{"id":49480,"date":"2019-07-31T06:00:24","date_gmt":"2019-07-30T20:00:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=49480"},"modified":"2019-07-31T06:10:05","modified_gmt":"2019-07-30T20:10:05","slug":"insights-from-marawi-for-a-changing-threat-paradigm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/insights-from-marawi-for-a-changing-threat-paradigm\/","title":{"rendered":"Insights from Marawi for a changing threat paradigm"},"content":{"rendered":"
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There is a growing debate, domestically and internationally<\/a>, about the nature of future conflict. Recently Australian Defence Force chief Angus Campbell drew attention to political warfare<\/a> as a key element of a changing threat paradigm.<\/p>\n

The Australian Army\u2019s futures statement, titled \u2018Accelerated warfare<\/a>\u2019, warns that \u2018the advent of rapidly evolving, easily accessed technology increasingly offers asymmetric capabilities to both established powers as well as non-state actors and even individuals\u2019. It notes that the intersection of such technology with geostrategic and socio-political change, including urbanisation, increases the scope for adversaries to coerce, control and influence. This demands a response that integrates kinetic elements and information operations.<\/p>\n

The Marawi crisis\u2014the seizure of the Southern Philippine city by militants linked to Islamic State and the response by Philippine authorities from May to October 2017\u2014illustrates such a strategic play by asymmetric actors within an evolving threat landscape. Adopting a \u2018seize\u2013defy\u2013discredit\u2019 approach, and replicating IS tactics employed in Mosul and Raqqa, insurgents tapped into an existing militant clan culture to raise a thousand-man force with stockpiled weapons and explosives.<\/p>\n

The insurgency\u2019s key objectives were to seize dense urban terrain and hold the population hostage; defy the government by exploiting the acute difficulties it had regaining control; and discredit the government by forcing either capitulation or the destruction of the city. As it turned out, the Armed Forces of the Philippines took five months to regain control and destroyed much of Marawi in the process.<\/p>\n

Our latest report for ASPI, The Marawi crisis\u2014urban conflict and information operations<\/em><\/a>, examines both the capability aspects of kinetic hard power and the lessons from soft-power information operations, and how they intersect in the urban environment. It draws on interviews with academics, members of the Philippine military in Manila and Marawi, local government stakeholders and displaced residents in Mindanao during a research trip in October 2018.<\/p>\n

The report highlights the need for states to be better prepared to engage in kinetic urban operations, or to support allies in such operations, with a clear focus on reducing military and civilian casualties. Equally important, it demonstrates the relevance of widening the concept of \u2018the battlefield\u2019 to include the narrative space.<\/p>\n

The insurgents\u2019 seizure of Marawi was accompanied by a systematic IS propaganda campaign aimed at projecting an image of triumph and strength. The Philippine forces engaged in active counter-messaging to undermine rebel narratives, both online and through traditional methods such as leaflet drops, banners, and radio or loudspeaker broadcasts. Tactically, the objectives were to avoid civilian casualties and to stem further recruitment and popular support for the insurgents. Strategically, the messaging was intended to morally denounce the militants and undercut their support bases.<\/p>\n

Our report provides the following insights and recommendations.<\/p>\n

Hard power <\/strong><\/p>\n

It can be tempting to attribute the five-month-long fight for Marawi to unpreparedness of the Philippine military. Similarly, a seize\u2013defy\u2013discredit strategy may appear to be relevant only when there\u2019s both a substantial jihadi force and a compliant or coerced population. Such deductions overlook the acute challenges urban terrain presents to any military, no matter how well trained.<\/p>\n

Eliminating the last 50 militants from an area less than a kilometre square still took a month\u2014despite hard-won operational experience, new weapons and equipment and the support of allies. Critics of the Philippine response ignore the similar experiences of our allies in recent battles such as Mosul. Without specialist capabilities, a force clearing a determined enemy from urban terrain suffers heavy losses unless it applies overwhelming firepower\u2014inevitably causing casualties among civilians.<\/p>\n

After decades of low-cost \u2018precision war\u2019, the Australian public don\u2019t expect to pay such a price<\/a>. That dissonance represents a reputational risk for the ADF that adversaries can exploit. There\u2019s a requirement for:<\/p>\n