{"id":45229,"date":"2019-02-05T06:00:27","date_gmt":"2019-02-04T19:00:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=45229"},"modified":"2023-01-12T16:05:49","modified_gmt":"2023-01-12T05:05:49","slug":"chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait"},"content":{"rendered":"<figure><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-45231\" src=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"640\" height=\"361\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg 603w, https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15-205x116.jpg 205w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px\" \/><\/figure>\n<p>On 20\u00a0May 2018, the <em>People\u2019s Liberation Army Daily<\/em> reported that the People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the China Coast Guard (CCG) and local authorities had staged<a href=\"http:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/diplomacy-defence\/article\/2147154\/chinas-navy-and-coastguard-stage-first-joint-patrols\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> five days of joint patrols<\/a> for the first time in the Paracel Islands, which are under Chinese control but also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam.<\/p>\n<p>Less than two weeks later, the CCG blocked a <a href=\"https:\/\/udn.com\/news\/story\/7321\/3188198\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Taiwanese civil supply ship<\/a> supporting the Taiwanese military near Kinmen Island in the Taiwan Strait. And in October, the CCG unilaterally ceased its annual <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/en\/news\/3560713\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">maritime rescue drill<\/a> with Taiwan. These developments suggest that the CCG may have its sights set on controlling the Taiwan Strait.<\/p>\n<p>The CCG is beginning to solve training and personnel problems as it shifts to being the key force in China\u2019s joint maritime defence structure. Although China seems adept at rapid shipbuilding for the PLAN, it has faced several difficulties in building its paramilitary maritime force:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Most of the CCG\u2019s senior officers have been promoted or transferred to the central office, and it\u2019s short of experienced personnel in lower ranks.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Its training hasn\u2019t caught up with its current operational demands. Most personnel haven\u2019t been trained to operate<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/gb.oversea.cnki.net\/KCMS\/detail\/detail.aspx?filename=WUJI201709002&amp;dbcode=CJFD&amp;dbname=CJFDTEMP\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">larger CCG patrol vessels<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. Many lack basic skills due to a shortage of facilities (for example,<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cnki.com.cn\/Article\/CJFDTotal-GAGD201703007.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">only around 10%<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of training bases have swimming pools for crew members\u2019 training), and some officers haven\u2019t been taught to operate the latest communication systems.<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.360doc.com\/content\/18\/0223\/14\/30199806_731716320.shtml\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> reorganisation<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the five Chinese maritime agencies announced in 2013 is ongoing. Although the vessels from China Marine Surveillance and the China Fishery Administration have been integrated into the CCG, most are still using their original ship names and numbers. This exacerbates difficulties in conducting joint training and tasks and makes the CCG\u2019s integrated command, control and communication systems less efficient.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In March 2018, the CCG was transferred to the People\u2019s Armed Police (PAP), which was put under the direct command of the Central Military Commission.<\/p>\n<p>Reorganising the PAP and CCG is the most feasible way to tackle the CCG\u2019s training and personnel problems. It\u2019s possible that China transferred the CCG to the PAP to integrate and use common training facilities and education systems. The Central Military Commission\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thetrumpet.com\/18002-chinas-militarized-coast-guard-increases-chances-of-war\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">direct control of the CCG through the PAP<\/a> could also remove the dual command structure of the commission and the State Council. In short, with the exception of shipbuilding programs, China\u2019s reorganisation of the CCG implies that it will strengthen the CCG\u2019s capability in 2019.<\/p>\n<p>Together, these developments imply that the CCG aims to achieve full control of China\u2019s \u2018offshore\u2019 regions. The shift in Beijing\u2019s naval strategic focus from \u2018offshore water defence\u2019 (\u8fd1\u6d77\u9632\u79a6) to a combination of \u2018<a href=\"http:\/\/eng.mod.gov.cn\/Press\/2015-05\/26\/content_4586805_4.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">offshore water defence with open seas protection<\/a>\u2019 (\u8fd1\u6d77\u9632\u79a6\u3001\u9060\u6d77\u9632\u885b) suggests that the CCG will seek to enhance its capabilities for precise multidimensional, multifunctional and mobile operations. It has conducted regular patrols to protect Chinese submarine cables, and since 2013 has been legally permitted to conduct <a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinanews.com\/gn\/2014\/01-24\/5779786.shtml\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">aviation law enforcement<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>In June 2018, China released a new <a href=\"http:\/\/www.mod.gov.cn\/big5\/topnews\/2018-06\/22\/content_4817507.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">policy<\/a> that clearly defines the CCG\u2019s mission. And in December, Rear Admiral Wang Zhongcai was appointed <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sohu.com\/a\/280556724_726570\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">commander of the CCG<\/a>; his previous post was deputy chief of staff of the PLAN East Sea Fleet. The CCG could thus share the burden of safeguarding China\u2019s offshore regions with the PLAN, enabling the latter to focus on far-sea naval activities as well as near- and middle-sea anti-access\/area-denial operations.<\/p>\n<p>The possibility of the CCG expanding its task to the Taiwan Strait must not be ignored. The PLA\u2019s founding naval strategist Liu Huaqing\u2019s \u2018<a href=\"http:\/\/www.hprc.org.cn\/gsyj\/wjs\/dwgx\/201711\/P020171109519692376945.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">offshore defence<\/a>\u2019 focused not only on the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea and the East China Sea, but also on the waters around Taiwan. Along with building the \u2018party\u2013government\u2013military\u2013police\u2013civilian <a href=\"http:\/\/www.xinhuanet.com\/english\/2018-04\/23\/c_137131238.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">joint costal defence<\/a>\u2019 (\u9ee8\u653f\u8ecd\u8b66\u6c11\u806f\u5408\u6d77\u9632) and promoting \u2018civil\u2013military fusion\u2019 (\u8ecd\u6c11\u878d\u5408), China\u2019s maritime militia could greatly improve its ability to gather intelligence in peacetime and support the mobility necessary for conducting \u2018maritime people\u2019s war\u2019 (\u6d77\u4e0a\u4eba\u6c11\u6230\u722d) once the military\u2013police\u2013civilian C4ISR system is established.<\/p>\n<p>Such an evolution would clearly pose a threat to regional maritime security and potentially elevate tensions in the waters around Taiwan.<\/p>\n<p>The development of the CCG comes as China is placing increasing pressure on Taiwan. On 4\u00a0January 2019, ROC <a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2019\/01\/was-it-wise-for-tsai-ing-wen-to-reject-the-1992-consensus-publicly\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">President Tsai Ing-wen publicly rejected<\/a> PRC President Xi Jinping\u2019s proposal of reunification with Taiwan under the framework of \u2018one country, two systems\u2019. It\u2019s likely that Beijing\u2019s response will include putting increased pressure on Taipei by sending more aircraft and warships to surround Taiwan. China might also expand the CCG\u2019s patrol area and use maritime militia in those waters, which would challenge the law enforcement capability of Taiwan\u2019s coastguard, threaten Taiwan\u2019s ability to protect its fisheries, and undermine the Taiwanese public\u2019s faith in its administration to a level that could affect the 2020 presidential election.<\/p>\n<p>The CCG will be the main force escalating tensions in the South China and East China seas in the near future. In addition to boosting their naval operational capabilities, countries such as Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines should consider their potential responses to China\u2019s growing CCG capabilities. That should include promoting cooperation on maritime domain awareness and strengthening exchanges with the US Coast Guard.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s also important to pay attention to the development of the CCG, given the CCG\u2019s complementary role alongside the PLAN in controlling disputed reefs and rocks in the South China Sea. It will be most important to stress the South China and East China seas and the Taiwan Strait in the overall regional security assessment and give greater consideration to China\u2019s evolving joint coastal defence capability. Incorporating the CCG into possible scenarios for conflict in the Taiwan Strait should be a pressing issue for Taiwan, the US and their regional allies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On 20\u00a0May 2018, the People\u2019s Liberation Army Daily reported that the People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the China Coast Guard (CCG) and local authorities had staged five days of joint patrols for the first time &#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":647,"featured_media":45231,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,2401,3430,130,392,2400],"class_list":["post-45229","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-china-coast-guard","tag-maritime-militia","tag-naval-capabilities","tag-taiwan","tag-taiwan-strait"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v19.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"On 20\u00a0May 2018, the People\u2019s Liberation Army Daily reported that the People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the China Coast Guard (CCG) and local authorities had staged five days of joint patrols for the first time ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2019-02-04T19:00:27+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-01-12T05:05:49+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"603\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"340\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Eli Huang\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Eli Huang\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI&#039;s analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg\",\"width\":603,\"height\":340},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/\",\"name\":\"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2019-02-04T19:00:27+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-01-12T05:05:49+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1a39939491ad1ac2e98040acc54265d0\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1a39939491ad1ac2e98040acc54265d0\",\"name\":\"Eli Huang\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/5fca974b226a1509088453f295f7e0ab?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/5fca974b226a1509088453f295f7e0ab?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Eli Huang\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/eli-huang\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait | The Strategist","og_description":"On 20\u00a0May 2018, the People\u2019s Liberation Army Daily reported that the People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the China Coast Guard (CCG) and local authorities had staged five days of joint patrols for the first time ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2019-02-04T19:00:27+00:00","article_modified_time":"2023-01-12T05:05:49+00:00","og_image":[{"width":603,"height":340,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Eli Huang","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Eli Huang","Est. reading time":"5 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI&#039;s analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/Chinese_Coast_Guard_ship_during_DiREx-15.jpg","width":603,"height":340},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/","name":"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2019-02-04T19:00:27+00:00","dateModified":"2023-01-12T05:05:49+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1a39939491ad1ac2e98040acc54265d0"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-coastguard-fuelling-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"China\u2019s coastguard fuelling tensions in the Taiwan Strait"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1a39939491ad1ac2e98040acc54265d0","name":"Eli Huang","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/5fca974b226a1509088453f295f7e0ab?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/5fca974b226a1509088453f295f7e0ab?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Eli Huang"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/eli-huang\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45229"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/647"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=45229"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45229\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":45234,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45229\/revisions\/45234"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/45231"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=45229"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=45229"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=45229"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}