{"id":59348,"date":"2020-09-25T11:00:28","date_gmt":"2020-09-25T01:00:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=59348"},"modified":"2020-09-28T17:12:50","modified_gmt":"2020-09-28T07:12:50","slug":"russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Australian specialist in Russian polar strategy Elizabeth Buchanan has urged lawmakers in the United States to reconsider key assumptions about the impact of the China\u2013Russia relationship on strategic issues in the Arctic. <\/em><\/p>\n

The following is an edited summary of Dr Buchanan\u2019s evidence to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Congressional Energy and National Security Caucus in which she argued that three widely held assumptions about Russia, China and the Arctic were wrong.<\/em><\/p>\n

Strengthened commercial engagement between Russia and China on Arctic energy ventures is driving a notion that there\u2019s a Sino-Russian alliance in the region.<\/p>\n

The reality is that mutual mistrust, centuries-old territorial tensions over the Russian Far East and hangovers from the Sino-Soviet split in the Cold War are all permanent features of the China\u2013Russia relationship. They\u2019ll continue to shape the strategic outlook, to an extent curtailing the two states\u2019 \u2018axis\u2019 potential.<\/p>\n

Moscow and Beijing have both learned that nations don\u2019t have allies, or partners. Secure, successful states seek merely mutually beneficial relationships. That sentiment frames Sino-Russian engagement in the Russian Arctic.<\/p>\n

Of the eight members of the Arctic Council, Russia took the most convincing to grant China its observer status in 2013. Moscow approved membership, and with it legitimacy, on the basis that Beijing explicitly acknowledged the sovereignty of Arctic-rim states and reaffirmed its commitment to the legal architecture of the Arctic region\u2014the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.<\/p>\n

Since 2014, with Western sanctions over Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea and sustained aggression in Ukraine, Moscow has had a cashflow problem. When sanctions targeted energy projects in the Russian Arctic, China wasted no time in offering capital injections and technology for offshore exploration.<\/p>\n

This doesn\u2019t mean that Beijing is tying all energy security plans to the Russian Arctic zone. Chinese Arctic engagement is driven by energy insecurity. Beijing diversifies its energy imports across the globe, and the Russian Arctic energy \u2018pot\u2019 is but one more source.<\/p>\n

China is also engaging in a mutually beneficial arrangement with Russia to access the Northern Sea Route, which slashes transit between Asia and Europe by roughly half and presents attractive savings for Chinese shipping. Russia hasn\u2019t given China privileged use of the route. Chinese vessels have been refused entry, and those that pass abide by Russian transit laws\u2014vessels must be piloted by Russian pilots, tolls are charged, and Russia must be pre-warned about trips. China is actively engaging with other Arctic-rim powers and has commercial ventures, investment plans and entrenched soft-power strategies in Norway, Canada, Iceland and Greenland.<\/p>\n

China is also driven by the prestige a polar footprint brings, supported by its icebreaker-building capabilities. Russia is aware of the rationale behind China\u2019s Arctic strategy. Any efforts by Beijng to move beyond the agreed terms of its arrangement with Moscow or failure to uphold its observer status commitments will no doubt encourage deeper cooperation among the Arctic-rim states. How closely China adheres to the legal and sovereign Arctic arrangements will signal the limits to its relationship with Russia.<\/p>\n

Another assumption, that Russia has an expansionist agenda in the Arctic, is generational but strategically incapacitating. It follows the notion that Moscow\u2019s military modernisation and securitisation of Arctic policy and planning are indicators of neo-imperialist ambitions there. This concern is sharpened by the Kremlin\u2019s public affairs stunts like planting the Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s northwest Arctic zone has historically housed its nuclear-armed Northern Fleet. This military capability, as well as the strategic location and Soviet-era bastion policy of area denial, never really went away with the fall of the Soviet Union. It fell into disrepair and, under President Vladimir Putin, the military has undergone a vast modernisation program. Moscow has reopened military bases along its Arctic frontier. Geographically, Russia is the largest Arctic player, and more than 50% of the Arctic Ocean is Russian coastline.<\/p>\n

A 2008 US geological survey indicated that most of the region\u2019s oil and natural gas lies in the Russian Arctic. Russia under Putin has renationalised energy as its future economic base. Resource deposits in the Russian Arctic zone (onshore and offshore) have immense economic potential and thus national security primacy. Russia\u2019s Arctic strategy is built on both economic security and frontier border security objectives.<\/p>\n

Securitising economic interests and increasing activity on the Arctic border fall short of an expansionist agenda. Peel back the posturing and the Arctic \u2018arms race\u2019, and Russia\u2019s Arctic priority remains stability. <\/em>Continued regional cooperation with its NATO-member and Western Arctic neighbours remains a central strategic objective. Keeping the arena free of conflict is crucial to ensuring the Northern Sea Route remains open and commercially viable. Russia needs to be able to deliver secure, trusted and unimpeded energy supplies from its northern frontier to Asian energy clients.<\/p>\n

Of course, opportunities to \u2018grab\u2019 territory beyond the Russian Arctic zone have yet to be seized by Moscow. This expansionist expectation refers to the broader continental shelf debate\u2014who \u2018owns\u2019 the North Pole. Arctic-rim powers Russia, Denmark (by way of Greenland) and Canada have submitted claims to formally extend their exclusive economic zones, which overlap in the high Arctic Ocean.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s territorial and maritime disputes\u2014notably with Norway in the Barents Sea and the US in the Bering Strait\u2014have long been resolved. So, where in the Arctic is Moscow looking to expand? It\u2019s well within Russia\u2019s interests to uphold the international legal architecture of the Arctic, particularly UNCLOS, as agreed by stakeholders. This is a simple case of revenge of geography.<\/p>\n

A final assumption is that Russia has fallen into Beijing\u2019s debt-trap diplomacy and that it is overreliant on Chinese capital and ownership in joint ventures for energy projects in the Arctic. In reality, Russia has worked to offset Chinese investment and the risk of overreliance in energy ventures. That\u2019s a delicate balance. On one side of the energy security \u2018coin\u2019, Russia relies on Chinese demand for Arctic LNG, but Moscow has worked to diversify its capital pools. Saudi Arabia, Japan, India and South Korea are all linked to Russian Arctic energy ventures.<\/p>\n

Russian law stipulates that while private Russian energy firms can develop in the Arctic zone, they may not cede controlling stakes to foreign firms. Neither of the two key LNG projects on the Russian Arctic\u2019s Yamal Peninsula is \u2018owned\u2019 by China. Beijing\u2019s share in the Yamal LNG venture is 29.9%, Russia\u2019s Novatek holds 50.1% and France\u2019s Total holds 20%. In the Arctic-2 LNG project, China holds 20%, Novatek holds 60%, Total holds 10% and the remaining 10% is held by a Japanese consortium. We can expect Russia\u2019s upcoming Arctic energy projects located near the Yamal Peninsula ventures to attract diverse capital pools.<\/p>\n

Sino-Russian Arctic ties will continue to be predictable. The relationship built upon an energy security foundation will remain mutually beneficial\u2014until it is not. Russia\u2019s foreign energy strategy and broader Arctic security agenda rely on predictability. <\/em>The Russian Federation\u2019s economic base is predicated on the Arctic remaining a zone of low tension to ensure the Northern Sea Route\u2014an economic artery\u2014<\/em>remains conflict-free.<\/p>\n

Moscow is unlikely to plunge into conflict the region it holds the largest stake in, and which it has tied its future economic and social security to. Any Arctic tensions will come from a misreading of Russian interests or a misunderstanding of basic geography or of how international law applies in the region.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Australian specialist in Russian polar strategy Elizabeth Buchanan has urged lawmakers in the United States to reconsider key assumptions about the impact of the China\u2013Russia relationship on strategic issues in the Arctic. The following is …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":952,"featured_media":59351,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[320,52,163],"class_list":["post-59348","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-arctic","tag-china","tag-russia"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nRussia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Australian specialist in Russian polar strategy Elizabeth Buchanan has urged lawmakers in the United States to reconsider key assumptions about the impact of the China\u2013Russia relationship on strategic issues in the Arctic. The following is ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-09-25T01:00:28+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2020-09-28T07:12:50+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/09\/putinice2509.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"617\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Elizabeth Buchanan\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Elizabeth Buchanan\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"6 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/09\/putinice2509.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/09\/putinice2509.jpg\",\"width\":1000,\"height\":617},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/\",\"name\":\"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2020-09-25T01:00:28+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2020-09-28T07:12:50+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/177b4e0204362e479ddab5724203a124\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/177b4e0204362e479ddab5724203a124\",\"name\":\"Elizabeth Buchanan\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed22b2c6d5aeb24d0951ec593b710f80?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed22b2c6d5aeb24d0951ec593b710f80?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Elizabeth Buchanan\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/elizabeth-buchanan\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities | The Strategist","og_description":"Australian specialist in Russian polar strategy Elizabeth Buchanan has urged lawmakers in the United States to reconsider key assumptions about the impact of the China\u2013Russia relationship on strategic issues in the Arctic. The following is ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2020-09-25T01:00:28+00:00","article_modified_time":"2020-09-28T07:12:50+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1000,"height":617,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/09\/putinice2509.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Elizabeth Buchanan","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Elizabeth Buchanan","Est. reading time":"6 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/09\/putinice2509.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/09\/putinice2509.jpg","width":1000,"height":617},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/","name":"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2020-09-25T01:00:28+00:00","dateModified":"2020-09-28T07:12:50+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/177b4e0204362e479ddab5724203a124"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/177b4e0204362e479ddab5724203a124","name":"Elizabeth Buchanan","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed22b2c6d5aeb24d0951ec593b710f80?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/ed22b2c6d5aeb24d0951ec593b710f80?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Elizabeth Buchanan"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/elizabeth-buchanan\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59348"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/952"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=59348"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59348\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":59401,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59348\/revisions\/59401"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/59351"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=59348"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=59348"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=59348"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}