{"id":69285,"date":"2021-12-13T06:00:15","date_gmt":"2021-12-12T19:00:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=69285"},"modified":"2021-12-12T11:37:52","modified_gmt":"2021-12-12T00:37:52","slug":"aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/","title":{"rendered":"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001.<\/em><\/p>\n

In Australian strategy today, to talk of the US is to talk of China.<\/p>\n

The two giants stand together\u2014or face off\u2014in a joined dynamic that defines the era. The US and China dominate global business<\/a> like never before, just as they drive geopolitics.<\/p>\n

Australia\u2019s strategic dilemma had such fundamental force that it became the standard foreign policy trope of ASPI\u2019s two decades: the balance between the alliance partner and the top trading partner. Or the choice.<\/p>\n

The evolution of the great dilemma tracks through Australian policy documents.<\/p>\n

The 2000 defence white paper<\/a> had a comforting, clear hierarchy on the contents page: the chapter on \u2018Australia\u2019s international strategic relationships\u2019 had as the first topic heading, \u2018The US Alliance\u2019. No other country was mentioned on the contents page\u2014they were implied in headings about regions, relationships and neighbours. It was the contents page of a contented nation.<\/p>\n

The 2009 white paper<\/a> had sharper headings, and the giants were in view: \u2018US strategic primacy\u2019 and \u2018The strategic implications of the rise of China\u2019.<\/p>\n

Come the 2013 white paper<\/a>, the two powers were joined in the discussion of strategic outlook: \u2018The United States and China\u2019. That joining of the US and China was the heading repeated in the 2016\u00a0defence white paper<\/a> and the 2017 foreign policy white paper<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The 2020 defence strategic update<\/a> declared that strategic competition between the US and China \u2018will be the principal driver of strategic dynamics in our region\u2019.<\/p>\n

Drawing on the 2016 white paper, the 2020 update defined the factors that would shape Australia\u2019s strategic environment; the top two were \u2018the roles of the United States and China\u2019 and \u2018challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order\u2019.<\/p>\n

Here was the great-power arc of the first two decades of the 21st\u00a0century in Australia\u2019s region. China\u2019s rise as Asia\u2019s paramount power intersected with US strategic primacy.<\/p>\n

In 2004, in Power shift: challenges for Australia in northeast Asia<\/em><\/a>, William Tow and Russell Trood wrote that China aimed to maximise its regional influence, and minimise America\u2019s, in a long-term, zero-sum competition for power and influence in Asia.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s aspirations for regional leadership had transformed its regional and international diplomacy in the 1990s. Once shy of regional institutions, Tow and Trood said, Beijing had concluded that those institutions could advance and protect its interests while simultaneously limiting Washington:<\/p>\n

China has embarked on a comprehensive strategy to become a pre-eminent regional power, one that is able to shape the international system to its advantage and not merely respond to events as best it can. This is a long-term goal, rooted in pragmatism and reality. It recognises, for example, that the US is a hegemonic power with effectively unassailable global reach. But China appears to believe that within the Asia\u2013Pacific region it can balance and constrain American actions and options. And where Chinese vital interests are threatened by the US\u2014especially in relation to Taiwan\u2014they will be defended.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Peter Jennings wrote in 2005 that Australia was caught between optimism and fear<\/a>:<\/p>\n

We are enthralled with the prospect of doing more business with one of the world\u2019s most dynamic economies, whose growth already underpins Australia\u2019s prosperity. But we are suspicious of China\u2019s authoritarian political system, and worried about their potential to turn economic power into military and strategic muscle.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

A \u2018tidal wave of common sense\u2019<\/a> had swept through Asia as the region\u2019s leadership emphasised economic growth, Kishore Mahbubani told ASPI\u2019s 2005 conference. Throughout the region, Mahbubani said, the guns had fallen silent: \u2018There are virtually no major wars anywhere across the Asia\u2013Pacific.\u2019 The fundamental dynamic for coming decades should be the focus on development and growth as more of Asia joined the middle class.<\/p>\n

What the US did in Asia, Mahbubani said, would \u2018set the tone\u2019 on the great-power front. Paradoxically, he said, America was both the greatest source for stability in the region and also the greatest source for instability in the region.<\/p>\n

The US was still the sole great power, Wang Gungwu told ASPI\u2019s 2007 conference. China was certainly a rising power, he said, but only a rising regional power. History suggested that it would be an aberration for China<\/a> to reach far beyond the region, Wang said:<\/p>\n

Most of the projections of China\u2019s \u2018superpower\u2019 or Great Power potential consist of hyperbolic optimism or alarmist pessimism. They are based on assumptions that have no precedent in Chinese history and use modern analogies like the rise of Germany and Japan in the 20th century. These fail to underscore the disastrous endings to both those adventures and assume that the Chinese are stupid and will not learn from history about the dangers of nationalist and militarist power.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Jian Zhang argued that Beijing and Washington had fundamentally different views of Asia\u2019s future regional order. And he penned a succinct version of the \u2018biggest dilemma\u2019<\/a> facing Australia: \u2018With China\u2019s rising influence and its increasing desire to shape the regional order, a key policy challenge for Canberra is how to balance its relationship with both Washington and Beijing to protect and advance Australia\u2019s diverse interests.\u2019<\/p>\n

Surveying Australia and the US in a new strategic age<\/a> in 2005, Rod Lyon judged that the US might no longer want the alliances it needed during the Cold War. To be effective, alliances might need different characteristics from those of the past 50\u00a0years. ANZUS could remain largely the property of the Department of Defence, or could become the property of many Australian government departments. In the first option, ANZUS would remain reactive, applicable to a world of defence and deterrence; in the second, it would become proactive, aimed at a new class of adversaries:<\/p>\n

The Australian\u2013US security partnership has already been partly reinvented, given that Australia sits comparatively far forward in the saddle in the War on Terror. The pressures for reinvention don\u2019t arise solely from the Bush Administration, or from the supposed influence of the neo-cons within it. They arise from a deeper and more fundamental shift in the nature of the security environment, and are likely to grow rather than shrink in the years ahead.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In 2006, separate papers from US economist David Hale and Australian Sinologist Ross Terrill examined the implications of China\u2019s unprecedented growth.<\/p>\n

Hale saw China as the first major test<\/a> of the capacity of the global system of states to cope with a new great power. Despite the natural suspicions of China in Washington, Tokyo and elsewhere, Hale believed, the odds were high that the system would accommodate China, not least because of China\u2019s self-interest:<\/p>\n

China has become so integrated with the global economy that she can no longer pursue a high-risk foreign policy without jeopardising her economic prosperity. China is likely to become a threat to other countries only if she experiences domestic political instability which produces an upsurge of nationalism or a search for external scapegoats to blame for local problems. The Communist regime appears to be firmly entrenched and is unlikely to lose power any time in the near future.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

For Terrill, China raised questions<\/a> about the relative weights of the colonial past and a globalised future, the role of democracy in East Asia, the message (if any) China had for Asia and the world, and the comparative experiences of China and the former Soviet Union.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s foreign policy goals would be shaped by the evolution of its political system and the reaction of other powers to its ambitions, Terrill wrote:<\/p>\n

Chinese foreign policy seeks to maximise stability at home, sustain China\u2019s impressive economic growth, and maintain peace in China\u2019s complicated geographic situation. More problematically, it also seeks to blunt US influence in East Asia and \u2018regain\u2019 territories that in many cases are disputed by others. Some uncertainty exists as to whether Beijing seeks to redress grievances of the past or attain a new pre-eminence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Terrill\u2019s conclusion was that China was an aspiring great power, yet still constrained at home and likely to act prudently if faced with countervailing power.<\/p>\n

Surveying the global financial crisis<\/a> of 2007\u201308, Geoffrey Garrett said the crash was born in the US, \u2018the product of too loose money and too lax regulation, aided and abetted by China\u2019s willingness to give the US endless credit so long as Chinese goods continued to fly off American shelves\u2019.<\/p>\n

The century\u2019s two most important countries were \u2018Chimerica\u2019, joined at the economic hip but wary of each other\u2019s ambitions, with radically different world views:<\/p>\n

What China and the US do\u2014alone, together, or in conflict\u2014will increasingly define the global bounds of the possible for fixing finance, reviving trade, resisting protectionism and tackling climate change, and for geopolitical stability in the Asia\u2013Pacific region and beyond. For more than a decade, China and the US have successfully managed down their geopolitical frictions by focusing on win\u2013win economic outcomes. What has been quite simply the most imbalanced economic relationship in recent human history has had the positive result of keeping a lid on Sino-American tensions.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

China\u2019s maritime strategy<\/a> challenged the US sea-based alliance system and the regional order, Chris Rahman wrote in 2010. Operations far from home weren\u2019t the main point of China\u2019s naval expansion. The focus remained on the semi-enclosed and other narrow seas of East Asia, to deny access to those seas in a crisis or conflict, Rahman said: \u2018China\u2019s maritime ambitions (and behaviour), even though focused relatively close to home, indicate nothing less than a bid for geopolitical pre-eminence in East Asia.\u2019<\/p>\n

At the close of ASPI\u2019s first decade, in 2011, the institute\u2019s executive director, Peter Abigail, said the most notable strategic development<\/a> of recent years had been China\u2019s assertive behaviour in territorial disputes. Unnerving its neighbours, Abigail said, China\u2019s \u2018charm offensive\u2019 had stumbled:<\/p>\n

At ASPI we noted this increased assertiveness in our dialogues with Chinese counterparts which included a new narrative built around the \u201820\u00a0years of strategic opportunity\u2019 first foreshadowed by Deng Xiaoping. The combination of China\u2019s confidence in successfully weathering the worst of the Global Financial Crisis, the apparent debilitation in Western economies, and the strategic distraction of the United States beyond East Asia, seemed to add an edge to the opportunities available to China during the coming decade or two. This included the Taiwan Strait and a sense that the balance of military capabilities in that area was swinging in China\u2019s favour and limiting US options.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Drawn from the book on the institute\u2019s first 20 years:\u00a0<\/em>An informed and independent voice: ASPI, 2001\u20132021<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001. In Australian strategy today, to talk of the US is to talk of China. The two …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":79,"featured_media":69287,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[2212,285,31,2397],"class_list":["post-69285","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia-china-relations","tag-foreign-policy","tag-united-states","tag-us-alliances","dinkus-20-years-of-aspi"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001. In Australian strategy today, to talk of the US is to talk of China. The two ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2021-12-12T19:00:15+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2021-12-12T00:37:52+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/GettyImages-50602997.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"683\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Graeme Dobell\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Graeme Dobell\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"8 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/GettyImages-50602997.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/GettyImages-50602997.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":683,\"caption\":\"Amer. & Chinese flags table decorations during US\/China ceremony renewing 1989 MOA Memo of Agreement re Intl. Trade in Commercial Launch Services. (Photo by Forrest Anderson\/Getty Images)\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/\",\"name\":\"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2021-12-12T19:00:15+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2021-12-12T00:37:52+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f\",\"name\":\"Graeme Dobell\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Graeme Dobell\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/graeme-dobell\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States | The Strategist","og_description":"ASPI celebrates its 20th anniversary this year. This series looks at ASPI\u2019s work since its creation in August 2001. In Australian strategy today, to talk of the US is to talk of China. The two ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2021-12-12T19:00:15+00:00","article_modified_time":"2021-12-12T00:37:52+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1024,"height":683,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/GettyImages-50602997.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Graeme Dobell","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Graeme Dobell","Est. reading time":"8 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/GettyImages-50602997.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/GettyImages-50602997.jpg","width":1024,"height":683,"caption":"Amer. & Chinese flags table decorations during US\/China ceremony renewing 1989 MOA Memo of Agreement re Intl. Trade in Commercial Launch Services. (Photo by Forrest Anderson\/Getty Images)"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/","name":"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2021-12-12T19:00:15+00:00","dateModified":"2021-12-12T00:37:52+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/aspis-decades-china-and-the-united-states\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"ASPI\u2019s decades: China and the United States"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f","name":"Graeme Dobell","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Graeme Dobell"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/graeme-dobell\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69285"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/79"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69285"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69285\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":69293,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69285\/revisions\/69293"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/69287"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69285"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69285"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69285"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}