{"id":47236,"date":"2019-05-01T06:00:13","date_gmt":"2019-04-30T20:00:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=47236"},"modified":"2019-04-30T18:10:47","modified_gmt":"2019-04-30T08:10:47","slug":"the-end-of-chimerica","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-end-of-chimerica\/","title":{"rendered":"The end of Chimerica"},"content":{"rendered":"
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On the morning of 4 October 2018, US Vice President Mike Pence was invited on to the stage at the Hudson Institute to deliver what many assumed would be a typical forward-leaning speech on China. Pence began by accusing China of \u2018employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence\u2019 at the expense of the US and its allies, before launching into more specific allegations of Chinese misbehaviour. Over the next 30 minutes, Pence gave a speech<\/a> that was later interpreted<\/a> by my fellow Hudson Institute colleague, Walter Russell Mead, as the announcing of \u2018Cold War II\u2019.<\/p>\n

Although the rhetoric was several notches tougher, Pence didn\u2019t go rogue. The tone and content are consistent with the 2017 national security strategy<\/a> and the 2018 national defence strategy<\/a> released by the Trump administration. Those two documents represent the considered view of the agencies and departments responsible for American security and intelligence assessments and foreign policy.<\/p>\n

Moreover, these judgements will survive past the Trump era. The administration\u2019s turn against China is perhaps the only major policy of Donald Trump\u2019s that the Democrats overwhelmingly support<\/a>. The majority of American think tank experts are supportive. (Just spend a couple of weeks there and that will become clear.) Much of the American business community has shifted<\/a> remarkably from positive to negative views of China. The American public is broadly in agreement<\/a> that China doesn\u2019t play by the rules.<\/p>\n

This points to the Americans becoming more willing to accept the economic and other costs of competing against China\u2014rather than cooperating with or tolerating it\u2014in what they have concluded is a comprehensive strategic and economic rivalry.<\/p>\n

Competition in all areas has been deepening between the US and China for some time. So, what has changed? In a new Strategic Insights paper<\/a>, released today by ASPI and the United States Studies Centre, I identify three major shifts from what has been before.<\/p>\n

1. China can\u2019t be shaped\u2014but it should be countered<\/em><\/p>\n

For eight administrations going back to Richard Nixon, there was the hope and assumption that deepening commercial, diplomatic and cultural ties would transform China\u2019s internal development and external behaviour in a more benign direction.<\/p>\n

Pence\u2019s speech is the first by a senior official to confirm departure from that approach. The Trump administration isn\u2019t necessarily concluding that China\u2019s internal and external behaviour can never be shaped or changed. But it\u2019s making the case that Beijing is moving in the opposite direction to political and economic liberalisation and has been for some time. China isn\u2019t merely \u2018free-riding\u2019 or failing to become a \u2018responsible stakeholder\u2019. It is actively undermining American leadership and capabilities.<\/p>\n

This means time and patience are no longer luxuries Washington can afford.<\/p>\n

2. The US will support global and international economic institutions only if they produce \u2018fair\u2019 or neutral outcomes<\/em><\/p>\n

In the era of uncontested US power during the 15 years after the end of the Cold War, the rapid advance of globalisation and interdependence between nations was generally viewed in one of two ways:<\/p>\n