{"id":46342,"date":"2019-03-21T06:01:10","date_gmt":"2019-03-20T19:01:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=46342"},"modified":"2019-03-21T06:34:11","modified_gmt":"2019-03-20T19:34:11","slug":"where-next-for-jemaah-islamiyah","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/where-next-for-jemaah-islamiyah\/","title":{"rendered":"Where next for Jemaah Islamiyah?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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After the 2002 Bali bombings and despite a concerted Indonesian security clampdown, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) never completely disappeared. In 2009, it made a dramatic reappearance with the twin bombings of the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in Jakarta. Since then, the movement has been quietly rebuilding its base and spreading its network of links in the world\u2019s largest Islamic nation.<\/p>\n

As outlined in a new ASPI report<\/a>, Jemaah Islamiyah: An uncertain future<\/em>, released today, JI\u2019s persistence gives rise to one central question: what direction will the group\u2019s future operational trajectory take? It\u2019s possible to delineate two main scenarios.<\/p>\n

First, the group may focus its efforts on furthering the Islamic agenda in Indonesia through education and peaceful activities. Abu Rusdan, the former emir of JI who has acted as the group\u2019s public face for much of the past decade, has consistently stated that, while the group remains intact and wholly committed to establishing a Negara Islam (an Islamic state), that objective will now be pursued through dakwah<\/em> (preaching and religious outreach) rather than violence. Some leading commentators following JI\u2019s current trajectory accept that this very well could be JI\u2019s intent, arguing that it should be considered in the context of other militant Islamist organisations that have made the shift to nonviolent tactics, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.<\/p>\n

An alternative possibility is that JI never really eschewed the path of violence but merely made a tactical decision to desist from armed attacks to recoup the losses that it had suffered at the hands of the Indonesian police force\u2019s elite Densus 88 unit. This line of reasoning reflects the jihadist concept of i\u2019dad<\/em> and its emphasis on rebuilding in times of weakness to prepare for future Islamist assaults.<\/p>\n

Irrespective of whether JI adopts a violent or nonviolent path, all indications at this point are that the movement\u2019s principal geographical area of interest is Indonesia. The transnational notion of a pan-regional caliphate appears to have been an accident of history and a by-product of the Afghan civil war in the 1980s. That said, there remains a possibility that JI will seek to reconsolidate the southern Philippines as a logistical rear base to support the primary Islamist campaign in Indonesia.<\/p>\n

One wild card in this assessment is whether JI will be able to capitalise on the growing disarray of Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria and stalled momentum in Mindanao to reassert itself as the dominant and most credible jihadist movement in Southeast Asia. By virtually every indicator, IS\u2019s effort to establish a caliphate in the Middle East has failed. As of the beginning of 2019, the group retained control of less than 1% of the Syrian and Iraqi territory it held in 2014. At the same time, its effort to use local affiliates as a means of pushing into Mindanao has been checked thanks to the Philippine government\u2019s success in denying the group Marawi City as the crux for the emergence of a future Islamic province in East Asia. These setbacks have arguably cast doubt on the credibility of IS\u2019s formula for establishing jemaahs (Islamic communities), potentially opening the way for the JI model to once again assume centre stage in Indonesia.<\/p>\n

Another wild card is the question of whether JI will maintain an independent posture or seek to re-establish historical ties with al-Qaeda Central (AQC). Over the past several years, AQC has actively underwritten regional militant proxies to counter IS influence in areas it considers integral to the global jihadist campaign against the US and its Western\/secular allies. Working with JI to \u2018positively tilt\u2019 the world\u2019s largest Muslim nation would doubtless be viewed as consistent with this core mission. JI itself would presumably welcome such a partnership both as a way of boosting the credibility of its religious standing relative to other above-ground mass Islamic movements and as a means of stunting the expansion of IS-affiliated rebel groups in Mindanao.<\/p>\n

The reappearance of JI has major relevance for Australia given that Indonesia is a large and important strategic partner: any threats to the archipelagic state\u2019s stability must therefore occupy a central place in Canberra\u2019s foreign, defence and security calculations. At the same time, Australia has been directly caught in the cross-hairs of JI\u2019s past violent activities, with the Bali bombings remaining the largest single loss of life to a terrorist attack in the nation\u2019s history.<\/p>\n

Australia could do several things to help Indonesia deal with the re-emergent JI threat:<\/p>\n