{"id":64381,"date":"2021-05-10T06:00:10","date_gmt":"2021-05-09T20:00:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=64381"},"modified":"2021-06-04T15:25:01","modified_gmt":"2021-06-04T05:25:01","slug":"aspis-decades-the-9-11-era","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-the-9-11-era\/","title":{"rendered":"ASPI\u2019s decades: The 9\/11 era"},"content":{"rendered":"
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ASPI will celebrate its 20th anniversary later this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2018A US decision to invade Iraq would be a clear demonstration that September 11 had changed the boundaries of US policy in fundamental ways, and perhaps even changed the US psyche. The long-term implications for US foreign policy could be profound.\u2019<\/p>\n

\u2014 <\/span>Australia\u2019s defence after September 11<\/em><\/a>, ASPI, July 2002<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The attacks on New York and Washington transformed US strategic policy. The \u2018war on terror\u2019 defined America\u2019s 9\/11 decade, swiftly shifting Australia\u2019s understanding of the alliance.<\/p>\n

Australia\u2019s shock at the Bali bombings in October 2002 was an echo of what America felt in September 2001. Terrorism suddenly sat at the heart of Canberra\u2019s security thinking.<\/p>\n

The US showed its extraordinary military power as it invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq. As a committed ally, Australia played a small role in the taking of Afghanistan and in the \u2018coalition of the willing\u2019 in Iraq, earning the status of an occupying power.<\/p>\n

Swift military victory could not be translated into peace. What America would come to lament as \u2018forever wars\u2019 were launched. Iraq was \u2018the first major geostrategic blunder<\/a> of the 21st century\u2019, Allan Gyngell told an ASPI conference in 2006.<\/p>\n

For Australian strategy, new life was injected into old arguments about defence of the continent versus the military expeditionary tradition\u2014how to balance a regional focus against vital interests in the global system?<\/p>\n

In mid-2002, the institute issued \u2018a public debate initiative\u2019 titled Australia\u2019s defence after September 11<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>prepared by Aldo Borgu with Hugh White and ASPI\u2019s other program directors.<\/p>\n

Reflecting the times, the guide had tentative answers to a cascade of sharp questions:<\/p>\n

Five years from now, will we look back on September 11, 2001 as being the start of a new era in global security? Will the \u2018war on terror\u2019 involve more major military campaigns? Might terrorists use a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon? Where is the United States heading? Has the US psyche changed? Has the fighting in Afghanistan shown us a new way of war? Do we need different capabilities in our defence force, or a different defence philosophy?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

To the question of whether global security had been redefined, the paper offered: \u2018Perhaps the long-term significance of September 11 will not be that it is the start of a new era in its own right, but rather that it has shown us more clearly the shape of the post-Cold War world in which we live.\u2019<\/p>\n

The problem with President George W. Bush declaring a \u2018war on terror\u2019 was the implication \u2018that the fight against terrorism will be primarily military. This is not the case.\u2019<\/p>\n

Deep US outrage at 9\/11 and a determination to deliver punishment had \u2018greatly amplified\u2019 the Bush administration\u2019s policy instincts. A US invasion of Iraq would show a \u2018fundamental\u2019 change in the US psyche with \u2018profound\u2019 implications for US foreign policy.<\/p>\n

Hugh White, ASPI\u2019s first director (2001\u20132004), wrote<\/a> that within months of the institute being launched, \u2018ASPI staff were among those arguing against an invasion of Iraq for which the government was doing all it could to build support. It is worth noting that [Prime Minister] John Howard never, at least to my knowledge, made any criticism of the role ASPI staff played in the debates over Iraq, which is a telling testament to his commitment to the concept on which it was established.\u2019<\/p>\n

By the time ASPI issued its first strategic assessment<\/a>, in November 2002, it reported a public mood in Australia that \u2018a war in Iraq might be inevitable\u2019. The effect on Australian strategy, Borgu wrote, was to turn Canberra\u2019s eyes away from its \u2018concentric circles\u2019 defence strategy, with the circles radiating out from Australia in priority order:<\/p>\n