{"id":6633,"date":"2013-05-28T12:15:56","date_gmt":"2013-05-28T02:15:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=6633"},"modified":"2013-05-29T14:56:31","modified_gmt":"2013-05-29T04:56:31","slug":"cold-calculations-our-antarctic-choices","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/cold-calculations-our-antarctic-choices\/","title":{"rendered":"Cold calculations: our Antarctic choices"},"content":{"rendered":"
The 2013 Defence White Paper says<\/a> that: \u2018There is no credible risk of Australia\u2019s national interests in the Southern Ocean and the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) being challenged in ways that might require substantial military responses over the next few decades\u2019. But in the decades to come, major military conflict between the major powers could well have an Antarctic dimension, given the possible role of Antarctic bases in surveillance and satellite monitoring<\/a>. There\u2019s also the possible scenario where we might have to deal with illegal, unreported or unregulated resource exploitation in our territory or elsewhere in Antarctica.<\/p>\n Over recent weeks, contributors to The Strategist<\/i> have looked at a range of issues relating to our Antarctic policy, and have set out a cluster of major national interests that we pursue in\u00a0the Antarctic. These include sustaining opportunities for critical scientific research and cooperation, resource conservation and environmental protection, and geostrategic interests that involve economic and security considerations. The last relates to maintaining a stable political and legal order in the region, especially the demilitarisation of the continent, that\u2019s dependent on the preservation of the Antarctic treaty<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Antarctic treaty is the international vehicle through which we pursue our polar interests. It continues to serve our national interests well, particularly in offsetting any latent conflicts over territorial claims<\/a>. This year\u2019s Defence White Paper points out<\/a> that in coming decades the Antarctic treaty might come under pressure as resources become scarcer elsewhere. The Madrid Protocol forbids exploration and exploitation of Antarctic minerals but, as Pat Quilty\u2019s post noted<\/a>, ‘Ultimately, resources of sufficient strategic or economic value will be exploited for a resource hungry world. International agreements can always be re-negotiated\u2019. Our diplomatic efforts to protect and advance the Antarctic treaty are being diminished by shrinking resources in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which has responsibility for leading our delegations in treaty meetings. (This year\u2019s budget subjects DFAT to significant efficiency measures<\/a>.)<\/p>\n Several contributors to our series noted that our Antarctic investment is struggling: our research and logistic infrastructure is aging<\/a> and we\u2019re facing critical decisions about our future access to and activities within Antarctica. At the same time, others are rapidly building their presence in our territory\u2014so we\u2019re running the risk of being left behind. China\u2019s established a station at Dome A<\/a>, the highest point of the AAT. India\u2019s opened a base near Davis Station. China\u2019s building a new icebreaker and will soon take its presence in the AAT to three stations, with the addition of a second inland station. (A fourth Chinese station is proposed in the adjacent New Zealand sector<\/a>). There\u2019s even talk of Iran establishing an Antarctic base<\/a>. Meanwhile, we\u2019ve got no presence in the Australian Antarctic Territory\u2019s (AAT) eastern sector, besides Mawson\u2019s Hut at Cape Denison<\/a>.<\/p>\n On research matters, \u2018big science\u2019 in Antarctica<\/a> now focuses on Southern Ocean oceanographic and ecosystem research, the stability of the Antarctic ice sheets and deep-drilled ice cores. <\/b>But our capacity in these areas is weakening. China\u2019s deep field capabilities in our territory, for example, position it to find the \u2018holy grail\u2019 of old ice: a million-year ice core.<\/p>\n China, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Korea and South Africa have launched or announced new icebreakers in recent years. Australia\u2019s Aurora Australis,\u00a0<\/i>the Antarctic program\u2019s multi-purpose icebreaker vessel, is approaching the end of its serviceable life. But there was some silver lining in this year\u2019s budget: provision was made for life extension works, at a cost of $7.9 million over four years, on the Aurora Australis<\/i>, and <\/b>Hobart’s Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre received $25 million to continue its work on Antarctic climate science. As well, the government has <\/i>allocated $1.7 million for the development of a business case for a new Antarctic shipping capability<\/p>\n But that was a bright point in an otherwise gloomy picture. We run our Antarctic program on the smell of an oily rag: for this coming financial year it\u2019s overall budget is $169 million<\/a>, an 8% cut from last year. A continued downward trajectory in budget allocations might well lead to closure or mothballing of stations, reduced scientific gains and a diminished standing in Antarctic affairs.<\/p>\n Other nations\u2019 deep field logistic capabilities allow them to visit parts of our territory that we\u2019ve never seen and can\u2019t get to. They give them their own place names<\/a>. Yet our inter-continental air link is unreliable in mid-summer\u2014the time of peak demand\u2014and it only services Casey station. It can\u2019t provide a solution for intra-continental movements (which require ski-equipped aircraft). We\u2019re not using Defence resources to support our Antarctic program. But many other nations use military personnel and equipment<\/a> to support their polar logistics. <\/b>(It’s part of the verification regime that they should report the use of military personnel, but many don\u2019t.)<\/p>\n If we\u2019re fair dinkum about pursuing our Antarctic interests, we need to be active in Antarctica. But our present capability means that we can\u2019t match what others are doing in our territory, let alone lead. We\u2019ll need to invest more if we\u2019re going to regain our position as a leading Antarctic player, particularly in our own patch, and ensure that critical Antarctic science is adequately funded and supported. We should be serious about Antarctica; it\u2019s part of Australia. Our role there gives us international influence in Antarctic affairs, as well as opportunities to work with Asia<\/a>. The Australia in the Asian Century <\/i>White Paper also promotes the importance of fostering closer cooperation with China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia and other partners on Antarctic research and logistics.<\/p>\n We could start by commissioning a replacement icebreaker, and increasing our reach within our territory by providing deep field traverse and air access. We could then establish an ongoing presence in the unoccupied eastern sector. The lack of progress is disappointing. Six years ago in a co-authored ASPI report<\/a> I wrote that:<\/p>\n We need a solid foundation for planning Australia\u2019s Antarctic policy over the next decade\u2026 Without [it], the government can\u2019t make good decisions about the investment we make in the Antarctic region and how we best use our strengths and attributes to ensure our Antarctic future.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n We need a long-term plan for Antarctica: the white continent demands a white paper from the next Australian government.<\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n