{"id":57791,"date":"2020-07-24T15:15:19","date_gmt":"2020-07-24T05:15:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=57791"},"modified":"2020-07-24T15:41:23","modified_gmt":"2020-07-24T05:41:23","slug":"china-military-watch","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/china-military-watch\/","title":{"rendered":"China military watch"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Welcome to \u2018China military watch\u2019, a new monthly feature in The Strategist<\/em> from ASPI\u2019s defence analysts examining developments in Chinese military affairs.<\/p>\n

\u2018Mighty Dragon\u2019 enters mass production <\/strong><\/p>\n

China has announced the beginning of mass production<\/a> of the J-20B \u2018Mighty Dragon\u2019 fifth-generation fighter. The J-20B is an upgrade of the J-20A and adds vectored thrust-engine technology for increased manoeuvrability during air combat within visual range, which is intriguing because it implies that the PLA Air Force still sees \u2018dogfighting\u2019 as important.<\/p>\n

Although many Western air forces are emphasising stealth technology and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile engagements over short-range air combat, there\u2019s still a need to be able to dogfight. The addition of vectored thrust will make the J-20B more deadly, especially if a force of J-20Bs can overwhelm an opponent with sheer numbers and force them into a close-in engagement.<\/p>\n

A challenge for the J-20B is that it still uses WS-10C<\/a> engines, since the development of China\u2019s much more powerful indigenous WS-15<\/a> engine is still behind schedule. The addition of the WS-15<\/a> would mark the final maturation of the J-20 platform. The WS-15 will enable China to end its dependence on Russian aircraft engine technology and potentially to develop new types of combat aircraft.<\/p>\n

Taiwan, missile defence and amphibious warfare<\/strong><\/p>\n

Wu Qian (\u5434\u8c26), a spokesperson from China\u2019s Ministry of National Defence, issued a statement opposing a US$620 million upgrade<\/a> to Taiwan\u2019s Patriot advanced capability (PAC-3) missile air defence system. The statement, republished in<\/a> the People\u2019s Liberation Army Daily<\/em>, said, \u2018China strongly demands that America immediately stop supplying weapons to Taiwan.\u2019 Wu\u2019s remarks then took a predictable ethno-nationalist turn, claiming that \u2018any plot to split China will always receive firm opposition from all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, including overseas Chinese\u2019. That\u2019s a bold threat for a few PAC-3 missiles.<\/p>\n

Despite the bluster, recent coverage in state media suggests that the PLA has taken a sober view of potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. On 1 May, CCTV\u2019s channel devoted to affairs in the PLA broadcast an episode on amphibious warfare<\/a> for its television series National Defence Science and Industry<\/em> (\u56fd\u9632\u79d1\u5de5). The episode took a close look at the amphibious operations conducted by the US Marine Corps in the Battle of Iwo Jima (February\u2013March 1945) during the Pacific War.<\/p>\n

The presenter claimed that US amphibious forces believed \u2018there wouldn\u2019t be much resistance along the volcanic ash deposits of Iwo Jima\u2019s sandy beach\u2019, yet Japan fought admirably, \u2018deliver[ing] a full-frontal assault with around 7,000 American soldiers perishing and 20,000 soldiers suffering injuries\u2019. The episode\u2019s message was clear: amphibious assaults are a tricky business and the PLA ought to expect significant casualties if it ever decides to try annexing Taiwan that way.<\/p>\n

The link between logistics and literacy<\/strong><\/p>\n

The PLA is working hard to become an \u2018informationised\u2019 force that uses autonomous systems to improve decision-making and battlefield effectiveness. Nowhere is the task of \u2018informationisation\u2019 (\u4fe1\u606f\u5316) more important than in the PLA\u2019s \u2018support\u2019 (\u4fdd\u969c) activities on land, on water and in the air. On 2 July, the People\u2019s<\/em> Liberation Army Daily<\/em> took a close look<\/a> at the sort of equipment and technology the PLA will need to support high-intensity combat operations in an information-dense environment.<\/p>\n

The article called for \u2018research and development into intelligentised, autonomous supply platform technology, [while] strengthen[ing] the development of intelligent, efficient and easy-to-protect unmanned land supply bases, unmanned supply ships, unmanned underwater vessels and unmanned aerial tankers\u2019. The vision put forward was of a PLA that can deploy autonomous systems as crucial logistical enablers.<\/p>\n

However, the PLA\u2019s vision might prove hard to realise with current staffing. Subsequent articles in state media made clear that the PLA is facing systemic challenges relating to the quality of its personnel.<\/p>\n

One article published on 15 July<\/a> raised a pressing illiteracy crisis across the PLA. The problem, known in Chinese as \u2018lifting a pen and forgetting the character\u2019 (\u63d0\u7b14\u5fd8\u5b57), arises because people have forgotten how to write certain words with a pen and paper after years of writing only on a smartphone or computer.<\/p>\n

A soldier from the 78th Group Army stressed in the article that \u2018Chinese characters are not only a tool for expressing the written word, but they are also an important medium for indicating the state of military affairs and transmitting military information.\u2019 The author warned that this form of illiteracy might affect the PLA\u2019s combat power, but nevertheless thought the problem could be overcome, claiming that \u2018the phenomenon of forgetting how to write during training also happens from time to time\u2019, especially \u2018in the wake of our military\u2019s rapid development of informationisation\u2019.<\/p>\n

Just how confident the PLA is in its ability to deal with these challenges while transforming into a high-tech force remains to be seen.<\/p>\n

Political commissars and decision-making in the PLA Navy <\/strong><\/p>\n

Cold War dramatisations of nuclear tensions between the Soviet Union and the US often had someone in the role of the zampolit<\/em>, or \u2018political commissar\u2019. These officers were generally portrayed as rigid ideologues who monitored their colleagues for possible treachery. The PLA also has political commissars, and a fascinating report<\/a> by the Center for Strategic and International Studies examines their role at sea and explains the unique \u2018dual-command authority\u2019 in which the commissar and military commander make administrative and operational decisions together.<\/p>\n

The report suggests that political commissars have more influence over Chinese naval operations than military commanders. The commissar acts as secretary of the \u2018party standing committee\u2019 aboard the ship, and the military commander serves as deputy secretary. The report notes that the collective approach to decision-making by a ship\u2019s party standing committee\u2014spread across five or six officers including a political commissar and two deputy political commissars\u2014may result in delayed response times in critical situations. Other possible issues with the dual-command system include a lack of flexibility to adapt to senior leaders\u2019 contrasting viewpoints, increased miscommunication, and poor crew initiative.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Welcome to \u2018China military watch\u2019, a new monthly feature in The Strategist from ASPI\u2019s defence analysts examining developments in Chinese military affairs. \u2018Mighty Dragon\u2019 enters mass production China has announced the beginning of mass production …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":147,"featured_media":57800,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1383,52,337,268,1414],"class_list":["post-57791","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-ccp","tag-china","tag-military","tag-missile","tag-pla"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina military watch | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/china-military-watch\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China military watch | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Welcome to \u2018China military watch\u2019, a new monthly feature in The Strategist from ASPI\u2019s defence analysts examining developments in Chinese military affairs. \u2018Mighty Dragon\u2019 enters mass production China has announced the beginning of mass production ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/china-military-watch\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-07-24T05:15:19+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2020-07-24T05:41:23+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-824410304.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"644\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Malcolm Davis\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Malcolm Davis\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/china-military-watch\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-824410304.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/GettyImages-824410304.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":644,\"caption\":\"Chinese soldiers carry the flags of (L to R) the Communist Party, the state, and the People's Liberation Army during a military parade at the Zhurihe training base in China's northern Inner Mongolia region on July 30, 2017. 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