{"id":4827,"date":"2013-03-26T05:00:48","date_gmt":"2013-03-25T19:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=4827"},"modified":"2013-03-27T06:51:03","modified_gmt":"2013-03-26T20:51:03","slug":"rethinking-the-defence-white-paper-after-next","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/rethinking-the-defence-white-paper-after-next\/","title":{"rendered":"Rethinking the Defence White Paper after next"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>As Andrew mentioned last week<\/a>, we were recently invited by RUSI ACT to talk about challenges and prospects of the next Defence White Paper. Actually, it was more about the White Paper after next, as a document released only shortly before an election is likely to be short-lived, particularly if there’s a change in government.<\/p>\n Andrew talked about White Papers then and now. My talk focused on how to readjust the strategy that must underpin any defence policy as it relates to dealing with the two major powers in our region, the US and China, and how we might approach our bigger neighbour to the north, Indonesia. The good news is that we are entering another \u2018interwar period\u2019 and we could use the \u2018strategic pause\u2019 to make changes to strategy and force structure. We don’t live in a rapidly deteriorating security environment, and there is no imminent major power war or destabilising arms race in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n Undoubtedly, China will become stronger militarily and flex its muscles in East Asia and parts of the South China Sea. But that doesn\u2019t mean that conflict or war is inevitable, or that we have to choose between China and the United States. Nor need we buy into inflated assessments of the PLA\u2019s rising military capabilities. In fact, China faces major challenges to project significant military power beyond its \u2018near seas\u2019<\/a>. Moreover, Chinese investments in lower-end military capabilities for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and protection of sea-lanes are largely underreported, and are\u00a0all avenues for cooperation with the PLA.<\/p>\n The 2009 White Paper was strong in its anti-Chinese rhetoric and its ambition was to develop an ADF geared towards participating in a potential war against China. It would be better if the next White Paper avoids that approach. We have no interest in complicating our relationship with China. Nor do we necessarily add any value to our US alliance by doing so. If there ever is a war with China, Australia could provide niche capabilities to coalition operations without subscribing to \u2018China threat\u2019 theories now. And we should avoid the folly of thinking that we need an independent military capability against China<\/a>\u2014which is, after all, a nuclear power.<\/p>\n The US alliance is still our best bet against unforeseen major strategic disruptions in Asia. As I’ve argued here recently<\/a>, Washington will be able to sustain the \u2018pivot\u2019 to Asia despite its current domestic problems. Staying close to the US also allows us to spend relatively little on defence, and gives us access to intelligence and world class military technology.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, the next White Paper needs to address the future alliance burden-sharing arrangement. The US expects its Asian allies to step up, and it hasn\u2019t been amused by our defence cuts. This raises the question if the next White Paper should define concrete areas of possible alliance contributions, even if explicitly excluding others. Should we structure the ADF to play a more active role in Southeast Asia but not for sending forces to Northeast Asia? The answer to this question has force structure implications: for example, would we want to build very big submarines which could operate in Northeast Asia or ones that can make meaningful contributions in maritime chokepoints in Southeast Asia and might be a a more cost effective option<\/a>?<\/p>\n Moreover, it\u2019s time to put our defence relationship with Indonesia on a new footing. As CDF General David Hurley has argued, Australia needs to work towards a true \u2018strategic partnership\u2019 with our bigger neighbour, which is on a strategic trajectory towards becoming the major power in Southeast Asia, and which will likely outgrow Australia economically by around 2030. Given our history with Indonesia, there’s a natural inclination among some security pundits in Canberra to argue that a more powerful Indonesia could also pose problems for us and that we need to maintain a \u2018residual capability\u2019 in case ‘something goes wrong’ in Jakarta.<\/p>\n