{"id":66779,"date":"2021-08-30T06:00:25","date_gmt":"2021-08-29T20:00:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=66779"},"modified":"2021-08-29T17:12:47","modified_gmt":"2021-08-29T07:12:47","slug":"aspis-decades-the-iraq-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-the-iraq-war\/","title":{"rendered":"ASPI\u2019s decades: The Iraq War"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001.<\/em><\/p>\n

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ran through Australian military thought and actions for two decades.<\/p>\n

The total cost of Australian military operations<\/a> in Afghanistan over the 20 years was $8.5 billion. The total cost of Australian operations in Iraq to June 2021 was $4.1 billion.<\/p>\n

ASPI\u2019s inaugural director, Hugh White, recalled that, as the institute\u2019s first reports were being written in 2002, Australians \u2018were starting to debate an issue which became unquestionably the most divisive question<\/a> of national strategic policy since Vietnam\u2014the proposal to invade Iraq\u2019.<\/p>\n

ASPI staff had to be part of that debate, White wrote, but it raised serious challenges for a new institute looking to establish its role as a government-owned and -funded but independent policy player:<\/p>\n

The potential for ASPI to find itself embroiled in intense and difficult public debates had, of course, been recognised and accepted from the outset, and some important principles had been established and embodied in ASPI\u2019s charter: that ASPI as an institution would hold no view, but present the views of staff and others who contributed to its work, and that it would seek to publish a range of views on contentious issues. These principles served ASPI well, but it was nonetheless a stern test to find that, within a few months of its launch, ASPI staff were among those arguing against an invasion of Iraq for which the government was doing all it could to build support.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

As one of only four members of the military coalition that deposed Iraq\u2019s government in March and April 2003, Australia shared responsibility for what Iraq would become.<\/p>\n

On 1 May, US President George W. Bush declared \u2018the end of major combat operations\u2019, while ASPI released a paper on 9 May on \u2018postwar Iraq from a distinctively Australian perspective<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n

Australia was a member of the transitional authority and had a direct responsibility for Iraq\u2019s future, Elsina Wainwright noted. Having participated in the military action, she said, Australia had a moral obligation to contribute to the replacement of the deposed regime with a new and better alternative.<\/p>\n

Practically, the United States and the United Kingdom wanted Australia to sustain an active role in Iraq\u2019s administration and political evolution. If things went badly, there was a clear risk the engagement could drag on indefinitely. Australia needed to set a clear limit to its commitment to the reconstruction process. Wainwright also identified\u2014\u2018not in any priority order\u2019\u2014a lengthy list of Australia\u2019s interests in the outcome:<\/p>\n