{"id":4437,"date":"2013-03-12T13:20:49","date_gmt":"2013-03-12T03:20:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=4437"},"modified":"2013-03-13T07:58:09","modified_gmt":"2013-03-12T21:58:09","slug":"reader-response-maritime-incidents-at-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/reader-response-maritime-incidents-at-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"Reader response: maritime incidents at sea"},"content":{"rendered":"
Sam Bateman recently reminded us<\/a> that both in the South China Sea and East China Sea incidents involving patrol vessels, warships, military aircraft, fishing and research vessels of the littoral countries are now occurring more frequently. Such incidents, if they got out of hand, could lead to actual conflict.<\/p>\n Sam is right that we can\u2019t just sit pat: what\u2019s needed is to put in place some operational maritime confidence building measures for the East China Sea and the South China Sea.\u00a0Most importantly, as Sam points out, we need a common interpretation of navigational rights and freedoms in offshore zones and measures to prevent and mitigate the risks of an unfortunate incident between maritime forces.<\/p>\n I agree with Sam that\u00a0INCSEA came about in different circumstances: there was an increasing number of confrontations<\/a> as the Americans and Soviets \u2018tested\u2019 each other at sea and in the air. The provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on\u00a0military activities in the EEZ\u2019s of other countries are ambiguous. But the US argues that there are no provisions in UNCLOS prohibiting such activities. The US position is that those activities are within the meaning and the exercise of the freedoms of the sea, particularly the freedoms of navigation and over flight.<\/p>\n Many Asian\u00a0countries don\u2019t agree, and argue that states\u2019 activities intended for military purposes in their EEZs aren\u2019t \u2018peaceful\u2019 under UNCLOS, and so can\u2019t be undertaken. It\u2019s a fair bet that the US would argue that any proposed guidelines would\u00a0invite more\u00a0misunderstandings, and so lead to more confrontations.<\/p>\n Naturally any guidelines for preventing and managing incidents at sea would need to operate without prejudice to any sovereignty claims. States should be decreasing the frequency of patrols in disputed areas by both naval and coastguard ships. Countries should try and use non-naval vessels for law enforcement at sea, and give other countries notice when they\u2019re going to undertake maritime operations. Hot lines and information exchange should be put in place between regional navies and civil coastguards. Normal international law rules for preventing collisions at sea should apply.<\/p>\n Military exercises in the maritime zones of other countries shouldn\u2019t undertake weapons exercises using live ammunition. And foreign warships or aircraft intending to carry out military exercises or war games in the ocean zones of other countries should notify the coastal state, behind the scenes. Countries should accept responsibility for the actions of all their national vessels operating in disputed maritime areas. Agreeing to suitable guidelines will be difficult, but\u00a0isn\u2019t insurmountable. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)<\/a>, has many Pacific navies as members, and a focus on professional naval mastery.<\/p>\n A number of years ago, the WPNS developed a voluntary\u00a0Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES)<\/a>. It\u2019s based on international legal and navigation principles. CUES might serve as an unofficial\u00a0template for the navies in North Asia as well as the United States, who are all WPNS members.<\/p>\n