{"id":57436,"date":"2020-07-10T12:03:15","date_gmt":"2020-07-10T02:03:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=57436"},"modified":"2020-07-10T12:03:15","modified_gmt":"2020-07-10T02:03:15","slug":"indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/","title":{"rendered":"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

After last month\u2019s clash in the Ladakh region\u2019s Galwan Valley killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops, the two countries are settling in for a prolonged standoff on their disputed Himalayan frontier, even amid reports of a disengagement at the site of the clash. More important, the recent skirmish may have highlighted a broader shift in Asian geopolitics.<\/p>\n

At first glance, this suggestion may seem exaggerated. After all, China and India had been making a decent fist of living with each other. Although they haven\u2019t reached a durable settlement of their disputed 3,500-kilometre border, not a shot had been fired across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 45 years. Meanwhile, bilateral trade climbed to US$92.5 billion in 2019<\/a> from just US$200 million in 1990<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Of course, bilateral tensions also reflect long-term disagreements that go beyond territorial disputes, such as China\u2019s \u2018all-weather\u2019 alliance with Pakistan, and India\u2019s hospitality towards the Dalai Lama, to whom it granted refuge when he fled Tibet in 1959. But neither country has been swept up by these issues. When China declared that the border dispute could be left to \u2018future generations\u2019 to resolve, India was happy to go along<\/a>. India also endorsed the \u2018one China\u2019 policy, and shunned United States\u2013led efforts to \u2018contain\u2019 its northern neighbour.<\/p>\n

But the latter policy, in particular, has played into China\u2019s hands. The People\u2019s Liberation Army has taken advantage of the seemingly benign situation to undertake repeated military incursions.<\/p>\n

Each one was minor. China would take a few square kilometres of territory along the LAC, declare peace, and then fortify its new deployment. As a result, each mini-crisis brought a \u2018new normal\u2019 on the LAC. And it was always China\u2019s position that improved.<\/p>\n

By the time \u2018future generations\u2019 settle the border dispute, China\u2019s leaders seem to hope, the reality on the ground\u2014as well as the broader balance of economic and military strength\u2014will heavily favour China. Any agreement will reflect that. In the meantime, border incidents keep India off balance and show the world that it\u2019s not capable of challenging China, let alone underwriting regional security.<\/p>\n

India has reinforced its military assets on the LAC to stave off deeper incursions, and hopes to press China to restore the status quo ante through diplomatic or military means. For example, it could capture land elsewhere on the LAC to use as leverage. But that\u2019s easier said than done.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has claimed<\/a> that China is not in control of his country\u2019s territory. This looks suspiciously like a surrender to the new reality in the Galwan Valley and Pangong Lake, where the PLA has established positions that didn\u2019t exist before May. It could embolden China to pursue additional small gains across the LAC.<\/p>\n

India has pursued some economic retaliation, banning 59 Chinese apps on data-security grounds. It is likely soon to bar Chinese companies from other lucrative opportunities in its vast market. But given India\u2019s dependence on Chinese imports\u2014including pharmaceuticals, automotive parts and microchips\u2014excessive restrictions could amount to cutting off its nose to spite its face.<\/p>\n

India has only two real strategic options: kowtow to China or align itself with a broader international coalition aiming to curb China\u2019s geopolitical ambitions. Despite Modi\u2019s apparent capitulation, there\u2019s reason to believe that India may choose the latter approach.<\/p>\n

For starters, India has lately increased cooperation with the US military. In 2016, it concluded a logistics support agreement, and in 2018, it reached a communication security agreement and an accord on geospatial cooperation.<\/p>\n

India has embraced, at least rhetorically, the US concept of a \u2018free and open Indo-Pacific\u2019, and is gradually abandoning its reluctance to participate in the US-led \u2018Quad\u2019, an informal four-country grouping (which also includes Australia and Japan) focused on countering China\u2019s regional ambitions. The foundations have been laid for a more substantive strategic shift.<\/p>\n

India has obvious incentives for such a shift. Beyond its belligerence on the LAC, China has increased its support for Pakistan, spending more than US$60 billion on a highway to the Chinese-run port of Gwadar. A \u2018peace strategy\u2019 towards these two adversaries holds no attraction for an Indian government that has stripped<\/a> Jammu and Kashmir of its autonomy, in an open challenge to Pakistan.<\/p>\n

Moreover, India sees China\u2019s hand in its difficulties with other neighbours, especially Sri Lanka and Nepal, whose communist government has begun questioning its own border with India. China has further rankled India by opposing its aspirations to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, blocking it from joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and making territorial claims in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.<\/p>\n

India\u2019s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is not averse to a policy shake-up. In May, two BJP MPs thumbed their noses at China by \u2018attending\u2019 the virtual swearing-in ceremony of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. India has also criticised China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative, refusing to attend BRI forums in 2017 and 2019. And it has withdrawn from the Asia-wide Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership over concerns about Chinese dominance.<\/p>\n

But there remain significant potential barriers to a strategic realignment. Such an approach would mark a major departure from India\u2019s traditional obsession with protecting its \u2018strategic autonomy\u2019\u2014a legacy of two centuries of colonial rule, reflected in India\u2019s role in establishing the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, India has no interest in putting all of its strategic eggs in one basket. It remains heavily dependent on Russian military equipment and supplies (though it has recently diversified its purchases), and Donald Trump\u2019s US isn\u2019t exactly a reliable partner. But is this a worse option than capitulating to China?<\/p>\n

Eight months ago, Modi hailed<\/a> \u2018a new era of cooperation\u2019 with China. Though it\u2019s too early to say with certainty, that era may soon be buried in the snowy heights of the Himalayas.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

After last month\u2019s clash in the Ladakh region\u2019s Galwan Valley killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops, the two countries are settling in for a prolonged standoff on their disputed Himalayan …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1170,"featured_media":57439,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,772,69],"class_list":["post-57436","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-geopolitics","tag-india"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nIndia\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"After last month\u2019s clash in the Ladakh region\u2019s Galwan Valley killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops, the two countries are settling in for a prolonged standoff on their disputed Himalayan ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-07-10T02:03:15+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-1220598110.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"683\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Shashi Tharoor\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Shashi Tharoor\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-1220598110.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-1220598110.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":683,\"caption\":\"Indian Border Security Force (BSF) soldiers guard a highway leading towards Leh, bordering China, in Gagangir on June 17, 2020. - India is sending hundreds of extra troops towards the Chinese border, sources told AFP on June 17, after the deadliest clashes in over 50 years between the two Asian giants left 20 Indian soldiers dead following brawls with fists, rocks and clubs. (Photo by Tauseef MUSTAFA \/ AFP) (Photo by TAUSEEF MUSTAFA\/AFP via Getty Images)\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/\",\"name\":\"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2020-07-10T02:03:15+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2020-07-10T02:03:15+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1859ec0aa9bcbc318cc6b69ad99e00c6\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1859ec0aa9bcbc318cc6b69ad99e00c6\",\"name\":\"Shashi Tharoor\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8863a35247a26c8b9a937c58afb49aa7?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8863a35247a26c8b9a937c58afb49aa7?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Shashi Tharoor\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/shashi-tharoor\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China | The Strategist","og_description":"After last month\u2019s clash in the Ladakh region\u2019s Galwan Valley killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops, the two countries are settling in for a prolonged standoff on their disputed Himalayan ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2020-07-10T02:03:15+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1024,"height":683,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-1220598110.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Shashi Tharoor","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Shashi Tharoor","Est. reading time":"5 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-1220598110.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-1220598110.jpg","width":1024,"height":683,"caption":"Indian Border Security Force (BSF) soldiers guard a highway leading towards Leh, bordering China, in Gagangir on June 17, 2020. - India is sending hundreds of extra troops towards the Chinese border, sources told AFP on June 17, after the deadliest clashes in over 50 years between the two Asian giants left 20 Indian soldiers dead following brawls with fists, rocks and clubs. (Photo by Tauseef MUSTAFA \/ AFP) (Photo by TAUSEEF MUSTAFA\/AFP via Getty Images)"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/","name":"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2020-07-10T02:03:15+00:00","dateModified":"2020-07-10T02:03:15+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1859ec0aa9bcbc318cc6b69ad99e00c6"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indias-strategic-options-for-dealing-with-china\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"India\u2019s strategic options for dealing with China"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/1859ec0aa9bcbc318cc6b69ad99e00c6","name":"Shashi Tharoor","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8863a35247a26c8b9a937c58afb49aa7?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8863a35247a26c8b9a937c58afb49aa7?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Shashi Tharoor"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/shashi-tharoor\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57436"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1170"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=57436"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57436\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":57440,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57436\/revisions\/57440"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/57439"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=57436"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=57436"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=57436"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}