{"id":40474,"date":"2018-07-09T13:36:59","date_gmt":"2018-07-09T03:36:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=40474"},"modified":"2018-07-09T13:41:42","modified_gmt":"2018-07-09T03:41:42","slug":"useful-ambiguity-new-zealands-strategic-defence-policy-statement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/useful-ambiguity-new-zealands-strategic-defence-policy-statement\/","title":{"rendered":"Useful ambiguity? New Zealand\u2019s strategic defence policy statement"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

New Zealand\u2019s new coalition government has just launched its strategic defence policy statement<\/a>. The statement carries on many of the themes familiar from past defence policy papers while introducing a number of new priorities. In delivering those themes it makes for intriguing reading, shifting as it does from forthrightness to purposeful ambiguity.<\/p>\n

The 2018 statement strongly asserts that New Zealand has \u2018no better friend than Australia\u2019 and that it\u2019s \u2018committed to responding immediately should Australia be subject to armed attack\u2019. There\u2019s an express emphasis on the \u2018obligation\u2019 to support a rules-based order.<\/p>\n

However, some things are new. In place of discussions of \u2018traditional partners\u2019 or even \u2018US alliance partners\u2019, the statement specifically talks of partnership with the other parties to the UKUSA Agreement (known as the Five Eyes, which also includes the US, UK, Canada and Australia). This focus on the Five Eyes allows for some ambiguity when talking about New Zealand\u2019s relationship with the US. (Indeed, what direct mention there is of the US in the statement is cautious, noting the withdrawal of US support for a range of multilateral initiatives while still describing US \u2018support\u2019 for regional peace and security.)<\/p>\n

There\u2019s also a degree of ambiguity in the claim that \u2018world events dictate where the government may deploy the Defence Force at any given time\u2019. Beyond non-negotiables, such as the defence of New Zealand and support for Australia and the South Pacific, it\u2019s in this phrase that the government restates its right to discretion in making decisions to engage out of area. Interestingly, the statement asserts that partnerships\u00a0\u2018from the Five Eyes to NATO and the EU are vital to enabling the realisation of our interests, the promotion of our values and the safeguarding of our sovereignty\u2019 and that the Middle East is a \u2018critical theatre of operations\u2019. The strength of the language used (\u2018vital\u2019 and \u2018critical\u2019) could provide impetus for future engagements outside of traditional defence arenas and roles.<\/p>\n

The statement identifies a range of \u2018complex disrupters\u2019, in which climate change and space and cyber capabilities are placed alongside terrorism as threats to security. Defence roles vis-\u00e0-vis climate change focus on humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and are similarly limited in support of efforts to counter terrorism or criminal activities. Most notable is direct recognition that New Zealand\u2019s overall official capacity to engage in the space and cyber domains is underdeveloped. The statement constitutes a plea for the resourcing of new capabilities in those domains, though it seems to assume that this lies within the NZDF\u2019s remit, rather than in a new agency or pan-agency entity.<\/p>\n

The statement more explicitly notes whole-of-government relationships. There\u2019s also an express labelling of the \u2018Community\u2019 role played by the NZDF. This has long been evident in practice\u2014for example, in Defence\u2019s highly visible post-disaster roles\u2014but hasn\u2019t had the same visibility in policy. The focus on \u2018Community, Nation and World\u2019 also emphasises the vastness of the range of potential roles for the NZDF. The call for combat-capable forces, interoperable with a number of \u2018traditional and non-traditional\u2019 partners, and trained and ready to respond to a range of other events, constitutes a heady wish list that could be difficult to sustain.<\/p>\n

Unprecedentedly forthright language is also used to discuss China. There\u2019s mention that defence relations have been strengthened, and that China is \u2018deeply integrated into the rules-based order\u2019. But it\u2019s also noted that China \u2018holds views on human rights and freedom of information that stand in contrast to those that prevail in New Zealand\u2019 and \u2018has determined not to engage with an international tribunal ruling\u2019.<\/p>\n

Useful ambiguity returns, however, in mentions of the risk to open societies of disruption to their political systems through foreign meddling, as well as in mentions of concern about others\u2019 pursuit of spheres of influence. Indeed, this statement includes unprecedented mention of Russia, thereby (like the inclusion of the US under the broader rubric of the Five Eyes) providing a way to discuss concerns in a more generalised fashion.<\/p>\n

Ambiguity and forthrightness walk hand in hand in this document, making for very interesting reading. Most interesting perhaps is the emphasis on space and cyber capabilities, in no small part because they could sit well with the New Zealand public if increasing those domestic capabilities can deliver more of the \u2018independent foreign policy\u2019 that New Zealanders believe they already have.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

New Zealand\u2019s new coalition government has just launched its strategic defence policy statement. The statement carries on many of the themes familiar from past defence policy papers while introducing a number of new priorities. In …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":827,"featured_media":40476,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,73,369,99],"class_list":["post-40474","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-new-zealand","tag-nzdf","tag-south-pacific"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nUseful ambiguity? 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