{"id":52013,"date":"2019-11-20T11:00:44","date_gmt":"2019-11-20T00:00:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=52013"},"modified":"2019-11-20T10:48:23","modified_gmt":"2019-11-19T23:48:23","slug":"the-great-game-in-the-south-pacific","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-great-game-in-the-south-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"The Great Game in the South Pacific"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The Great Game was played by Great Britain and Russia throughout the 19th century and reflected the two powers\u2019 political and strategic jostling for influence across Central Asia. It was essentially about geographic positioning, and a 21st-century version is now being played in the South Pacific. The outcome will change the strategic balance across Asia and most of the Pacific. Australia needs to consider how to position itself in this contest in order to shape what\u2019s likely to be a significantly altered strategic landscape.<\/p>\n

On one side is China, cashed up, with a clear strategic direction and a willingness to play over the long term. It is also willing to play by a completely different set of rules. On the other side is a grouping of players, spread across the Pacific. There are Japan and South Korea, which don\u2019t seem to know they\u2019re in the game, but will be significantly affected by the outcome. There\u2019s the United States, at the moment the best player, trained up, with the best kit, but increasingly disinterested and in more of a mind to just go home. Then there\u2019s Australia, wanting to play alongside the US but not able either to convince America to stay in the game or to play alone.<\/p>\n

The latest moves by Australia and China are illustrative. Australia\u2019s was two-pronged: to re-establish a naval base<\/a> at Manus Island and to comprehensively engage the South Pacific island states. The jury is out on the effectiveness of the first move and the second was a partial own goal. Manus Island was intended to be a mechanism to bring the US more into the game while providing a forward base for surveillance of regional developments. The Pacific islands move was warranted, albeit late, but the lack of commitment<\/a> by Canberra to address climate change has arguably harmed some relationships, particularly in countries facing an existential threat from rising sea levels.<\/p>\n

The latest China move builds on the position gained through the developments in the South China Sea, centred on militarising a string of artificial islands and on the build-up of anti-access\/area-denial (A2\/AD) systems. China has given itself the capability to essentially close the sea routes across this important area in situations short of war.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s strategy is to build a permanent presence in the Southwest Pacific, a move made clearer and more real by an attempt by China, since deemed illegal<\/a>, to lease the entire island of Tulagi in Solomon Islands for 75 years. The importance of that move to the players is brought into stark relief by a map from the Center for Strategic and International Studies\u2019 ChinaPower project<\/a>, reproduced below. It highlights the impact of the progressive denial of the archipelagic straits and the South China Sea to shipping.<\/p>\n

If all these routes are closed, the strategic value of the South Pacific islands will be elevated. Traffic to Japan and South Korea will have to travel even further out into the Pacific, the ability of the US to manoeuvre freely will be affected, and Australia may be isolated from our increasingly reluctant ally.<\/p>\n

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Source: China Power Team, <\/em>\u2018How much trade transits the South China Sea?\u2019<\/em><\/a>,<\/em> 2 August 2017; updated 10 October 2019. <\/em><\/p>\n

The next Australian move in the game is crucial and needs to take advantage of geography and not just be dictated by it. The priorities should be to:<\/p>\n