{"id":38839,"date":"2018-04-25T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2018-04-25T02:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=38839"},"modified":"2018-04-26T06:16:27","modified_gmt":"2018-04-25T20:16:27","slug":"last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/","title":{"rendered":"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918"},"content":{"rendered":"<figure><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"639\" height=\"407\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-38840 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg 639w, https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored-205x131.jpg 205w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 639px) 100vw, 639px\" \/><\/figure>\n<p>23 April 2018 marks the centenary of the British raid on the German held ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Belgian coast. This daring assault was only partially successful in its attempt to block the ports and prevent their use by U-boats. It was marked nevertheless by extraordinary gallantry and Australian sailors were among those decorated for their courage.<\/p>\n<p>But another, perhaps more significant operation was unfolding further north on the same day. The Imperial German Navy was under pressure. The U-Boat offensive was failing. Their losses remained low, but the average tonnage sunk had declined. The new convoy system was proving a significant challenge. The German army\u2019s high command had lost faith in the U-Boats\u2019 ability to win the war but, with its own \u2018last throw\u2019 offensive on the Western Front in progress, it appealed for a special effort against ships carrying Allied reinforcements.<\/p>\n<p>This was easier said than done, but the High Sea Fleet\u2019s commander, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, believed he could strike a heavy blow another way. Convoys to Scandinavia had already proved vulnerable to raiding German forces. The British had strengthened the escort but also enlarged the convoys, and thus their attractiveness as targets.<\/p>\n<p>The plan was for battle cruisers under Admiral Franz von Hipper to lead an attack. If von Hipper were unable to brush aside the squadron of the Grand Fleet\u2019s capital ships covering the convoy, he could call on the entire High Sea Fleet, which would follow him into the North Sea. This was a welcome change for Germany\u2019s battle fleet, which had spent most of the previous 18\u00a0months in a defensive role, protecting the minesweepers that maintained the U-boats\u2019 access to the open sea.<\/p>\n<p>The raiding forces sailed early on 23\u00a0April 1918. The Germans had at last stopped using radio to pass preparatory messages and their communications security was excellent, helped by new call signs and a change in the cipher key on 21\u00a0April, which the British didn\u2019t break for three days. Five British submarines were in the Heligoland Bight and one, <em>J6<\/em>, sighted the Germans. Unfortunately, its captain decided that the ships were forces covering a British minelaying operation and took no action.<\/p>\n<p>The Germans\u2019 own intelligence was poor. Their sortie coincided with a gap in the convoy schedule. Ironically, the covering force that returned to Rosyth on 24\u00a0April was one of the most vulnerable of any element of the Royal Navy\u2019s Grand Fleet, the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron, comprising the four oldest of the type, led by HMAS <em>Australia<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>The German battle cruisers also had to do their own reconnaissance. Zeppelins were launched but recalled because of rising winds. This forced von Hipper to proceed nearly 60\u00a0degrees north, further than the High Sea Fleet had been since July 1914.<\/p>\n<p>German progress was slowed by breakdowns and poor coal. Worse followed. The battle cruiser <em>Moltke<\/em>\u2019s inner starboard propeller shaft snapped due to the failure of an old repair. The shaft and propeller broke off. The turbine shattered and debris penetrated pipes and machinery. <em>Moltke <\/em>rapidly took in 1,600\u00a0tons of water. Von Hipper was alarmed to receive the crippled ship\u2019s signal at 0543 on 24\u00a0April that it was restricted to four knots. This breach of radio silence was justifiable with the ship at risk of being helpless in the open sea.<\/p>\n<p><em>Moltke\u2019s <\/em>signal was picked up by the British. The text was not immediately decrypted, but the intelligence centre\u2014\u2018Room 40\u2019\u2014identified the call sign. Unfortunately, the direction-finding fix on the transmission placed <em>Moltke<\/em> inland in Norway, causing doubts over its credibility. Finally, Room 40 decrypted a signal reporting German analysis that the British were unaware of German forces at sea. The inference was clear. The Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet out at 1047. Despite the Firth of Forth being enveloped in thick fog, the entire fleet departed in less than three hours.<\/p>\n<p>The High Sea Fleet didn\u2019t linger. There was eventually no doubt that the intelligence was mistaken. After sighting the Norwegian coast, the German battle cruisers turned for home. The <em>Moltke <\/em>had been taken in tow while its engineers made repairs. By 1600, the battle cruiser\u2019s portside shafts were turning. The Germans could be reasonably confident they had a clear run to the Heligoland Bight.<\/p>\n<p>The geometry was probably obvious to the British. The Grand Fleet couldn\u2019t get across the North Sea in time to intercept the Germans once the latter turned south. That they had done so was made clear by an Admiralty signal at 1625, which gave the position of the German flagship steering a course SSE. Room 40 decrypted a signal from <em>U19<\/em> that reported \u201811\u00a0old enemy cruisers\u2019 in a position that matched that of the High Sea Fleet.<\/p>\n<p><em>J6<\/em> was not the only muddled submarine on patrol, although the U-Boats had the benefit of warning by \u2018catchword\u2019 signals that their fleet would be at sea\u2014a clue Room 40 had missed. The Grand Fleet continued, but the High Sea Fleet was well ahead, helped by perfect weather that allowed <em>Moltke <\/em>to maintain speed until it cast off the tow at 1640. This was timely as the fleet was approaching the Bight, trammelled by minefields and submarines. The minesweeper <em>M67<\/em> had already hit a mine and sunk.<\/p>\n<p><em>J6 <\/em>did no better a job on the High Sea Fleet\u2019s return. After observing the German fleet, it surfaced and reported the sighting. However, giving priority to reporting was intended for outward contacts: <em>J6<\/em> should have attacked. The British had a last chance with the submarine <em>E42<\/em>, fortunate to spot smoke in the late afternoon of 25\u00a0April. A dash south-east brought <em>E42 <\/em>in contact with <em>Moltke\u2019s <\/em>formation. The submarine fired four torpedoes at a range of over 2,000\u00a0yards and was rewarded by a single explosion.<\/p>\n<p><em>Moltke <\/em>had spotted a torpedo and turned to avoid, but was hit abreast its port engine room at 1838. More than 1,700\u00a0tons of water flooded in, threatening <em>Moltke\u2019s <\/em>ability to move. <em>E42 <\/em>was hunted, but remained unscathed. Hard work by the engineers meant that <em>Moltke<\/em> never lost steaming power and was safe at anchor next morning, but it wasn\u2019t fully operational again until mid-September.<\/p>\n<p>The Grand Fleet returned to harbour. The incident confirmed misgivings over the requirement to protect the convoys with a detachment of heavy ships, while the signals intelligence system could certainly have done better. Confirmation that Room 40 couldn\u2019t be relied upon to provide warning every time heightened concerns, but perhaps the greatest failure lay in the poor assessments by <em>J6<\/em>\u2019s captain.<\/p>\n<p>The RAN battle cruiser <em>Australia<\/em>\u2019s near-miss has been noted. Its loss defending a convoy in such circumstances might have had an interesting effect on Anglo\u2013Australian relations, already scarred by Gallipoli.<\/p>\n<p>A might-have-been more often suggested is that the US Navy formation, the Sixth Battle Squadron, had also covered earlier convoys. Destruction of the American force, when thus isolated from the Grand Fleet, would certainly have been a disaster for the Anglo\u2013American relationship. Von Hipper\u2019s battle cruisers, however, would have found the powerful American dreadnoughts a hard nut to crack, even if the German problems with coal and machinery didn\u2019t negate their theoretical speed advantage.<\/p>\n<p><em>Australia<\/em> and its squadron mates certainly would have been fast enough to stay clear. Acutely aware of the risk of defeat in detail, the British or American admirals would have had to make unlikely errors to become entangled with the German main body. Scheer had already taken his fleet further away from its bases than it had been since July 1914. He would have had little appetite for a chase that risked a Grand Fleet getting between his ships and Germany.<\/p>\n<p>The High Sea Fleet\u2019s sortie was the last it would make before the armistice in November\u00a01918. Poorly planned, the material problems showed just how seriously shortages of metals and skilled labour were affecting the fleet. Historians have long pondered why the German fleet did so little in the later years of the Great War. At least part of that inactivity may have been because it was becoming unfit to conduct sustained operations.<\/p>\n<p>Between the blockade, finally fully effective once the United States had entered the war in 1917, the inefficiencies of the German federal system and the competing demands of other elements of Germany\u2019s war machine, the High Sea Fleet was falling apart.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>23 April 2018 marks the centenary of the British raid on the German held ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Belgian coast. This daring assault was only partially successful in its attempt to block &#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":76,"featured_media":38840,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1267],"tags":[678],"class_list":["post-38839","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-australia-and-the-great-war","tag-world-war-i"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v19.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918 | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918 | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"23 April 2018 marks the centenary of the British raid on the German held ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Belgian coast. This daring assault was only partially successful in its attempt to block ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2018-04-25T02:00:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-04-25T20:16:27+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"639\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"407\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"James Goldrick\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"James Goldrick\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"7 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI&#039;s analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg\",\"width\":639,\"height\":407},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/\",\"name\":\"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918 | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2018-04-25T02:00:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-04-25T20:16:27+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a9ee56242a6eb913591d14a06b13f9be\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a9ee56242a6eb913591d14a06b13f9be\",\"name\":\"James Goldrick\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/009826d42ec0f0972bfc27d573118e26?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/009826d42ec0f0972bfc27d573118e26?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"James Goldrick\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/james-goldrick\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918 | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918 | The Strategist","og_description":"23 April 2018 marks the centenary of the British raid on the German held ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Belgian coast. This daring assault was only partially successful in its attempt to block ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2018-04-25T02:00:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-04-25T20:16:27+00:00","og_image":[{"width":639,"height":407,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"James Goldrick","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"James Goldrick","Est. reading time":"7 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI&#039;s analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/640px-First_and_second_battleship_squadrons_and_small_cruiser_of_the_-_NARA_-_533188-2_restored.jpg","width":639,"height":407},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/","name":"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918 | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2018-04-25T02:00:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-04-25T20:16:27+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a9ee56242a6eb913591d14a06b13f9be"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/last-sortie-german-high-sea-fleet-april-1918\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The last sortie of the German High Sea Fleet\u2014April 1918"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a9ee56242a6eb913591d14a06b13f9be","name":"James Goldrick","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/009826d42ec0f0972bfc27d573118e26?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/009826d42ec0f0972bfc27d573118e26?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"James Goldrick"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/james-goldrick\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38839"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/76"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=38839"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38839\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":38843,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38839\/revisions\/38843"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/38840"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=38839"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=38839"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=38839"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}