{"id":38116,"date":"2018-04-09T12:37:31","date_gmt":"2018-04-09T02:37:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=38116"},"modified":"2019-01-15T15:23:36","modified_gmt":"2019-01-15T04:23:36","slug":"closer-faster-harder-australias-strategic-geography","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/closer-faster-harder-australias-strategic-geography\/","title":{"rendered":"Closer, faster, harder\u2014Australia\u2019s strategic geography"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

The need for Australia to have a navy (indeed an integrated defence force) to protect its supply routes, set out so directly in John Saunders\u2019 excellent article<\/a>, is worth examining as part of a broader discussion about the nation\u2019s changing strategic circumstances.<\/p>\n

Australia\u2019s defence has long been based on two basic premises. The first is that we\u2019re a long way from anyone with the capability and intent to do us harm. The second is that we\u2019re closely allied to the world\u2019s predominant global maritime power. Those fundamentals underpin discussions about the growth of China\u2019s military power and global strategic weight, the US response and the implications for Australia\u2019s strategic position.<\/p>\n

Both Malcolm Davis and Stephan Fr\u00fchling have offered compelling analyses of the potential consequences for Australia\u2019s nuclear weapons policy and the US doctrine of extended deterrence. Both contend that China would need bases in the Indonesian archipelago to use \u2018overwhelming conventional forces<\/a> to invade Australia or to otherwise coerce us into submission\u2019 or \u2018to threaten Australia<\/a>, at least in a sustained and substantial way\u2019.<\/p>\n

In many possible contingencies, this is a reasonable premise on which to base a defence force. However, as Saunders\u2019 article demonstrates, there are also contingencies in which the traditional \u2018fortress Australia\u2019 approach would no longer work. It remains necessary, but is in no way sufficient.<\/p>\n

Modern global trading and communications systems mean that Australia has vulnerabilities that are located well north of the archipelago. We need to consider if force could be used against those in a way that could coerce or threaten Australia without the need to directly attack our territory.<\/p>\n

Uniquely and easily identifiable Australian interests\u2014particularly shipping and communications\u2014are located far beyond the archipelago to our north. Or they\u2019re accessible via physical supply chains or cyber means from locations well beyond the archipelago. In many cases our neighbours, friends and allies share similar concerns, but in others their worries are quite different or don\u2019t have the same level of importance. The relatively small number of finger\u2011width submarine cables<\/a> connecting Australia is one example.<\/p>\n

Shipping is another. Ocean passages of the world <\/em>shows the routes most commercial shipping uses. Port websites such as Yokohama<\/a> or Melbourne<\/a> and shipping apps<\/a> using automatic identification system information provide even more detailed, accurate and near real-time information about our national economic arteries. An aggressor wouldn\u2019t have to come south of the archipelago to target them.<\/p>\n

Australia\u2019s commitment to global trade means that disruptions to the trading system have significant effects on us. In some cases we\u2019re very sensitive to even short disruptions. Australia\u2019s dependence on petroleum imports is well known. In 2016\u201317, Australia had stocks of unleaded, diesel and aviation turbine fuel<\/a> to meet demand for 23, 17 and 20 days.<\/p>\n

Given our dependence on global communications, finance and trade, conventional forces could put enormous pressure on Australia from great distances beyond the archipelago. The effects could be rapid, targeted, scalable and sustained over weeks and months. Such pressure might not engage the interests of other nations sufficiently for Australia to be able to depend on their assistance.<\/p>\n

Put simply, we are much closer<\/em> to the rest of the world (both in a physical sense and in cyberspace), and disruption to our connections would affect us faster<\/em> and harder<\/em> than in the past.<\/p>\n

Direct assault on a fortress was and is never a first preference. Siege tactics of various types\u2014bypassing, isolating, island-hopping\u2014are preferable. So while we must be prepared to defend the Australian fortress, we must also understand the vulnerabilities that could lead to the fortress submitting without direct assault.<\/p>\n

This isn\u2019t to suggest that Australia\u2019s alliance with the United States is diminished in any way. If anything, I believe the contrary. But it does mean that the traditional first premise of Australian defence strategy\u2014that we are a long way away\u2014is no longer true in many circumstances.<\/p>\n

This has implications for the way in which we conduct our diplomacy in the region, and in the way that we structure the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The basic approach is emerging\u2014an integrated defence force across sea, land, air, cyber, space and industry. But many of the cultural, doctrinal and familiar approaches will need to evolve if the ADF is to be as effective as necessary.<\/p>\n

It might be that our cyber capabilities will need to feature much more prominently. Or that our land forces will need to be far more comfortable operating at and from the sea. Or that our submarines will have to be more closely integrated into other Defence elements to achieve greater effects at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Or that we need to revisit the discussion about fixed-wing aircraft at sea, perhaps as part of what Richard Menhinick suggests should be a larger, more potent maritime force<\/a>.<\/p>\n

More likely still, we will need to do all of these things and more. We must challenge ourselves to avoid the pre\u2013World War I malaise of Great Britain\u2019s military leaders described by Max Beloff<\/a>:<\/p>\n

But their service training had not inculcated that rare kind of imagination which enables men to plan not just for the exploitation of the existing state of their art but for its future developments also \u2026 It was then neither intelligence nor character that failed Britain, but imagination, the ability to see facts afresh without professional blinkers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In an assessment of military effectiveness, Paul Kennedy concluded that if an organisation\u2014or country\u2014shrinks from encouraging imagination<\/a>, \u2018it is unlikely to maintain its military effectiveness for long, or even to be very effective in the first place\u2019.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The need for Australia to have a navy (indeed an integrated defence force) to protect its supply routes, set out so directly in John Saunders\u2019 excellent article, is worth examining as part of a broader …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":351,"featured_media":38117,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1114,114],"class_list":["post-38116","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-defence","tag-ran"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nCloser, faster, harder\u2014Australia\u2019s strategic geography | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/closer-faster-harder-australias-strategic-geography\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" 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