{"id":53376,"date":"2020-02-06T14:54:58","date_gmt":"2020-02-06T03:54:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=53376"},"modified":"2020-02-06T20:18:40","modified_gmt":"2020-02-06T09:18:40","slug":"reassessing-australias-defence-policy-part-3-preparing-for-major-war-in-the-2020s","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/reassessing-australias-defence-policy-part-3-preparing-for-major-war-in-the-2020s\/","title":{"rendered":"Reassessing Australia\u2019s defence policy (part 3): Preparing for major war in the 2020s"},"content":{"rendered":"
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While current concerns about Australian strategic policy are many, the underlying theme behind much of the disquiet is that we aren\u2019t sufficiently prepared for the demands of major war in our own region, even before doubts about the extent of US assistance are taken into account. Australia doesn\u2019t have the residual memory of Cold War organisation that the US and NATO now fall back on, and Australia\u2019s Defence Department has been struggling in recent years to develop a concept for mobilisation.<\/p>\n

The roots of some of the problems go fairly deep. For example, supplies of certain munitions ran low<\/a> even for the relatively small coalition campaign in Syria. Our defence industry is not structured<\/a> to deal with disruptions to supplies. Our noncompliance with our obligation to the International Energy Agency to hold 90\u00a0days\u2019 worth of fuel consumption in country remains<\/a> a strategic embarrassment. And our merchant marine<\/a> includes few oil tankers and freighters that could be used for wartime resupply.<\/p>\n

Still, there are good reasons to think that Australia should place more emphasis on preparations for major war than it has in the past: \u2018competition\u2019 is at least as much political, economic and diplomatic as it is military; the Australian Defence Force is already geared towards limited war<\/a>, the outcomes of which will, however, continue to rest on US resolve; and developments in Moscow, Beijing and Washington since 2014 have all given greater credence to worst-case scenarios.<\/p>\n

But we don\u2019t have the luxury of time\u2014if there was a time to declare strategic warning, it was in 2009, rather than 2019. Bringing forward the frigate and submarine replacement programs by a few years wouldn\u2019t make a significant difference to the ADF of the 2020s, so what we\u2019re left with in terms of new platforms are the off-the-shelf purchases already planned for the air force\u2014F-35s, MQ-4C and MQ-9 drones, and MC-55A electronic warfare support aircraft\u2014and the navy\u2019s new offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). But even within the broad outlines of the force structure laid out in the 2016 defence white paper<\/a>, Australia could make significant improvements focused on the possibility of major war during the 2020s.<\/p>\n

In particular, the government should consider making Australia\u2019s air combat capability more resilient by acquiring additional KC-30A tanker aircraft; increasing munitions stocks and resupply capability; integrating Kongsberg\u2019s Naval Strike Missile on the F-35; reviewing the number of pilots, base support personnel and battle-damage repair capabilities required to maintain continuous high tempos of operation, including dispersed from civilian airfields; and improving fuel stock and resupply infrastructure at air bases across the north of the continent.<\/p>\n

We should also strengthen the ability to protect the sea lanes across the Pacific and Indian oceans that we would depend on for the war effort against long-range submarine operations by acquiring additional P-8A Poseidons and fitting towed arrays to the Anzac-class frigates. We need to ensure the availability of sonobuoys for periods of large-scale extended use. If they\u2019re equipped with towed arrays and a rudimentary self-defence capability, such as RAM or Phalanx systems, the new OPVs should also be able to make a meaningful contribution to antisubmarine operations in areas of limited air threat. If the OPVs were able to support lilypad operations of the MH-60R, additional antisubmarine helicopters may also be worthy of consideration.<\/p>\n

Defence should consider accelerating the acquisition of land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, additional short-range air defence systems, and the foreshadowed medium-range air defence capability. It should also consider using those capabilities to establish a permanent army garrison on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, which lie close to areas that major Chinese naval forces now regularly transit through but would be very difficult to reinforce, let alone retake from mainland Australia.<\/p>\n

In addition, Defence should consider:<\/p>\n