{"id":50308,"date":"2019-09-04T11:00:09","date_gmt":"2019-09-04T01:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=50308"},"modified":"2019-09-04T10:50:27","modified_gmt":"2019-09-04T00:50:27","slug":"from-the-bookshelf-the-costs-of-conversation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/from-the-bookshelf-the-costs-of-conversation\/","title":{"rendered":"From the bookshelf: \u2018The costs of conversation\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
Oriana Skylar Mastro\u2019s recently published book, The costs of conversation: obstacles to peace talks in wartime<\/em><\/a>, is a tight, densely written piece of prose. Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University in Washington and an officer in the US Air Force Reserve. In 141 pages\u2014supplemented by another 45 pages of notes\u2014she explores directly one of the key puzzles confronting intra-conflict bargaining: how to initiate peace talks without signalling weakness to an adversary.<\/p>\n Although we\u2019re inclined to gloss over it\u2014more readily fascinated by geopolitical transition, shiny bits of metal, and the mystique of the cyber world\u2014ours is an age when the capping and termination of conflict has special importance. Since World War II, there have been strong incentives to contain modern warfare\u2014by keeping conflict between great powers \u2018cold\u2019, and between smaller powers limited. In those circumstances, intra-conflict bargaining constitutes an important tool in the modern strategic toolkit, its importance increasing the further up the ladder of conflict one cares to look.<\/p>\n Over the years, academics have produced a range of detailed studies of specific negotiations. But Mastro\u2019s research ploughs a largely unturned field: how adversaries get to the negotiating table in the first place. She explores four case studies\u2014North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War; Chinese diplomatic decisions during the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War; and Indian diplomatic decisions, also during the Sino-Indian War\u2014and concludes that negotiations will be acceptable to a combatant only when the costs of embarking on such a course are low. Agreeing to negotiations is always the first concession\u2014one made before talks even begin. And it\u2019s all too easy for adversaries to interpret an opponent\u2019s sudden willingness to talk as a waning of resolve.<\/p>\n True, Mastro\u2019s research is indicative rather than definitive: her findings are tied to four specific case studies, covering just three of the 38 instances of conflict identified in the Correlates of War<\/a> database. Not being expert in the minute details of her case studies, I can say only that her argument\u2014which turns upon the test of diplomatic openness\u2014is both considered and intuitively appealing.<\/p>\n I\u2019m more hesitant about the policy implications she unpacks in her final few pages. For her own country, and looking towards a potential conflict with China over Taiwan, Mastro urges a simple policy shift\u2014that the \u2018involved parties\u2019 announce an openness to wartime talks as official policy before a conflict erupts. Assuming the parties include the US, China and Taiwan, that\u2019s probably easier said than done.<\/p>\n