented the organisation away from mass casualty-terrorism, especially against Muslims.<\/p>\n

To highlight how attuned Zawahiri is to shifting perceptions, he clearly noted that by the late 2000s, pollsters were pointing out that public opinion, especially in Muslim-majority countries, had shifted against suicide bombing<\/a>. In Lebanon, for example, 74% of the population thought that such attacks could be justified in 2002; by 2007, that support had fallen to only 34%. At that time, WorldPublicOpinion.org noted that large majorities<\/a> in Egypt (88%), Indonesia (65%) and Morocco (66%) opposed attacks on civilians.<\/p>\n

Zawahiri\u2019s al-Qaeda even chastised Islamic State, accusing it of \u2018deviation and misguidance<\/a>\u2019 and saying that the group \u2018exceeded the limits of extremism<\/a>\u2019. That has meant that the prospect of another al-Qaeda\u2013inspired 9\/11 has decreased, as Zawahiri appreciates that such an attack is likely to harm his cause more than to help it.<\/p>\n

Rebuilding<\/strong>: Zawahiri has had to deal with an organisation that had been decimated<\/a>. It had lost leaders, key ideologues, strategic thinkers and fighters<\/a>. Al-Qaeda was also facing a major challenge from Islamic State and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who publicly rejected<\/a> Zawahiri\u2019s order to keep al-Qaeda\u2019s Jabhat al-Nusra affiliate separate from Islamic State.<\/p>\n

Because Zawahiri couldn\u2019t compel Islamic State\u2019s compliance, he opted to engage in a franchising program. A key aspect of the rebuilding was using secure communications to spread al-Qaeda\u2019s message. Secure communications have also allowed Zawahiri to reconstitute al-Qaeda\u2019s Shura Majlis<\/a> (advisory councils). This allows al-Qaeda to adopt a \u2018glocalist\u2019 strategy<\/a> that links local grievances to its globalist campaign.<\/p>\n

Zawahiri\u2019s careful three-prong strategy has enabled al-Qaeda to knit together \u2018a global movement of more than two dozen franchises<\/a>\u2019 through which it now commands around 20,000 men in Syria, 4,000 in Yemen, 7,000 in Somalia and 3,000 in Indonesia. These are all strategically important locations from which al-Qaeda can and will seek to advance its brand.<\/p>\n

Interestingly Zawahiri appears to have adapted the ideas of his arch-enemy, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam<\/a>, who argued that after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, it was time for the Arab Afghans (Arabs who had made the hijrah<\/em> (migration) to Afghanistan) to shift their attention to the near enemy<\/a>\u2014\u2018apostate\u2019 Muslim regimes and Israel. Zawahiri had argued that the mujahedeen should focus on the far enemy<\/a> (the US and the West in general), as it was Washington that was keeping the Arab leaders in power.<\/p>\n

Zawahiri\u2019s current strategy seems to indicate that al-Qaeda is moving away from its initial focus, the far enemy, and focussing instead on the near enemy, specifically Arab countries with fragile governments. There are many such governments across the Muslim and Arab World, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb.<\/p>\n

\u2018So where are you<\/a>,\u2019 Zawahiri asks his followers in his latest message. \u2018Where is your Islamic zeal? Where is your eagerness? Where is your settlement of your duties for the inheritance of your fathers?\u2019<\/p>\n

Hoffman has provided a powerful reminder that we can\u2019t bask in the defeat of Islamic State. We must reorient our attention to al-Qaeda, which remains committed to freeing Muslim lands<\/a>, ending the suffering of Muslims at the hands of the infidels and restoring the Muslim umma<\/em> (nation) to its old glory.<\/p>\n

In recognising that al-Qaeda remains a potent force, counterterrorism policymakers face several challenges, such as how to disrupt its operations through activities such as limiting its use of encrypted messaging, which terrorists seem to increasingly rely on, without undermining basic rights.<\/p>\n

An additional challenge is addressing low-intensity conflicts, civil wars and flagrant abuses such as those ones inflicted on the Rohingya, the Cham and others, which feeds the Salafi\u2013jihadi narrative of the West\u2019s moral relativism. There\u2019s evidence that both Islamic State<\/a> and al-Qaeda<\/a> are using the Rohingya as a rallying cry.<\/p>\n

Clearly, the demise of the caliphate has been a huge boost to the counterterrorism world, but Hoffman\u2019s briefs are a timely reminder that we ignore al-Qaeda at our peril.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

After the deaths of Osama bin Laden and several other leaders in 2011 and 2012, followed by the rise of Islamic State, many considered al-Qaeda \u2018a spent force\u2019. 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