{"id":40116,"date":"2018-06-22T06:00:42","date_gmt":"2018-06-21T20:00:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=40116"},"modified":"2020-11-19T13:19:01","modified_gmt":"2020-11-19T02:19:01","slug":"what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/","title":{"rendered":"What does the special forces controversy tell us about strategy and force structure?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Australia\u2019s special forces have been in the news due to allegations ranging from poor culture to potential war crimes, including arbitrary executions. These allegations have led to a number of Defence-initiated reviews and investigations.<\/p>\n

Much of the commentary has focused on individuals. And it\u2019s a little dispiriting that Brendan Nelson, the director of the Australian War Memorial, wants to see the inquiries wrapped up<\/a> as soon as possible, rather than insisting that we do whatever is necessary to reveal what actually happened. But Nelson did usefully invite us<\/a> to examine not just the special forces but our national leadership: \u2018If anyone bears responsibility, let it be the political class, including me, who sent them and the military leadership tasked with adherence to the truths by which they live.\u2019<\/p>\n

So let\u2019s elevate our focus to look at the decisions of our political and military leaders who sent the special forces to Afghanistan and kept them there, and what they could learn.<\/p>\n

Generally, Australia applies military force as a measure of last resort to achieve national goals. Use of force is part of a strategy. Strategy can be broken down into the classic triumvirate of ends, ways, and means: we want to achieve a goal, we plan how we are going to achieve it, and we apply resources to implement the plan. When those three align, the strategy can succeed. When they don\u2019t, we have a situation like Vietnam and potentially now Afghanistan.<\/p>\n

After more than 16 years of involvement and $8.3 billion spent, we\u2019re entitled to ask, What exactly was Australia\u2019s strategy in Afghanistan? And were special forces used appropriately? And what is the way forward?<\/p>\n

The ends seem to have been a combination of supporting the alliance with the United States (Prime Minister John Howard invoked ANZUS in the wake of the 9\/11 attacks) and defeating terrorism.<\/p>\n

Over time, our ways have meandered along with the broader coalition\u2019s, from directly overthrowing the Taliban, to nation-building, then explicitly not nation-building, along with swings between counterterrorism (kill the Taliban) to counterinsurgency (win over the people).<\/p>\n

Despite the wavering about ways, throughout Australia\u2019s involvement in Afghanistan the means have involved the special forces. But with such an unfocused strategy, how do we assess progress? And importantly, how do troops on the ground see progress and, consequently, meaning in their contribution? If the allegations are proved, it wouldn\u2019t be the first time that kill counts became for some the measure of success, in the absence of any other way to assess it.<\/p>\n

But if the ways and means have become the ends in themselves (we are there in order to be there), there\u2019s no inherent necessity to send special forces. And certainly no need to send special forces on continual rotations. Without pre-empting the outcomes of reviews and inquiries, it does seem that one of the factors at work may well have been the constant rotations that individual special forces members were put through\u2014with some going through five, six or more deployments.<\/p>\n

Repeated rotations were combined with the Special Air Service Regiment being increasingly used for direct action\u2014conducting raids to kill and capture enemies\u2014rather than their traditional covert surveillance role<\/a>. It\u2019s perhaps not surprising that, for a small number, killing became the new normal. Throughout military history, small-unit culture has trumped institutional or national culture. So, again, it\u2019s not surprising if some elements of the special forces\u2014under the influence of charismatic leaders who were particularly good at killing and had obtained status from successful and repeated deployments\u2014behaved badly.<\/p>\n

And even for those special forces soldiers who continued to act appropriately (by all accounts the vast majority, including those who raised concerns about the behaviour of some of their colleagues), such frequent rotations impose a high personal cost, potentially on their mental health and on their families. As my colleague Brendan Nicholson has noted<\/a>, it can be easier for governments to deploy the special forces rather than conventional units, particularly because it\u2019s in the nature of special forces to always say they can do the job. But deploying the special forces is not without personal and institutional costs.<\/p>\n

So what are the lessons for our political and military leaders? The main one is that the government should always articulate a clear strategy for military action, including in Afghanistan, outlining the ends, ways and means. And if the ultimate end of that strategy is to secure the support of our great and powerful ally when we need it, so be it. Australians and our servicemen and -women deserve that statement because it helps give meaning to their contributions.<\/p>\n

An additional reason may well be to reduce the ability of terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base for launching international attacks (although that\u2019s a strange primary reason, given that terrorists who want to launch such attacks have numerous other sanctuaries they could use).<\/p>\n

If these rationales are the goals of the strategy, there\u2019s no inherent need for the means to always be special forces deployed on continual rotations doing direct-action operations. Why dissipate one of Australia\u2019s most potent military capabilities on something that\u2019s not the very highest priority, or that could be done by a broader set of units across the wider army? Why not share the burden more equitably?<\/p>\n

But if it does indeed have to be special forces, then some hard thinking about force structure is required. If anything, the continual use of special forces in Afghanistan has exposed the fundamental incoherence between our thinking and doing. We essentially structure our forces for the worst case (the defence of Australia) and invest heavily in ships, submarines and aircraft. But on actual operations the government largely deploys the army, and its special forces in particular, to far-off places in causes that are not directly related to the defence of Australia. Special forces fall into that category of high-value, low-density capabilities\u2014they are powerful, but we don\u2019t have many of them. That usually means they should be employed sparingly, with an eye to not dissipating their capability by overuse.<\/p>\n

So, if long-term, sustained high-operational-tempo deployments are what the government actually wants its special forces to do, it probably needs to direct Defence to structure appropriately. Whether that means establishing more special forces beyond the two regiments\u2014which could be challenging with a small army in a small population\u2014or deciding that with appropriate enhancements in training and equipment the army\u2019s infantry, among the world\u2019s best trained and equipped, can take over some of the roles that the special forces are conducting, is for the experts to answer.<\/p>\n

If Defence cannot develop the appropriate force structure, its leaders should have the courage to tell government that cycling some of our most talented and motivated people through an endless series of deployments, with no clear goal beyond continuing to do them, cannot be sustained.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s clear that that policy exacts a cost that is borne disproportionately.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Australia\u2019s special forces have been in the news due to allegations ranging from poor culture to potential war crimes, including arbitrary executions. These allegations have led to a number of Defence-initiated reviews and investigations. 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Much ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2018-06-21T20:00:42+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2020-11-19T02:19:01+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/06\/20100226adf8537195_0011.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"656\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Marcus Hellyer\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Marcus Hellyer\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"6 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/06\/20100226adf8537195_0011.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/06\/20100226adf8537195_0011.jpg\",\"width\":1000,\"height\":656,\"caption\":\"Caption: An Australian soldier with the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) in southern Afghanistan takes a moment to reflect before heading out on another mission to underwrite future prosperity and stability for the people of Afghanistan. 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Their Officer Commanding, a Major B, said the wide variety of skill sets and experience that came with a deployment of Army Reservists proved to be a key enabler in fulfilling their mission. \u0093I think on this particular tour, focusing on PCO, even though we\u0092re special forces there\u0092s no doubt that having reservists there we\u0092ve got a broader experience of life in general that\u0092s certainly value added to this particular SOTG rotation,\u0094 Major B said.\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/\",\"name\":\"What does the special forces controversy tell us about strategy and force structure? | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2018-06-21T20:00:42+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2020-11-19T02:19:01+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/87e4e7561c0d7071411d7d635b9e32c1\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"What does the special forces controversy tell us about strategy and force structure?\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/87e4e7561c0d7071411d7d635b9e32c1\",\"name\":\"Marcus Hellyer\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ab3d49a0ff8e79106b3af65880612804?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ab3d49a0ff8e79106b3af65880612804?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Marcus Hellyer\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/marcus-hellyer\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"What does the special forces controversy tell us about strategy and force structure? | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-the-special-forces-controversy-tell-us-about-strategy-and-force-structure\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"What does the special forces controversy tell us about strategy and force structure? | The Strategist","og_description":"Australia\u2019s special forces have been in the news due to allegations ranging from poor culture to potential war crimes, including arbitrary executions. 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