{"id":64375,"date":"2021-05-07T14:58:46","date_gmt":"2021-05-07T04:58:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=64375"},"modified":"2021-05-07T14:58:46","modified_gmt":"2021-05-07T04:58:46","slug":"china-military-watch-8","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/china-military-watch-8\/","title":{"rendered":"China military watch"},"content":{"rendered":"
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There\u2019s rising concern about the prospect of a major military crisis erupting across the Taiwan Strait as a result of China\u2019s intention to force Taiwan to unify with the mainland. President Xi Jinping suggested in early 2019 that China must be and will be reunified<\/a>, and noted, \u2018It is a historical conclusion drawn over the 70 years of the development of cross-Strait relations, and a must for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era.\u2019 He went on to say, \u2018We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means.\u2019<\/p>\n

So it\u2019s no surprise that China has been steadily expanding aggressive aerial patrols<\/a> in Taiwan\u2019s air defence identification zone and undertaking highly visible<\/a> naval deployments encircling Taiwan. In a previous<\/a> edition of \u2018China military watch\u2019, we considered China\u2019s military options to force Taiwan to accept unification on Beijing\u2019s terms\u2014what would amount to annexation of Taiwan initially through the use of coercive grey-zone actions, but via a cross-strait invasion if those measures failed.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s a general consensus that the People\u2019s Liberation Army doesn\u2019t have the means to forcibly take Taiwan now, given its capability gaps in key areas such as conducting complex naval operations and holding training exercises against realistic opposition forces, even as its naval capabilities rapidly close qualitative gaps against the US Navy and already overmatch it in quantitative terms.<\/p>\n

Our assessment focuses instead on a series of escalating coercive actions to pressure Taipei to bend to Beijing\u2019s will over the next six years. It\u2019s in that timeframe that the threat of a cross-strait invasion increases<\/a>, according to the head of the US Navy\u2019s Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson.<\/p>\n

So, how will Taiwan respond to escalating grey-zone actions by China designed to coerce it into unification on Beijing\u2019s terms over the next six years, and to what extent can Taiwan resist an invasion that might occur at the end of that period? Some idea can be gleaned<\/a> from Taiwan\u2019s 2021 quadrennial defense review<\/em> (QDR<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The QDR outlines the concept of \u2018resolute defence and multi-domain deterrence\u2019 ( \u9632\u885b\u56fa\u5b88\uff0c\u91cd\u5c64\u5687\u963b), which is the key military strategy for Taiwan\u2019s national defense. It emphasises responding to the growing threat posed by China, including by acquiring long-range strike capabilities and new asymmetric capabilities, and exploiting tactics to deal with \u2018cognitive warfare\u2019 undertaken through grey-zone operations. The document sets out Taiwan\u2019s \u2018overall defence concept\u2019 as follows:<\/p>\n

If the enemy launched [an] attack to invade Taiwan, our guiding principles [would be] to \u2018resist the enemy on the opposite shore, attack it at sea, destroy it in the littoral area, and annihilate it on the beachhead,\u2019 and impose multiple interdictions and joint fire strikes to degrade its capabilities, disrupt its offensive and prevent it from landing, so as to ultimately defeat its aggression.<\/p>\n

The requirement for long-range precision fires is key. Taiwan is acquiring 135<\/a> of Boeing\u2019s AGM-84H standoff land attack missile\u2013expanded response, known as the SLAM\u2013ER, which can be air-launched from its F-16 fighters, as well as 11 Lockheed Martin M142 high-mobility artillery rocket systems, or \u00a0HIMARS<\/a>, that will be equipped with 64 army tactical missile systems (ATACMS<\/a>). The SLAM-ER has a range of 270 kilometres and the ATACMS has a range of 300 kilometres, meaning they can strike PLA ports, airbases and facilities in Fujian province.<\/p>\n

These acquisitions give a distinct boost to Taiwan\u2019s ability to strike fast at any Chinese invasion fleet, though the small size of the capability won\u2019t allow for sustained operations against China\u2019s forces.<\/p>\n

Such capabilities also don\u2019t provide an effective response option in the face of air and naval blockades, cyber operations or the seizing of Taiwan\u2019s offshore territories such as Pratas Island, for example.<\/p>\n

The 2021 QDR suggests that asymmetric warfare would be conducted by \u2018small, numerous, smart, stealthy, mobile\u2019 systems, but these are not clearly defined. The emphasis in Taiwanese capability development is on mobile long-range firepower through coastal defence missile systems, mine-laying operations, and information- and electronic-warfare capabilities. Yet the review is vague on how the Taiwanese armed forces will actually respond to asymmetric threats below the level of a full-scale invasion of the island.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s this asymmetric challenge of a graduated escalation of grey-zone actions by China that seems to be the most immediate threat to Taiwan. The QDR acknowledges Chinese hybrid warfare tactics and incorporates it into the Ministry of National Defense\u2019s counter deterrence strategy as Chinese grey zone actions have increased substantially in the past few years. It\u2019s notable that the previous QDR<\/a>, released in 2017, didn\u2019t address<\/a> the threat posed by Chinese grey-zone tactics.<\/p>\n

Beijing has employed its so-called \u2018three warfares<\/a>\u2019 strategy\u2014encompassing psychological, public opinion and legal warfare\u2014using both soft power and sharp power<\/a> to meet its political interests. It has not only attempted to entice<\/a> Taiwanese individuals and businesses to move to and invest in the mainland, in an effort to gradually shift Taiwanese self-identity, but also used media campaigns to spread disinformation and try to sow distrust and friction between the Taiwanese people and the government.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s propaganda campaign, according to the QDR, is designed to \u2018go into the island, every household, everyone\u2019s head and ultimately [every] individual\u2019s mind\u2019. Beijing\u2019s grand strategy to coerce Taiwan isn\u2019t simply a military one and understanding its non-military aspects is key.<\/p>\n

While the six-year timeline is the central challenge for Taiwan, as well as the US and its allies, to tackle, cognitive warfare should also be dealt with tactically. The 2021 QDR recognises that Taipei needs to address Beijing\u2019s grey-zone tactics, which is perhaps a more urgent requirement than even long-range missile systems.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

There\u2019s rising concern about the prospect of a major military crisis erupting across the Taiwan Strait as a result of China\u2019s intention to force Taiwan to unify with the mainland. President Xi Jinping suggested in …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1310,"featured_media":64377,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,381,1414,392],"class_list":["post-64375","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-information-warfare","tag-pla","tag-taiwan"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina military watch | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/china-military-watch-8\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China military watch | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"There\u2019s rising concern about the prospect of a major military crisis erupting across the Taiwan Strait as a result of China\u2019s intention to force Taiwan to unify with the mainland. 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