{"id":48944,"date":"2019-07-09T06:00:23","date_gmt":"2019-07-08T20:00:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=48944"},"modified":"2019-07-08T17:52:38","modified_gmt":"2019-07-08T07:52:38","slug":"australia-nuclear-weapons-and-americas-umbrella-business","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-nuclear-weapons-and-americas-umbrella-business\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia, nuclear weapons and America\u2019s umbrella business"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Hugh White\u2019s new book, How to defend Australia<\/em><\/a>, has stirred up a hornet\u2019s nest on the topic of potential nuclear proliferation. In one sense, that\u2019s a surprise, since anyone who\u2019s read the relevant chapter knows that it\u2019s book-ended by carefully crafted paragraphs which state explicitly that White \u2018neither predicts nor advocates\u2019 Australia\u2019s development of an indigenous nuclear arsenal.<\/p>\n

But in between those paragraphs White explores the history of Australian interest in a national nuclear weapons program, underlines the dwindling credibility of US nuclear assurances to allies, canvasses a possible nuclear doctrine for Australia, and recommends a force structure\u2014more<\/em> submarines\u2014suitable to what he sees as our new straitened strategic circumstances. If he\u2019s not advocating a nuclear arsenal, why is he telling us so much about what it ought to look like?<\/p>\n

Let\u2019s start with the possibility of Australian nuclear proliferation up front. As I wrote recently for a chapter in After American primacy<\/a><\/em>, there are five barriers to Australian proliferation: ideational, political, diplomatic, technological and strategic. Briefly, crossing the nuclear Rubicon would require:<\/p>\n