{"id":64731,"date":"2021-05-27T14:30:49","date_gmt":"2021-05-27T04:30:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=64731"},"modified":"2021-05-27T13:28:34","modified_gmt":"2021-05-27T03:28:34","slug":"australia-has-more-important-things-to-buy-than-mq-9-drones","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-has-more-important-things-to-buy-than-mq-9-drones\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia has more important things to buy than MQ-9 drones"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Let\u2019s see if we can spot a contradiction here.<\/p>\n

On 25 April, Defence Minister Peter Dutton told the ABC<\/a> war with China over Taiwan could not be ruled out. He did not need to add that, if such a war broke out, Australia, alongside the US, would be fighting fearsome, high-technology enemy forces.<\/p>\n

Two days before, the US State Department approved<\/a> export to Australia of $2.1 billion worth of General Atomics MQ-9B drones\u2014aircraft that are useful only against an enemy that doesn\u2019t shoot back.<\/p>\n

In other words, amid a high and rising Chinese threat to the peace of the Western Pacific, the government is preparing to buy costly equipment for another Middle East campaign.<\/p>\n

Australia is not remotely prepared for a major war against a powerful enemy close to home. Critical improvements to national resilience are urgently needed: for example, improved abilities to repair air bases, supply them with fuel, disperse aircraft to civilian fields, fix aircraft battle damage, and clear sea mines. We also need more pilots.<\/p>\n

Dutton should challenge the Department of Defence to explain why a single dollar should be spent on preparing to go back to the Middle East before these more pressing issues have been attended to.<\/p>\n

MQ-9Bs would be just about useless in a war with China. These propeller-driven aircraft have worse flight performance than World War II fighters and are simply unsurvivable in the face of modern fighters and surface-to-air systems.<\/p>\n

This is not because the MQ-9B is badly designed but, rather, because it is not intended for serious combat or anything like it. As the latest version of the MQ-9 Reaper, it\u2019s tailor made for conducting surveillance of territory occupied by enemies who have only guns or, at most, low-level anti-aircraft missiles. It can also attack targets if they are similarly incapable of defending themselves.<\/p>\n

In a war with China, by contrast, the most that MQ-9Bs could do would be to collect radio signals from a very safe distance, from which they might not collect much at all.<\/p>\n

The prospective Australian order would cover up to 12 MQ-9Bs, according to the US. They would come with an impressively complete array of sensors, communications radios and targeting systems, plus equipment on the ground for control and training. Hardly any weapons are mentioned, and additional facilities in Australia will presumably needed, so the overall budget has to be bigger than $2.1 billion.<\/p>\n

Altogether, this program would indeed produce an excellent force for supporting Australian soldiers on the ground in, say, Afghanistan.<\/p>\n

But Australia is not obliged to turn up in such places with all the equipment it needs. As with attack helicopters<\/a>, it could rely on allies, such as the US and UK, which have similar aircraft and would well understand that Australia was under far too much strategic stress to fully equip itself for secondary wars. That is to say, they would understand something that the Australian Department of Defence evidently does not.<\/p>\n

The MQ-9B should be a doubly unwelcome addition to Australia\u2019s military, because it will be another type added to the aircraft fleet, with consequent complications in support and training. The burdens of a new fleet would not arise if the money were spent instead on, for example, hardening air bases.<\/p>\n

Nor would new burdens arise if the money were used to pay for more aircraft of a type already in service, deepening an important capability rather than adding a new one of low priority. Limiting the conversation to surveillance and intelligence, there are three types, in service or coming into service, for which more units would be highly valuable.<\/p>\n

For $2.1 billion, Defence could probably buy:<\/span><\/p>\n