{"id":69706,"date":"2022-01-07T06:00:28","date_gmt":"2022-01-06T19:00:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=69706"},"modified":"2022-02-22T16:55:46","modified_gmt":"2022-02-22T05:55:46","slug":"editors-picks-for-2021-chinas-actions-not-australias-words-are-the-problem","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/editors-picks-for-2021-chinas-actions-not-australias-words-are-the-problem\/","title":{"rendered":"Editors\u2019 picks for 2021: \u2018China\u2019s actions, not Australia\u2019s words, are the problem\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Originally published 28 April 2021.<\/em><\/p>\n

There\u2019s a greater likelihood of major conflict in the Indo-Pacific region now than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War.<\/p>\n

That\u2019s why the Australian government\u2019s 2020\u00a0defence strategic update<\/a>\u00a0ended the longstanding planning assumption for the Australian Defence Force that we would have 10 years of strategic warning time to prepare for military conflict.<\/p>\n

The Chinese government under Xi Jinping is the major driver of this stark assessment because of its creation of a People\u2019s Liberation Army that is able to project power\u2014and in particular because of its use of the PLA to take over disputed areas in the\u00a0South China Sea<\/a>\u00a0and build military bases there, its use of the PLA on the\u00a0India\u2013China<\/a>\u00a0border, and the high tempo of its aggression in the\u00a0East China Sea<\/a>\u00a0and in the airspace and sea around Taiwan.<\/p>\n

These actions have been in direct contradiction with Beijing\u2019s assurances of\u00a0peaceful intent<\/a>, which makes it hard to trust the words of Chinese leaders and diplomats when it comes to security.<\/p>\n

Most infamously, in 2015 Xi assured US President Barack Obama that China would\u00a0not militarise<\/a>\u00a0the South China Sea\u2014and then went home and accelerated the PLA\u2019s efforts to do just that. More recently, we\u2019ve seen the Chinese government simply abandon its international commitment to maintaining Hong Kong\u2019s open system of free speech and independent courts. Beijing broke its\u00a0treaty<\/a>\u00a0with the UK, introduced a draconian national security law and followed up with arrests, prosecution and long jail terms for Hongkongers who practised political freedoms denied to China\u2019s mainland citizens.<\/p>\n

Xi has spoken of using\u00a0force against Taiwan<\/a>\u00a0to unify it with mainland China. He and other senior government figures also speak about defending China\u2019s growing \u2018core interests\u2019 by force. Related actions include authorising not just its military, but its coastguard to use\u00a0lethal force<\/a>\u00a0wherever China claims jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

None of the above is anything other than simple factual description of what Chinese armed forces have done and what Xi as the commander-in-chief of the PLA has said about using the military.<\/p>\n

Reporting what Xi says and what the PLA and other Chinese armed forces do is not \u2018stoking the drums of war\u2019; it\u2019s noticing what is happening in our region that affects our security. It is a matter of empirical fact that\u00a0Chinese military incursions<\/a>\u00a0into Taiwanese airspace in 2021 are at record levels, multiple times the average over the previous four years. And Chinese naval activity around Taiwan has also\u00a0intensified<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This military pressure is being felt in Taiwan and is the reason for various international leaders\u2019 meetings mentioning Taiwan in their public statements.<\/p>\n

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken did so in Alaska, at the first senior-level\u00a0US\u2013China meeting<\/a>\u00a0following US President Joe Biden\u2019s first phone call with Xi.<\/p>\n

Taiwan was discussed at the March virtual meeting of the Quad leaders, and also featured in the statement of the\u00a0US\u2013Japan summit<\/a>\u00a0between Biden and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga last week.<\/p>\n

Discussion of the potential for conflict without naming the source of this conflict naturally leads to anxieties and also to claims that people are stoking war by talking.<\/p>\n

The source of instability and tension in our region is the Chinese state under Xi and its use of the PLA. Saying this is being open about why there is tension in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n

Being able to say what the source of the problem is useful if you then want to do things to resolve the problem. A \u2018country agnostic\u2019 approach to the causes of regional insecurity is simply not credible\u2014and distorts public debate.<\/p>\n

Australia contributes to a powerful combination of allies and partners that can provide credible deterrence and raise the costs of military adventurism for China. But this does require unity of effort and clear-minded analysis of the issues at hand.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0government\u2019s plan<\/a>\u00a0for developing Australia\u2019s military capabilities is designed around shaping the strategic environment in ways that make military conflict less likely, and having the military power and partnerships to deter conflict.<\/p>\n

That plan includes giving the ADF more offensive power to raise the costs of conflict for others. And it\u2019s based on strong alliance and security partnerships, with the US, Japan, India and Australia\u2019s other security partners in the Five Eyes, the wider Indo-Pacific region and Europe.<\/p>\n

This isn\u2019t about Australia acting alone.<\/p>\n

No one power needs to face the challenge of deterring Beijing from use of military force alone; it is best done multilaterally. And before anyone contemplates the use of military force, the costs of conflict can be raised by other activities. In Taiwan\u2019s case, that includes reintegrating it into international forums and organisations like the World Health Organization and UN bodies, reversing Beijing\u2019s\u00a0long-term<\/a>\u00a0political isolation of the island.<\/p>\n

But the idea that quiet\u00a0behind-the-scenes diplomacy<\/a>\u00a0will raise the costs of conflict in Xi\u2019s eyes and act as a deterrent seems to have no supporting evidence from recent history. Instead, the evidence suggests that the Chinese government\u2019s confidence that its actions won\u2019t have consequences is increased by international silence on regional security and is reduced by international discussion and cooperation.<\/p>\n

Xi has no doubt been encouraged by the limited international response to his takeover of Hong Kong institutions and repression of freedoms China guaranteed to retain for decades. His military activities in the South China Sea have also proceeded without tangible opposition.<\/p>\n

But he will have noticed that Taiwan is featuring at international meetings in discussions about finding ways to support Taiwanese security and reintegrate it into the international community. These efforts are all about reducing the prospects of China using force against Taiwan\u2019s 23 million people.<\/p>\n

The Chinese government\u2019s judgements about being able to use force against Taiwan with impunity are affected by this, which is why Chinese government officials react so stridently to any moves to support Taiwan. Changing those calculations is the goal of credible deterrence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Originally published 28 April 2021. There\u2019s a greater likelihood of major conflict in the Indo-Pacific region now than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War. That\u2019s why the Australian government\u2019s 2020\u00a0defence strategic …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":766,"featured_media":53364,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[2212,52,392,204],"class_list":["post-69706","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia-china-relations","tag-china","tag-taiwan","tag-xi-jinping"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nEditors\u2019 picks for 2021: \u2018China\u2019s actions, not Australia\u2019s words, are the problem\u2019 | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/editors-picks-for-2021-chinas-actions-not-australias-words-are-the-problem\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Editors\u2019 picks for 2021: \u2018China\u2019s actions, not Australia\u2019s words, are the problem\u2019 | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Originally published 28 April 2021. 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