{"id":70242,"date":"2022-02-04T06:00:44","date_gmt":"2022-02-03T19:00:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=70242"},"modified":"2022-02-04T06:36:25","modified_gmt":"2022-02-03T19:36:25","slug":"boosting-maritime-law-enforcement-in-southeast-asia-and-the-south-china-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/boosting-maritime-law-enforcement-in-southeast-asia-and-the-south-china-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"Boosting maritime law enforcement in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Five and a half years on from the international arbitral tribunal\u2019s rejection of China\u2019s expansive South China Sea claims in July 2016, the international maritime order in East Asia clearly is in trouble. China is continuing to consolidate its control over the Paracel Islands and most of the Spratleys group and is increasing its encroachments on the recognised exclusive economic zones of most of the South China Sea\u2019s littoral states with relative impunity. The Philippines and Vietnam in particular have suffered numerous Chinese incursions, and Indonesia\u2019s Natuna Islands and more recently Malaysia\u2019s EEZ have been targeted in China\u2019s bid to control the southern waters of the first island chain.<\/p>\n

The region\u2019s maritime order under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is central to the rules-based order that Australia, India, Japan, the US and other likeminded states hold to be central to regional security and prosperity. Yet China\u2019s grey-zone tactics are continuing apace, weakening the authority and relevance of UNCLOS in the absence of a coordinated and unified regional stance supporting its rules and authority both in principle and in practice.<\/p>\n

The wider regional implications of China continuing to unilaterally impose its own maritime laws on other states, denying them fishing and other maritime rights, provide compelling reasons for the Quad states, and others, to work harder to ensure that the rights and entitlements of all South China Sea littoral states under UNCLOS are protected. The threats include not only the further erosion of the rules-based order\u2019s authority and legitimacy, perhaps to an irreparable degree, but also a major increase in Beijing\u2019s political and economic leverage over the many Southeast Asian states that continue to depend on the fishing, energy and other sovereign rights China seeks to control.<\/p>\n

Allowing Beijing to further expand its already significant presence and influence in the South China Sea would make it much more difficult for Australia, Japan and the US to build regional diplomatic support against China\u2019s actions in the South China Sea and elsewhere, making great-power military conflict in the region more likely.<\/p>\n

ASEAN\u2019s role in the disputes remains hamstrung by internal divisions over its responsibility as a regional institution for protecting individual state maritime rights, despite its various statements affirming UNCLOS<\/a> as the basis for resolving maritime entitlement disputes. Many in ASEAN are fearful of the consequences of being forced to choose between the US and China, of ASEAN becoming marginalised by great-power politics in its own backyard, and of the region becoming more militarised and conflict prone.<\/p>\n

The lack of a unified ASEAN stance and response on China\u2019s claims is also explained by fence-sitting among member states that are not directly affected by the South China Sea disputes or whose political and business elites prioritise the benefits<\/a> of not antagonising Beijing. The fact that rival maritime claimants in ASEAN hold conflicting interpretations<\/a> of UNCLOS\u2019s provisions has been an additional obstacle to developing a common ASEAN position.<\/p>\n

But signs of greater willingness to cooperate<\/a> on maritime law enforcement and other maritime issues, encouraged by Beijing\u2019s aggressive behaviour, are beginning to appear<\/a> among the littoral ASEAN states. An agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines on their overlapping EEZs in the Celebes Sea was ratified by both governments in 2014. Vietnam and Malaysia are planning to sign a memorandum of understanding<\/a> on maritime security cooperation addressing several problem areas, including illegal Vietnamese fishing in Malaysian waters. Vietnam and Indonesia<\/a>, meanwhile, are continuing negotiations to establish provisional boundaries in overlapping areas of their claimed EEZs in the North Natuna Sea; in December last year the two nations signed a memorandum<\/a> pledging improved cooperation on maritime security and safety.<\/p>\n

These bilateral agreements should be read as both an assertion of the parties\u2019 maritime rights and a clear rejection of China\u2019s illegal \u2018nine-dash line\u2019 claims.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s deployment of militia vessels for maritime fishing exposes them to suspicion of illegal fishing and thus also to legitimate maritime law enforcement action under UNCLOS. The longstanding problem of Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the South China Sea therefore may present an important opportunity<\/a> for the South China Sea states most at threat from China\u2019s illegal maritime claims\u2014the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia\u2014to collectively develop, with greater capacity-building and regulatory support from the Quad states, a UNCLOS based, non-military means of pushing back against China\u2019s claims and grey-zone tactics.<\/p>\n

Doing so will ensure that regional, rather than external, actors take the lead in upholding and affirming maritime rights. It will also provide a broad and unambiguous affirmation of UNCLOS\u2019s authority and relevance and place the onus for any military escalation on China by imposing grey-zone dilemmas on China\u2019s leadership, especially in terms of its own conflict threshold calculations.<\/p>\n

Aside from the geostrategic threat that a Chinese takeover of the South China Sea poses, the alternative to cooperative EEZ regulation and better maritime law enforcement is a Chinese-controlled South China Sea. That would extinguish the resource and freedom-of-navigation rights of all other states and make any plans for cooperative or multilateral management (such as through a regional fisheries management organisation) of those resources and rights redundant. The risk of a catastrophic collapse of the region\u2019s biggest fisheries resource due to Chinese mismanagement<\/a>, intensifying competition and conflict, or both, would significantly increase. Such an outcome would very likely mean more illegal fishing in Southeast Asia\u2019s already depleted waters, and in the EEZs of other states, including Australia and Japan.<\/p>\n

By collectively supporting the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia in their efforts to more effectively regulate and police fishing and other maritime activities, the Quad states can indirectly push back on China\u2019s grey-zone encroachments while also helping the coastal states to better manage a longstanding threat to the region\u2019s socioeconomic security and future prosperity.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Five and a half years on from the international arbitral tribunal\u2019s rejection of China\u2019s expansive South China Sea claims in July 2016, the international maritime order in East Asia clearly is in trouble. China is …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1153,"featured_media":70244,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[189,971,71,2328,471,25],"class_list":["post-70242","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-asean","tag-illegal-fishing","tag-maritime-security","tag-quad","tag-south-china-sea","tag-southeast-asia"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nBoosting maritime law enforcement in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/boosting-maritime-law-enforcement-in-southeast-asia-and-the-south-china-sea\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Boosting maritime law enforcement in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Five and a half years on from the international arbitral tribunal\u2019s rejection of China\u2019s expansive South China Sea claims in July 2016, the international maritime order in East Asia clearly is in trouble. 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