{"id":65527,"date":"2021-07-06T06:00:46","date_gmt":"2021-07-05T20:00:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=65527"},"modified":"2021-07-05T17:57:04","modified_gmt":"2021-07-05T07:57:04","slug":"indonesian-peacekeeping-and-civil-military-relations-a-double-edged-sword","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indonesian-peacekeeping-and-civil-military-relations-a-double-edged-sword\/","title":{"rendered":"Indonesian peacekeeping and civil\u2013military relations: a double-edged sword"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

During Indonesia\u2019s two-year stint on the United Nation\u2019s Security Council (2019\u20132020), the country made significant gains not just in promoting peacekeeping operations but in augmenting the role of female peacekeepers<\/a> with the passing of Indonesian-sponsored resolution 2538.<\/p>\n

Since its first first peacekeeping deployment<\/a> of 559 infantry personnel to Sinai in 1957, Indonesia\u2019s commitment to UN peace missions has met many of the country\u2019s foreign and defence policy objectives as well as domestic interests.<\/p>\n

Most notably, these operations have strengthened Indonesia\u2019s constitutionally mandated obligation to be a \u2018free and active\u2019 contributor to global peace and stability. Its participation has garnered reputational dividends for its military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), and police, the Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (POLRI).<\/p>\n

Domestically, Indonesia\u2019s peacekeeping is also driven by a belief that it will enhance military professionalism by promoting interoperability and enhancing skills. However, peacekeeping might be a double-edged sword: what works in the short term for Indonesia\u2019s military capacity may throw up challenges for civil\u2013military relations in the long run. While there are several other factors like patronage systems and strongman nostalgia that influence the civil\u2013military balance in the archipelago, the impact of UN peacekeeping has been a relatively underexamined area in scholarly and policy analysis.<\/p>\n

Since 1998, both civilian and uniformed leaders have pushed for reform of the TNI, starting with its exit from formal politics and separation from the police. Policymakers have also endeavoured to build up the military\u2019s reputation as a capable and externally focused fighting force, leaving behind memories of human rights violations and an obsession for internal security.<\/p>\n

Normatively, while civilians\u2019 influence over the military has grown, including in the development of defence policy, budgets and procurement, uniformed members still hold considerable sway over state affairs. Active and retired generals serve as senior ministers<\/a>, advisers<\/a> and the heads of critical taskforces<\/a>, and the military has a pervasive presence throughout the archipelago due to its territorial command system.<\/p>\n

Peacekeeping affects civil\u2013military relations in three areas. The first is military culture, often defined as the institutional beliefs, practices, attitudes and preferences of a military. It\u2019s important for\u00a0 armed forces\u2019 identity and cohesion, and can also mean<\/a> a military\u2019s \u2018way of war\u2019 or how it fights. Indonesian leaders have attempted to shift<\/a> the TNI\u2019s culture away from an internally focused and land-based mindset to a more externally focused and maritime-based outlook.<\/p>\n

However, as numerous studies show, cultural change takes time. With the lion\u2019s share of Indonesian peacekeeping being land-based operations, there\u2019s ample justification for the army to receive additional funding, resources and training while gaining international experience.<\/p>\n

Since 2009, Jakarta has contributed naval assets<\/a> to the UN Maritime Task Force in Lebanon to support the Lebanese navy; however, that represents a limited proportion of Indonesian peacekeepers. For instance, out of 1,300 personnel deployed in 2018, only around 100 came from the navy<\/a>. The reputational dividend largely goes to ground forces, privileging army officers. This added international exposure potentially reinforces the army\u2019s sense of primacy among the services, and further promotes a land-based culture and influence within the military. As has been demonstrated during Joko Widodo\u2019s presidency, active and retired army officers<\/a> are often first picks for important roles.<\/p>\n

Peacekeeping commitments also justify the TNI\u2019s expansive territorial system across 15 regional commands (or KODAMs) which privilege land-based forces. Due to its geographic circumstances and historical trajectory, Indonesia maintains a military presence throughout the archipelago, in a system that mirrors civilian administration from the provincial level down to the village level.<\/p>\n

Indonesian academic Muhamad Haripin notes in a recent book<\/a> about the country\u2019s non-war military operations that the TNI maintains that the community engagement skills soldiers learn in remote areas of the archipelago are useful in training them for peacekeeping operations and vice versa. He says this logic allows senior military officials to argue that the territorial system is justified, as are its attendant resources, to meet Indonesia\u2019s foreign policy interests.<\/p>\n

While the territorial system was touted as a potential area for reform after 1998, it has endured. Not only has there been a lack of political will to reform it, but it remains useful. The military\u2019s sprawling presence allows it to engage remote communities and, in many cases, the TNI is the only force with the strategic lift, logistics and command-and-control capabilities to properly respond to the country\u2019s frequent natural disasters.<\/p>\n

The military\u2019s remote presence has led to its involvement in areas such as education, counter-radicalisation and health, muddying the division of labour between security forces and civilians.<\/p>\n

For Australia, there are several gains from Indonesia\u2019s continuing passion for peacekeeping. For one, both governments have committed to working towards a co-deployment of their militaries<\/a> on a future UN peacekeeping mission, representing a \u2018new chapter\u2019<\/a> in their comprehensive strategic partnership.<\/p>\n

Expectations of progress on this co-deployment need to be managed, however, in the context of Covid-19 resource constraints. It\u2019s also in Australia\u2019s interests to see further professionalisation of Indonesia\u2019s military and police through international experience. From Canberra\u2019s strategic perspective, while land forces are important for the kinds of potential amphibious operations Indonesia would need to prepare for to defend its Natuna Islands, peacekeeping represents an untapped opportunity to bolster the naval forces Jakarta needs to guard its exclusive economic zone.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s clear that Indonesia and the international community derive many important benefits from peacekeeping. Indonesia\u2019s global reach and presence as a security actor are welcome and Jakarta should rightly be proud of its commitments. It\u2019s among the top 10 contributing countries<\/a> to UN peace missions since 2017.<\/p>\n

However, complexities in domestic civil\u2013military relations result from deploying Indonesian military and police on these operations. The continuing professionalisation of the armed forces must be balanced against the need for a stronger maritime culture. Maintaining a clearer division of labour between civil and military forces while strengthening the forces is no simple feat.<\/p>\n

By being cognisant of some of the tensions and interactions between its foreign policy objectives and domestic aims, and making the requisite adjustments, Indonesia can continue to maximise the value of its contributions to international security while maintaining a civil\u2013military balance at home.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

During Indonesia\u2019s two-year stint on the United Nation\u2019s Security Council (2019\u20132020), the country made significant gains not just in promoting peacekeeping operations but in augmenting the role of female peacekeepers with the passing of Indonesian-sponsored …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":65534,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[64,8,150],"class_list":["post-65527","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-civil-military-relations","tag-indonesia","tag-peacekeeping"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nIndonesian peacekeeping and civil\u2013military relations: a double-edged sword | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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