{"id":39430,"date":"2018-05-21T11:00:08","date_gmt":"2018-05-21T01:00:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=39430"},"modified":"2018-05-21T11:06:40","modified_gmt":"2018-05-21T01:06:40","slug":"chinas-strategic-strait-in-the-south-china-sea-part-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-strategic-strait-in-the-south-china-sea-part-1\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s strategic strait in the South China Sea (part\u00a01)"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

In a highly provocative move, China has deployed anti\u2011ship cruise missiles<\/a> (ASCMs), as well as surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, to three disputed territories\u2014Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef\u2014in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n

The deployment extends China\u2019s military capability within the South China Sea and can be seen as another challenge to the findings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration<\/a>. The Chinese actions also make a mockery of Xi\u00a0Jinping\u2019s promises<\/a> not to militarise the South China Sea, and reinforce doubts about Chinese declarations that it doesn\u2019t seek to become a hegemonic power.<\/p>\n

The deployed ASCM system is the\u00a0YJ\u201112B<\/a>, one of China\u2019s most advanced anti-ship missile systems. With a 545\u2011kilometre range<\/a>, it flies at Mach\u00a03 and can manoeuvre to evade anti\u2011ship missile defence systems. Its range and speed combination makes it very difficult to intercept and deadly to modern naval surface combatants. It\u2019s this type of ASCM that has driven US development of cooperative engagement capability (CEC<\/a>), alongside allies including Australia.<\/p>\n

CEC was most recently tested<\/a> on HMAS Hobart<\/em> and NuShip Brisbane<\/em>. CEC combines data from sensors on several vessels to create a common operating picture that allows Navy surface combatants to more effectively counter such high-speed, long-range missiles. It also forms an integral part of the broader US Navy concept<\/a> of Navy Integrated Fire Control\u2014Counter Air (NIFC-CA<\/a>), with Australia emulating this concept by integrating the E\u20117 Wedgetail and the AIR\u00a06500 Integrated Air and Missile Defence into the mix.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s deployment of such missiles, together with its long-range HQ\u20119B\u00a0SAMs, to South China Sea bases enhances its ability to defend these bases. The HQ\u20119B<\/a> is considered roughly equivalent to the Russian SA\u201120\u00a0SAM, and is a highly effective air defence system, including against cruise missiles.<\/p>\n

Together, these systems extend China\u2019s anti\u2011access and area denial bubble deep into the South China Sea, giving China overlapping<\/a> coverage of the Spratly Islands with the YJ\u201112B\u00a0ASCMs, and broad<\/a> coverage over the Spratlys with its long-range SAMs.<\/p>\n

The latest missile deployments don\u2019t mark the end of China\u2019s militarisation of the South China Sea. One possible future development could include steps to establish military facilities on the disputed Scarborough Shoal. China\u2019s coast guard already controls the seas around the shoal, and China has asserted<\/a> the right to establish an \u2018environmental monitoring station\u2019<\/a> on it.<\/p>\n

Any future militarisation of the shoal, similar to what has occurred on Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross reefs, would increase China\u2019s ability to isolate Taiwan with a distant blockade without placing its naval surface combatants at risk close to Taiwanese territory. It would also place Chinese military forces a mere 350\u00a0kilometres from Manila.<\/p>\n

For the moment, China appears in no hurry to extend its reach to the Philippines-owned Scarborough Shoal. President Rodrigo Duterte is playing a useful role for Beijing by accepting<\/a> Chinese control of the fishing grounds around the shoal and arguing that China\u2019s missile deployments \u2018protect the Philippines\u2019.<\/p>\n

Duterte seems ready to accept<\/a> Chinese claims in return for Chinese economic investment. However, Duterte\u2019s term of office is up in\u00a02022, and China could act more aggressively if his successor is not so compliant.<\/p>\n

Secondly, it\u2019s likely that China will deploy<\/a> air combat capabilities onto established bases<\/a>. China has already begun deployments<\/a> of H\u20116K bombers into the Paracels. Flying such aircraft from bases<\/a> in the Spratlys<\/a> would bring northern Australia into missile range. If accompanied by deployment of fighters into these bases, China could enforce any declaration<\/a> of an air defence identification zone<\/a> (ADIZ) over part or all of the South China Sea, and ensure local air superiority over the entirety of the sea.<\/p>\n

At the strategic level, China\u2019s creeping militarisation of the South China Sea gives it greater ability to control this vital waterway, potentially transforming it into what Richard Bitzinger refers<\/a> to as a strategic strait<\/a> that it would seek to control. This is occurring as Chinese academics are now promoting the idea of replacing the nine-dash line with a continuous boundary<\/a> as part of a new \u2018Four Sha\u2019 doctrine.<\/p>\n

That doctrine is changing how China views territorial disputes, moving from treating disputed islands as individual claims to regarding them as an integrated archipelagic body, with continuous baselines and their own exclusive economic zones. That would represent a new ambit claim that further contradicts the findings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. A continuous boundary would expand<\/a> China\u2019s territorial claims effectively over the entirety of the South China Sea.<\/p>\n

In a military context, the most recent missile deployments make it riskier<\/a> for the US\u00a0Navy to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). Australia doesn\u2019t do FONOPs, but does exercise its freedom of navigation rights via Operation Gateway, both in the air with RAAF P\u20118\u00a0Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and on the high seas with naval deployments.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s missile deployments increase the potential<\/a> that any future incident\u2014whether it be with the\u00a0US or its allies, including Australia\u2014could turn into a serious military clash. China specialist Andrew Erickson highlighted these concerns in Congressional testimony<\/a> in\u00a02015:<\/p>\n

China is poised to \u2018outstick\u2019 the US\u00a0Navy by\u00a02020 by deploying greater quantities of missiles with greater ranges than those of the US\u00a0ship\u2011based systems able to defend against them.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Even with the deployment of these missiles, there\u2019s no suggestion that the\u00a0US would cease exercising<\/a> its right under international law to maintain freedom of navigation of the seas, and of the airspace above it. Yet China\u2019s forward deployment of missile forces into the Spratly Islands does make such operations riskier, and increases the chance of escalation and tension.<\/p>\n

In part\u00a02 of this post, I\u2019ll consider the likely US\u00a0and allied military responses to China\u2019 actions, and how Chinese control of the South China Sea directly affects Australia\u2019s security.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In a highly provocative move, China has deployed anti\u2011ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, to three disputed territories\u2014Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef\u2014in the South China Sea. The …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":147,"featured_media":39431,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,471],"class_list":["post-39430","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina\u2019s strategic strait in the South China Sea (part\u00a01) | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-strategic-strait-in-the-south-china-sea-part-1\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China\u2019s strategic strait in the South China Sea (part\u00a01) | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In a highly provocative move, China has deployed anti\u2011ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, to three disputed territories\u2014Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef\u2014in the South China Sea. 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