{"id":40249,"date":"2018-06-28T06:00:13","date_gmt":"2018-06-27T20:00:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=40249"},"modified":"2018-06-27T20:18:30","modified_gmt":"2018-06-27T10:18:30","slug":"coping-with-the-beijing-freezer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/coping-with-the-beijing-freezer\/","title":{"rendered":"Coping with the Beijing freezer"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

In a 2017 poll conducted by the Chinese newspaper Global Times<\/a><\/em>, Australia had the dubious honour of being voted \u2018least friendly country to China\u2019. In the same Chinese Communist Party\u2013linked newspaper, a recent editorial<\/a> argued that a temporary cooling of China\u2013Australia bilateral relations would be \u2018a good lesson for Australia to learn\u2019, while declaring that there were \u2018no benefits for any country that chooses to take provocative measures against China\u2019.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s been much commentary on the Australia\u2013China relationship in the wake of the Australian government\u2019s introduction of foreign interference legislation and the sharpened political rhetoric of Australia\u2019s political leaders towards China\u2014and the chill that followed from Beijing. The punitive refusals of visas<\/a>, for instance, has even extended to the Australia-China Relations Institute, a \u2018think tank\u2019 headed by one of the most pro-Chinese voices in Australia, former foreign minister Bob Carr.<\/p>\n

But Australia isn\u2019t the only state that has found itself inside the \u2018Beijing freezer\u2019. China has long deployed a diplomatic carrot-and-stick approach, wherein states are rewarded when they engage in activities that are favourable to Beijing\u2019s interests and selectively punished for public criticism of the CCP\u2019s actions and intentions. Status recognition is an important factor in Chinese foreign policy, with any perceived slights resulting in strained relations\u2014as Australia and other countries are now learning.<\/p>\n

Norway provides an instructive example of the ways China can punish and gradually transform the behaviour of states, particularly middle and smaller powers. Beijing put the Sino-Norwegian relationship<\/a> in the deep freezer after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, which included a ban on Norway\u2019s lucrative salmon exports. Relations were deeply strained for six years despite the Norwegian Nobel Committee\u2019s independence from the Norwegian government.<\/p>\n

China demanded an apology but Norway repeatedly refused. The 2016 joint declaration that ended the stoush stopped short of an apology, but committed Oslo to acknowledging \u2018China\u2019s core interest and major concerns\u2019 and to \u2018do its best to avoid any future damage to the bilateral relations\u2019. The thaw in relations followed substantive efforts at confidence-building, and highlights how China also benefits from normalised trading relations with other states.<\/p>\n

More recently, China applied informal economic sanctions against South Korea<\/a> in retaliation for its deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. As a consequence, Hyundai\u2019s car sales in China dropped 64%<\/a>, Lotte supermarket sales fell 95%, and the banning of Chinese tour groups to South Korea resulted in an estimated revenue loss of US$15.6 billion in 2017. While trade overall increased between the two states, pressure was selectively and skillfully deployed.<\/p>\n

South Korean President Moon Jae-in, himself sceptical of THAAD, presented China\u2019s President Xi Jinping with a \u2018three no\u2019s policy<\/a>\u2019 in response to the economic sanctions, promising no further deployment of THAAD, and no participation in US missile defence networks or a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan.<\/p>\n

More importantly, the retaliatory sanctions convinced the Moon administration that South Korea\u2019s economy was too dependent on Chinese customers and needed to protect its national interest by diversifying its diplomatic and economic profile. It has since initiated a \u2018New Southern policy\u2019 aimed at deepening relations with the member states of ASEAN and India.<\/p>\n

Singapore\u2019s relations with Beijing also soured after the island nation appeared to side with the US and other countries in opposing China\u2019s island-building and ongoing militarisation of the South China Sea. Singapore\u2019s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was excluded<\/a> from the 2017 Belt and Road Summit in Beijing, and was invited for a state visit only after agreeing to sign a formal memorandum of understanding on Belt and Road collaboration in April.<\/p>\n

So how can Australia and other middle powers in the region deal with Beijing\u2019s \u2018doghouse diplomacy\u2019? Should policymakers roll over and acquiesce to China\u2019s demands, or should they seek to cope with strained ties by pushing back or diversifying their economic relations?<\/p>\n

Like South Korea, Australia would benefit from a more diverse trading profile and deeper economic engagement with the ASEAN states and India. It\u2019s also in the collective interests of \u2018like-minded\u2019 states to form coalitions to manage their relations with Beijing, thereby preserving their independence and protecting their national interests.<\/p>\n

According to the Lowy Institute\u2019s Asia Power Index<\/a>, the combined GDP (PPP) of Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea and Australia is $20,087 trillion, compared with China\u2019s $21,780 trillion and America\u2019s $18,624 trillion. The annual military expenditure of these five middle powers is $204.1 billion (PPP), compared with China\u2019s $210 billion and America\u2019s $641 billion.<\/p>\n

Unilaterally, middle powers have little capacity to shape international systems, but this data suggests that in concert they could push back against a coercive rising power, particularly if they retain the support of the US, which remains a significant player in the region and a key economic partner to states such as Australia.<\/p>\n

The revived Trans-Pacific Partnership<\/a> is a great example of how regional and middle-power states can articulate and defend their collective interests in coalitions that exclude great powers, although it remains to be seen how effective it will be in the absence of the US.<\/p>\n

Australia needs to work more closely with other countries that are concerned by China\u2019s destabilising actions in our region to effectively resist China\u2019s retaliatory diplomacy while upholding international rules and norms. Beijing prefers to deal with states on a bilateral basis, allowing it to exert maximum economic and political leverage. By binding together, like-minded middle powers may be able to resist or blunt Beijing\u2019s bullying behaviour.<\/p>\n

But to do this, they will need to find a convergence of strategic and economic interests vis-\u00e0-vis China and a broad consensus about the rules, norms and institutional architecture that have supported regional peace and prosperity in the post\u2013World War II period. No state can afford to turn its back on Beijing, but they can decide the terms on which they are willing to engage with China.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In a 2017 poll conducted by the Chinese newspaper Global Times, Australia had the dubious honour of being voted \u2018least friendly country to China\u2019. In the same Chinese Communist Party\u2013linked newspaper, a recent editorial argued …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":820,"featured_media":40250,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[2212],"class_list":["post-40249","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia-china-relations"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nCoping with the Beijing freezer | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/coping-with-the-beijing-freezer\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Coping with the Beijing freezer | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In a 2017 poll conducted by the Chinese newspaper Global Times, Australia had the dubious honour of being voted \u2018least friendly country to China\u2019. 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