{"id":65946,"date":"2021-07-23T06:00:18","date_gmt":"2021-07-22T20:00:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=65946"},"modified":"2021-07-22T18:23:42","modified_gmt":"2021-07-22T08:23:42","slug":"managing-risk-in-the-submarine-transition-is-there-a-plan-b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/managing-risk-in-the-submarine-transition-is-there-a-plan-b\/","title":{"rendered":"Managing risk in the submarine transition: Is there a Plan B?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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In my last post, I looked at<\/a> the latest information on the life-of-type extension program for the Royal Australian Navy\u2019s Collins-class submarines. That\u2019s essentially Defence\u2019s strategic risk mitigator for its long submarine transition. But it\u2019s part and parcel of Plan A, the current plan. It\u2019s not an alternative or a Plan B. Let\u2019s look at what we\u2019ve learned about possible Plan Bs for submarine capability that the government and Defence might be considering.<\/p>\n

Outside of Defence, there are many Plan Bs being proposed for the submarine transition and no consensus has emerged. It\u2019s a confused space with people talking past each other. That\u2019s partly because some regard Plan B as a replacement for Plan A, while others think it\u2019s something in addition to Plan A. Some argue that it\u2019s something we should be embarking on now; others regard it as something to have in our back pocket just in case. But if it\u2019s something Defence should be holding as a contingency plan, what are the triggers that would make it use it? Some commentators are convinced we\u2019re there already, but the government and Defence haven\u2019t publicly set any red lines.<\/p>\n

Generally, the proposers\u2019 Plan Bs mirror what they thought Plan A should have been in the first place. If you think Plan A should have been the acquisition of a different large, conventional submarine, then that\u2019s your Plan B. One variant of this Plan B that has some vociferous backers is the idea of reopening<\/a> the submarine competition to reinject commercial tension and rescue a Commonwealth taken \u2018hostage\u2019 by the French.<\/p>\n

This could involve the original unsuccessful participants in the submarine competitive evaluation process, or Saab, which wasn\u2019t included in the first place. But telling the French that Australia isn\u2019t committed may not bring the increased commitment from Naval Group that such an approach seeks. And other potential candidates have been burned already. The bottom line is that Naval Group has a five-year head start over any path seeking to design and build a new large, conventional submarine.<\/p>\n

If you think it should have been nuclear-propelled submarines (SSNs), then that\u2019s your Plan B. But there\u2019s no convincing map yet for what that path looks like. Its perhaps possible that SSNs could become part of Plan A at some point in the future should the government decide to switch from building Attack-class boats to SSNs, but there\u2019s no credible way to get that capability faster than Plan A.<\/p>\n

There doesn\u2019t seem to be any Plan B that can deliver the kind of submarine capability Defence wants faster than Plan A. Therefore, another strand of Plan Bs involves dialling the navy\u2019s capability aspirations down to open up other solutions. One that received some attention earlier this year is the acquisition of an interim submarine. Media reporting<\/a> claimed Defence was considering the acquisition of an off-the-shelf boat such as the German Type 212 made by TKMS as a stopgap measure. At first glance, a \u2018Super Hornet\u2019 option might seem appealing. Acquiring off-the shelf boats built overseas could provide the navy with some capability, even that\u2019s well short of the range and endurance it seeks from the Attack class, and mitigate the risk in the transition.<\/p>\n

But it seems unlikely the navy would accept a boat that didn\u2019t have the AN\/BYG-1 combat system and Mk-48 torpedo used by the Collins and Attack classes and the US Navy. That would create interoperability problems not just with our ally but inside the RAN itself. If Defence did seek to integrate the AN\/BYG-1, the design and delivery times that would generate would likely get us into the 2030s anyway. The other difficulty for the navy is what to do with them once the Attack class starts arriving. It\u2019s going to be hard enough managing two fleets of submarines during the 10-year overlap between the Collins and Attack classes. It hard to see Defence managing three.<\/p>\n

Despite the debate in the public sphere, the government\u2019s and Defence\u2019s thinking around Plan Bs remains opaque. I\u2019ve previously examined some of the more excited claims that the government is considering walking away from the Attack class and regard them as highly improbable<\/a>. But Senate estimates hearings in early June confirmed that Defence has at least put some thought into the Plan B space. However, with the department continuing to deflect senators\u2019 questioning, it\u2019s difficult to say where that thinking is heading.<\/p>\n

Overall, there seem to be two broad approaches inside Defence. The secretary, Greg Moriarty, acknowledged his concerns about the Attack class and stated it was prudent to look at alternatives<\/a>:<\/p>\n