{"id":65177,"date":"2021-06-21T06:00:20","date_gmt":"2021-06-20T20:00:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=65177"},"modified":"2021-06-20T16:18:37","modified_gmt":"2021-06-20T06:18:37","slug":"aspis-decades-kit-complexity-and-capability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-kit-complexity-and-capability\/","title":{"rendered":"ASPI\u2019s decades: Kit, complexity and capability"},"content":{"rendered":"
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ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001.<\/em><\/p>\n

The military needs kit. Cash builds capability. Such plain propositions to describe such expensive complexity.<\/p>\n

What do we get for what we pay? And we\u2019re paying billions.<\/p>\n

How capable are we with the capability we buy? Getting the kit and capability wrong means taking chances with what fate might throw at us.<\/p>\n

Delay and difficulty and soaring dollars are a tough mix.<\/p>\n

ASPI boss Peter Jennings lamented<\/a> that no story seemed more enjoyable to an Australian audience than to be told our defence equipment purchases were all duds:<\/p>\n

It\u2019s beyond understanding why an Australian Defence Department that\u2019s able to make such sensible decisions on equipment is so chronically unable to explain them. It\u2019s not sustainable to treat Australia\u2019s biggest ever defence investments like secret projects never to be discussed or explained.<\/p>\n

In the absence of those explanations, we will continue to be subjected to an endless stream of critical commentary about the F-35 and future submarines that ranges from the mildly plausible to unhinged conspiracy theories.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

When Andrew Davies stepped down after 12 years as director of ASPI\u2019s defence and strategy program in 2018, he reflected that this period involved seven defence ministers, three defence white papers (though we\u00a0still haven\u2019t finished delivering<\/a>\u00a0the force structure from the 2000 version), two\u00a0and a bit<\/a>\u00a0national shipbuilding plans, two wars and the approval of more than $100 billion in spending on major projects.<\/p>\n

He penned a piece with a typically apt Davies headline, \u2018A farewell to (writing about) arms\u2019<\/a>. \u2018One of the challenges to a job like this,\u2019 he wrote, \u2018is to not slip into a persistently negative mindset regarding defence policy and procurement practices. After all, ASPI\u2019s job is to question the prevailing wisdom, and to be Jiminy Cricket to Defence\u2019s Pinocchio.\u2019<\/p>\n

The trick is to be constructive while being critical, to put forward a way ahead when discussing even the poorest outcomes of previous decisions. And, Davies notes, we must remember that, despite all the missteps along the way, the Australian Defence Force now is much more capable than it was in 2006 when he joined ASPI:<\/p>\n

There are many things that could (and should) have been done faster, cheaper or better\u2014and some that shouldn\u2019t have been done at all\u2014but the average outcome has been an improvement to the nation\u2019s defence capabilities. Of course, it would be alarming indeed if that weren\u2019t the case, given the size of the defence budget and the number of skilled people involved in the enterprise.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Major ASPI case studies tracked the history of kit, big and small:<\/p>\n