{"id":65810,"date":"2021-07-19T06:00:40","date_gmt":"2021-07-18T20:00:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=65810"},"modified":"2021-07-16T17:02:01","modified_gmt":"2021-07-16T07:02:01","slug":"aspis-decades-defence-dollars-extreme-ironing-and-extreme-analysis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-defence-dollars-extreme-ironing-and-extreme-analysis\/","title":{"rendered":"ASPI\u2019s decades: Defence dollars, \u2018extreme ironing\u2019 and \u2018extreme analysis\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2018Strategy without money is not strategy.\u2019<\/p>\n

\u2014 Arthur Tange, Secretary of the Department of Defence, 1970\u20131979*<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

On the cover of ASPI\u2019s first defence budget analysis, The cost of defence 2002\u20132003<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>there\u2019s a small picture of a couple of Australian Army vehicles inset into a larger picture of the Department of Defence\u2019s administrative offices at Russell in Canberra.<\/p>\n

Below the pictures is a dollar amount, spelled out in words: \u2018Thirty-nine million, nine hundred and ninety-one thousand, eight hundred and ninety-eight dollars and sixty-three cents per day\u2019.<\/p>\n

That was what Australia budgeted then, every day, to pay for defence. An updated daily dollar figure has since been on the cover of every annual ASPI evaluation of the defence budget.<\/p>\n

For 2021\u201322<\/a>, the spelled out number was \u2018One hundred & twenty-two million, two hundred & forty-two thousand, seven hundred and thirty-nine dollars and seventy-three cents per day\u2019.<\/p>\n

Tracking the cash for the kit, then giving the clearest of explanations, has been an enduring feature of the institute\u2019s approach to its examination of Australia\u2019s defence organisation.<\/p>\n

The second annual budget brief introduced what became an intermittent feature\u2014a cartoon on the cover. Among the cover greatest hits: a cartoon of a submarine firing two torpedoes rendered as barrels loaded with cash, with the words \u2018Pork barrels away!\u2019 issuing from the conning tower; a paper aeroplane labelled \u2018White paper\u2019, with one wing on fire and trailing smoke; a bayonet charge by uniformed kangaroos and koalas, all wearing slouch hats; and a senior officer with many medals smiling at a piece of paper labelled \u2018Defence budget\u2019, exclaiming \u2018Incoming\u2019 as showers of bank notes fall from the sky.<\/p>\n

The cartoons are fun with high purpose.<\/p>\n

The official presentation of the defence budget had always been notoriously opaque and incomprehensible<\/a>, Hugh White wrote in 2016, even to people within government and defence: \u2018ASPI believed that it would be impossible to foster a more rational and better-informed debate on defence priorities without a clear understanding of how the money was being spent and what things cost.\u2019<\/p>\n

For maximum impact, this analysis has to be published only a few weeks after the federal budget is announced in early May, not least to help inform the Senate estimates hearings that begin around the end of May. Recalling the first 2002\u201303 report, White wrote:<\/p>\n

After an astonishing marathon effort, Mark Thomson duly produced the first of what has become an annual series of ASPI defence budget briefs, which was launched in Parliament House in late May. This laid out in clear terms just what the defence budget was being spent on, and how well the numbers added up, as well as including clear recommendations for what could be done better. This immediately established ASPI as the authoritative source of information on and analysis of the hard nuts and bolts of defence policy.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

After a decade watching Thomson do his annual May marathon as a frantic sprint, Andrew Davies pronounced: \u2018Every year I get to watch Mark Thomson pull off a remarkable feat of \u201cextreme analysis\u201d, as he cranks out 260 pages of the annual\u00a0Cost of Defence<\/em>\u00a0report in the couple of weeks after the federal budget is released. (It\u2019s a bit like\u00a0extreme ironing<\/a>, but with fewer shirts and more graphs.)\u2019<\/p>\n

Extreme ironing involves taking an iron and ironing board up mountains, on bikes, on the tops of cars, on parachutes, on skis, and in the midst of war zones. For Canberra, Thomson\u2019s feat of extreme analysis was equally as impressive.<\/p>\n

Not only did he explain the defence organisation to everybody else in government, politics and bureaucracy, he helped explain Defence to itself.<\/p>\n

The sprawling Defence beast was offered a comprehensive yet sharp understanding of its own nature.<\/p>\n

Journalists in the parliamentary press gallery quickly embraced Thomson\u2019s deep understanding and clear exposition. He became a unique resource on the day of the federal budget\u2019s release, when reporters spend six hours in the \u2018lock-up\u2019, confined in parliamentary committee rooms with embargoed copies of the budget until the treasurer rises to speak at 7.30pm. For defence writers, the most welcome arrival (aside from the coffee and sandwiches) was the smiling, lanky figure of Mark Thomson (also locked up) ready to offer a burst of analysis and explanation. The coffee quality was so-so, but the budget-night journalism on Defence got the Thomson version of intellectual caffeine.<\/p>\n

According to the Australian Financial Review<\/em>, the influence of Thomson\u2019s analysis gave him \u2018power\u2019 in the way Canberra dealt with Defence. The paper published an annual list of the most powerful people in Australia\u2014wielding overt, covert or cultural power\u2014and one sector was the five most powerful people in defence. Mark Thomson got the fifth spot in the list in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2011. In the first year he appeared, the list ran: prime minister, defence minister, Defence secretary, chief of the Australian Defence Force, and at number 5, Mark Thomson, with this explanation from Geoffrey Barker:<\/p>\n

Mark who? A new name on the power list. Dr Thomson is budget and management analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He has single-handedly over the past three years made the labyrinthine Defence budget transparent and accessible through his superb post-budget briefs for ASPI. His insights are widely admired and sought in defence, industry and foreign policy circles.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The 2006 list lauded the \u2018unprecedented clarity\u2019 Thomson brought to Defence spending, making him \u2018a powerful and respected Defence insider\u2019. In 2007, the list called him a \u2018star\u2019. In 2010, John Kerin wrote that Thomson ensured \u2018the government provides more certainty for the defence industry on weapons\u2019. In 2011, Kerin said that Thomson\u2019s review of the budget was \u2018once again compulsory reading. Its release is even more anticipated than the budget itself.\u2019<\/p>\n

As well as the annual Cost of Defence work, Thomson ranged widely across the cash\u2013kit\u2013capability nexus. In Pay your money & take your <\/em>pick<\/em><\/a>, in 2003, he considered what sort of defence force Australia could afford by examining five alternative futures and differing levels of defence spending, ranging from a\u00a0modest 1.3% of GDP up to a robust 2.5%.<\/p>\n

At the cheaper end, Australia would have a force less capable than today\u2019s but still able to undertake a credible range of tasks. The problem was that Australia\u2019s relative military strength would erode as regional countries continued to modernise. With the top option, 2.5% of GDP would provide a power-projection capability built around two aircraft carriers and a much expanded army and more capable air force and navy, significantly boosting Australia\u2019s standing as an ally and its role in the region.<\/p>\n

To the question, \u2018How much should Australia spend on defence?\u2019, Thomson responded that there was no \u2018right\u2019 answer. Canberra made choices and trade-offs. Better a modest policy that worked and lasted than a more ambitious one that failed when the money ran out. Joined to that eternal economic judgement about the opportunity costs of government choices was a statement of the strategist\u2019s creed:<\/p>\n

Finally, in all strategic policy making, it is wise to maintain an intelligent pessimism. Lurid and implausible worst-case scenarios should not dominate our thinking, but it is important to bear in mind that strategic policy choices last a long time, and that large and unexpected changes happen surprisingly often. A strategic policy that cannot encompass inherently improbable events is likely to prove inadequate.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Australia\u2019s ability to fund defence was a recurring topic\u2014a discussion ranging from regional power shifts to Australia\u2019s changing demographics. Assuming defence would account for 2% or 3% of Australia\u2019s GDP by mid-century, Thomson\u2019s 2004 calculation was a cash mountain of more than a trillion dollars<\/a>, just to maintain current capabilities through to 2050:<\/p>\n

To many commentators, the question of defence spending is all too simple. You work out what is required so that the Australian Defence Force \u2026 can fight and win in any credible circumstance and you simply pay the bill. And you do this irrespective of competing demands for health, education and prudent economic management. In this view, the government (and ultimately the electorate) retains a steady appetite for national security, no matter what the cost. If only defence planning was that simple.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The reality was a constant set of choices about affordability and risk management<\/a>. The Thomson prediction was that economic needs would batter at Defence\u2019s budget:<\/p>\n

If demographics are destiny, our destiny is mixed. While we should be able to maintain a defence force like we have today\u2014or even somewhat larger\u2014out to 2050, our relative economic weight is set to decline in the decades ahead along with, more than likely, our strategic weight. This, by itself, is not an argument for spending more on defence. Just because we can afford to spend more on defence, does not mean we should; and just because other countries can afford to spend more on defence does not mean that they will.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In 2016, Thomson noted that since he wrote his first Cost of Defence in 2002, capital investment to modernise the force had driven the budget: investment had grown by 120%, operating costs by 46% and personnel costs by 39%. The ADF had become \u2018a little larger, somewhat better managed, much better equipped, and a lot more expensive<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n

Saying goodbye to ASPI in 2018, Thomson worried that multibillion-dollar defence projects were being contorted to\u00a0\u2018buy Australia\u2019<\/a> and serve parochial politics:<\/p>\n

In normal times, the creation of a boutique defence industrial complex in Australia would simply be wasteful. But these aren\u2019t normal times. The\u00a0strategic environment is deteriorating<\/a>\u00a0much more rapidly than current plans are strengthening the ADF. While the government focuses on the\u00a0economically dubious<\/a>\u00a0goal of \u2018creating jobs\u2019 in defence industry, the gap between what the ADF can do and what it might be called upon to do grows by the day.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

* Arthur Tange, quoted by Paul Dibb, \u2018Defence policymaking\u2019, in Peter J. Dean, Stephan Fr\u00fchling and Brendan Taylor (eds), Australia\u2019s defence: towards a new era<\/em>, Melbourne University Press, 2014, p. 166.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001. \u2018Strategy without money is not strategy.\u2019 \u2014 Arthur Tange, Secretary of the Department of Defence, 1970\u20131979* …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":79,"featured_media":65815,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1823,26,38],"class_list":["post-65810","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-defence-budget","tag-defence-spending","tag-department-of-defence"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nASPI\u2019s decades: Defence dollars, \u2018extreme ironing\u2019 and \u2018extreme analysis\u2019 | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-defence-dollars-extreme-ironing-and-extreme-analysis\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"ASPI\u2019s decades: Defence dollars, \u2018extreme ironing\u2019 and \u2018extreme analysis\u2019 | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. 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