{"id":68229,"date":"2021-10-29T14:30:28","date_gmt":"2021-10-29T03:30:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=68229"},"modified":"2021-10-29T14:23:49","modified_gmt":"2021-10-29T03:23:49","slug":"explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/","title":{"rendered":"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Proudly non-aligned, Indonesia never loses an opportunity to reiterate that it has no intention of choosing sides in the Indo-Pacific\u2019s evolving great-power contest.<\/p>\n

But that doesn\u2019t mean it always treats both sides equitably.<\/p>\n

Take the question of the regional arms race, about which Indonesia\u2019s foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, is evidently \u2018deeply concerned\u2019<\/a> and of which, it seems, the catalyst was Canberra\u2019s announcement that Australia will acquire eight nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS pact with the United Kingdom and the United States over the coming decades.<\/p>\n

The Indonesian government revealed its consternation in an official statement<\/a>. It felt sufficiently disquieted to remind Australia, one of only two countries with which Indonesia has a comprehensive strategic partnership, of its non-proliferation and other international legal obligations and its commitments to preserving peace in line with ASEAN\u2019s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.<\/p>\n

Indonesian legislators<\/a> were quick to pile on, affirming the argument that Australia\u2019s prospective submarines threatened the neighbourhood\u2019s peace and demanding that Indonesia confront Australia over the issue. Indonesian media commentators also tended to jump on this censorious bandwagon.<\/p>\n

The issue has now generated enough political energy to drive Indonesia\u2019s foreign ministry (Kemlu) to consider advocating<\/a> a change to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) presumably aimed at preventing non-nuclear-weapon states, including Australia, from acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, which the NPT currently doesn\u2019t block.<\/p>\n

From Jakarta\u2019s perspective, the problem appears not to be that Canberra is intent on breaching the letter of international arms treaties, but rather that it intends not to \u2018abide by the spirit\u2019 of them.<\/p>\n

One area of concern is presumably the threat of diversion; that is, that the weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) used to fuel British, American and other nuclear submarines might end up in a nuclear weapons program.<\/p>\n

Few Indonesians seem to believe that Australia would have such nefarious designs. The fear seems to be more that Australia\u2019s acquisition of submarines of this specification would set a precedent that others less deserving of the benefit of such doubt would follow.<\/p>\n

Another concern seems to relate to the implications of Australia\u2019s acquisition for such issues as the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) if, as looks most likely, Australia builds submarines powered by HEU from the US\u2019s slowly shrinking stockpile<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The impact of eight submarine reactors on US stocks might not be profound but it wouldn\u2019t be negligible. Unless the US shifts to lowly enriched uranium (LEU)\u2014which, ironically, is what France uses in the submarines of which Australia originally sought to build a conventional version\u2014or to non-weapons-grade LEU+ fuel for its future generations of naval vessels, fuelling even eight new boats would accelerate the need for Washington to produce a new stock of HEU.<\/p>\n

Such an outcome would not only fly in the face of Indonesia\u2019s efforts to codify an FMCT. It would run counter to the US\u2019s own stated interest in having such an instrument. Australia, too, has been an active player in negotiations<\/a> on the FMCT, and officially remains committed to developing a viable regime to \u2018reduce the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n

It would be tempting to dismiss Jakarta\u2019s statement and subsequent comments on at least two grounds.<\/p>\n

First, no matter how measured it might be, an official public statement implying that Australia needs to be reminded about keeping true to its non-proliferation obligations is excessive if the only prospective violation is in spirit rather than an actual breach.<\/p>\n

Indonesia has rightly criticised Australian politicians for megaphone diplomacy in the past. In this case, Indonesia\u2019s message was hardly blared out, but it was no less a performative gesture directed at a domestic constituency primed to hear its call.<\/p>\n

The administration could easily have raised its worries through the closed diplomatic channels it normally insists Australia use when it has concerns with Indonesia. Given that Australia\u2019s non-proliferation credentials are impeccable and that it has worked assiduously and in good faith on arms control instruments for decades, it has surely earned enough credit for Jakarta to have broached the matter in this way and spirit.<\/p>\n

The second ground is the lack of evenhandedness.<\/p>\n

Jakarta\u2019s preoccupations with Australia\u2019s long-term military aspirations evidently don\u2019t equally extend to the actual behaviour of the other country with which Indonesia has a comprehensive strategic partnership: China.<\/p>\n

Any observer scanning the horizon over Jakarta is more likely to spot a Chinese hypersonic missile than a comment from the Indonesian government that such a weapon system might constitute a clear and all too present danger to its hopes that the region won\u2019t be caught up in an arms race.<\/p>\n

Jakarta\u2019s official statements (or lack thereof) instead suggest that it sees hypothetical Australian nuclear-powered submarines intended to carry only conventional weapons as somehow posing a more serious risk to regional peace and the international rules-based order than a new class of missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead out of China.<\/p>\n

Indonesia could rightly counter that China, as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, has a right to arm itself with nuclear weapons\u2014a prerogative that Australia, an NPT signatory in good standing, neither has nor seeks to achieve illicitly.<\/p>\n

It could point to the fact that the US is also working on hypersonic missiles and that Australia<\/a> is a willing partner in that endeavour.<\/p>\n

So, Jakarta may justifiably argue, it would be inappropriate for it to \u2018note cautiously\u2019 China\u2019s actions or remind it to adhere to its legal obligations, since its actions breach none of them.<\/p>\n

But for a country seemingly so worried about Australia\u2019s compliance with the spirit of arms control regimes, its silence on China\u2019s activities in military technology and modernisation hardly suggests consistency.<\/p>\n

This is doubly so in view of Indonesia\u2019s criticism of the NPT nuclear-weapon states for failing to abide by their obligations to move towards disarmament, which historically it has articulated on behalf of the non-aligned movement in UN forums such as the Conference on Disarmament.<\/p>\n

It would therefore be well aware that China is the only NPT nuclear-weapon state that is increasing its nuclear arsenal<\/a>, which is surely an actual in-spirit breach, not just a prospective one.<\/p>\n

Nothing reflects this distinction better than the reaction<\/a> of Indonesia\u2019s coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment, Luhut Pandjaitan, to a contemporaneous issue with Kemlu\u2019s AUKUS statement.<\/p>\n

Responding to questions as to why Indonesia hadn\u2019t reacted publicly to China\u2019s apparent hydrographic surveying of the sea floor in Indonesia\u2019s exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands, Luhut stated, \u2018We don\u2019t feel we have issues with China.\u2019<\/p>\n

\u2018It\u2019s like with your brothers and sisters,\u2019 he said. \u2018Sometimes you have problems but don\u2019t make it into a big problem.\u2019<\/p>\n

That Luhut considers China\u2019s continuing flagrant violation of Indonesia\u2019s sovereignty as legitimised under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)\u2014another instrument, incidentally, to which Jakarta felt obliged to refer in its statement on Australia\u2019s submarines\u2014so little a problem that it warrants no official public response is noteworthy.<\/p>\n

One can only speculate as to why arguably Indonesia\u2019s most powerful person sees things this way.<\/p>\n

Indonesia has long repudiated China\u2019s nine-dash-line-based claims in the South China Sea as incongruous with UNCLOS. Spooked by China\u2019s earlier actions near the Natunas, more recently it has cited<\/a> the 2016 arbitral tribunal\u2019s decision in a note verbale<\/em> to the UN contradicting China\u2019s claims. It has toiled in ASEAN to resist China\u2019s efforts to bilateralise the South China Sea issue and to promote a just, UNCLOS-based solution.<\/p>\n

Moreover, Indonesia\u2019s accelerating efforts to modernise its military<\/a>, especially its air and sea assets, as well as its defence cooperation with the US, are no less a response to China\u2019s bullying in Indonesia\u2019s northern approaches than Australia\u2019s are.<\/p>\n

So, to say that Indonesia hasn\u2019t been balanced in its official response to the most recent Australian and Chinese actions is not to suggest that it has taken an intentional position on China\u2019s side and against the US and its allies.<\/p>\n

But by the same token it\u2019s hard to avoid the conclusion that when it comes to comprehensive strategic partners, in Jakarta\u2019s eyes one is more equal than the other; and that, for all the arguments about norms and \u2018spirit\u2019, the underlying explanation for the difference is realpolitik.<\/p>\n

Jakarta knows it can get away scot-free with casting veiled aspersions about Australia\u2019s behaviour as an international citizen in a way it can\u2019t with its other close strategic partner.<\/p>\n

Still, we shouldn\u2019t let these inconsistencies on Jakarta\u2019s part stop us from responding seriously to its concerns, which, while exaggerated and amplified by their transmission, aren\u2019t theoretically invalid.<\/p>\n

Indeed, it would be prudent for Canberra to go out of its way to assuage them. It should make a virtue of such a necessity by taking sensible measures (perhaps like those proposed by experts in the field<\/a>) that would practically reiterate Australia\u2019s commitments to non-proliferation.<\/p>\n

And it should do so in as open, cooperative fashion\u2014in the spirit of a close strategic partner.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Proudly non-aligned, Indonesia never loses an opportunity to reiterate that it has no intention of choosing sides in the Indo-Pacific\u2019s evolving great-power contest. But that doesn\u2019t mean it always treats both sides equitably. Take the …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1241,"featured_media":68234,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,52,56,8],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nExplaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Proudly non-aligned, Indonesia never loses an opportunity to reiterate that it has no intention of choosing sides in the Indo-Pacific\u2019s evolving great-power contest. But that doesn\u2019t mean it always treats both sides equitably. Take the ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2021-10-29T03:30:28+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2021-10-29T03:23:49+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/GettyImages-594329980.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"683\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"David Engel\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"David Engel\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"7 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/GettyImages-594329980.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/GettyImages-594329980.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":683,\"caption\":\"NATUNA, RANAI, INDONESIA - AUGUST 17: A security ship crew of Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, works on the map during a patrol in the South China Sea on August 17, 2016 in Natuna, Ranai, Indonesia. Amidst the escalated tensions at the South China Sea, Indonesia continues to maintain its sovereignty over the Natuna Islands through security patrols along Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which overlaps China's nine-dash line, an area which Beijing claims as its \\\"traditional fishing grounds\\\". After a series of face-offs between government vessels and illegal fishermen, the Indonesian government sank 60 illegal foreign vessels to mark its Independence Day while announcing that it seeks to rename the South China Sea to the Natuna Sea in the area within 200 nautical miles of the Natuna Islands. Aiming a hardline approach to its neighboring countries, including China, to be in control of its territory, Indonesian President Joko Widodo launched a campaign to strengthen Indonesian fisheries, oil exploration and defence facilities around the Natuna islands. (Photo by Ulet Ifansasti\/Getty Images)\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/\",\"name\":\"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2021-10-29T03:30:28+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2021-10-29T03:23:49+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/8143ffe51018dbf1b95cac3e4c4d4757\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/8143ffe51018dbf1b95cac3e4c4d4757\",\"name\":\"David Engel\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7dea68b6accc6054bacc8ac4ebce1bbb?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7dea68b6accc6054bacc8ac4ebce1bbb?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"David Engel\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/david-engel\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China | The Strategist","og_description":"Proudly non-aligned, Indonesia never loses an opportunity to reiterate that it has no intention of choosing sides in the Indo-Pacific\u2019s evolving great-power contest. But that doesn\u2019t mean it always treats both sides equitably. Take the ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2021-10-29T03:30:28+00:00","article_modified_time":"2021-10-29T03:23:49+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1024,"height":683,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/GettyImages-594329980.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"David Engel","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"David Engel","Est. reading time":"7 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/GettyImages-594329980.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/GettyImages-594329980.jpg","width":1024,"height":683,"caption":"NATUNA, RANAI, INDONESIA - AUGUST 17: A security ship crew of Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, works on the map during a patrol in the South China Sea on August 17, 2016 in Natuna, Ranai, Indonesia. Amidst the escalated tensions at the South China Sea, Indonesia continues to maintain its sovereignty over the Natuna Islands through security patrols along Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which overlaps China's nine-dash line, an area which Beijing claims as its \"traditional fishing grounds\". After a series of face-offs between government vessels and illegal fishermen, the Indonesian government sank 60 illegal foreign vessels to mark its Independence Day while announcing that it seeks to rename the South China Sea to the Natuna Sea in the area within 200 nautical miles of the Natuna Islands. Aiming a hardline approach to its neighboring countries, including China, to be in control of its territory, Indonesian President Joko Widodo launched a campaign to strengthen Indonesian fisheries, oil exploration and defence facilities around the Natuna islands. (Photo by Ulet Ifansasti\/Getty Images)"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/","name":"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2021-10-29T03:30:28+00:00","dateModified":"2021-10-29T03:23:49+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/8143ffe51018dbf1b95cac3e4c4d4757"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/explaining-indonesias-lopsided-treatment-of-its-two-strategic-partners-australia-and-china\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Explaining Indonesia\u2019s lopsided treatment of its two \u2018strategic partners\u2019\u2014Australia and China"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/8143ffe51018dbf1b95cac3e4c4d4757","name":"David Engel","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7dea68b6accc6054bacc8ac4ebce1bbb?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7dea68b6accc6054bacc8ac4ebce1bbb?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"David Engel"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/david-engel\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68229"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1241"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68229"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68229\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":68233,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68229\/revisions\/68233"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/68234"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68229"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68229"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68229"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}