{"id":70258,"date":"2022-02-04T13:30:43","date_gmt":"2022-02-04T02:30:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=70258"},"modified":"2022-02-04T13:41:50","modified_gmt":"2022-02-04T02:41:50","slug":"xi-jinping-and-the-ccps-expanding-technology-agenda","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/xi-jinping-and-the-ccps-expanding-technology-agenda\/","title":{"rendered":"Xi Jinping and the CCP\u2019s expanding technology agenda"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Chinese Communist Party leaders use \u2018collective study sessions\u2019 to identify emerging technologies that they can harness politically. Given the merging of civil and military industrial goals in China, the international community needs to recognise the challenges this strategy poses.<\/p>\n

Huawei, one of tech war\u2019s main supporting actors, recently completed the rollout in China<\/a> of its new operating system, HarmonyOS 2.0, which aims to reduce <\/a>China\u2019s dependence on US technology. During his presidency, Donald Trump had\u00a0turned<\/a>\u00a0that dependency into an existential threat.<\/p>\n

While HarmonyOS is a success story in terms of Chinese innovation and scientific and technological progress, it also gives the party-state significantly more power in cyberspace.<\/p>\n

Unlike its US rivals, iOS and Android, HarmonyOS requires third-party developers to go through an\u00a0extensive identification<\/a>\u00a0process involving identity cards, passports and bank credentials. These developers, the growth drivers of such platforms, will be rendered, at least to some extent, subject to Chinese law regardless of where they live. That will enable Chinese authorities to bring previously unassailable individuals within the range of Chinese law by threatening them with sanctions, fines or bans. It will also give China increased leverage over newly developing cyber territories.<\/p>\n

HarmonyOS\u2019s strict developer identification process can be seen as part of the general regulatory wave targeting big tech in China. But it\u2019s also a reflection of China\u2019s successful transition towards a \u2018government-steered market economy<\/a>\u2019. Over the past decade, the CCP has gained the ability to formulate, implement and evaluate government interventions. This \u2018industrial policy\u2019\u00a0is now managed through new institutions, interlocking policies and the strong integration of China\u2019s tech companies. The policy has been tailored to reinforce the CCP\u2019s legitimacy and power by developing emerging technologies and appropriating science and technology<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The CCP\u2019s Politburo Standing Committee has long\u00a0staged<\/a>\u00a0\u2018collective study sessions\u2019 (\u96c6\u4f53\u5b66\u4e60) to introduce the leadership to new ideas while establishing geopolitical contexts, new vocabulary and rhetorical frameworks. For two decades, these visions have been implemented throughout the party and across provinces through policies and laws, institutionalising party doctrine<\/a>\u00a0in emerging technology.<\/p>\n

The cornerstone for HarmonyOS to expand the party\u2019s sovereignty over cyberspace was set during the\u00a038th<\/a>\u00a0collective study session on the development of internet technology in January 2007. Then president Hu Jintao called for the \u2018construction and management of cyber culture\u2019 to \u2018spread [Chinese] advanced culture\u2019 and \u2018the advanced culture of socialism\u2019. He discussed a \u2018purified network environment\u2019 (\u51c0\u5316\u7f51\u7edc\u73af\u5883) and a new \u2018order for the dissemination of online information\u2019. That study session was followed by the banning of Google and Facebook within China, the expansion of China\u2019s \u2018Great Firewall\u2019 and tighter online censorship.<\/p>\n

Under Xi Jinping, government interventions have become more potent and Chinese cyber sovereignty has accelerated. China\u2019s national security interests were extended to cyberspace in 2017.<\/p>\n

The independent innovation capabilities of Chinese tech giants are suffering as military and civil industries are drawn much closer together and as accountability<\/a>\u00a0to the state for search engines, instant messaging services, websites, online payments, e-commerce and software increases.<\/p>\n

Xi has also strengthened the signalling power of CCP study sessions to reach those developing new technologies. He has put more such technologies\u2014big data, artificial intelligence and blockchain\u2014on the study agenda than his predecessors and has made sure that the meetings are managed by his close allies, such as Ding Xuexiang, director of the General Office of the CCP, and Jiang Jinquan<\/a>, director of the Central Policy Research Office.<\/p>\n

Once portrayed as proof of the party\u2019s learning capacity, study sessions are now a feature of a\u00a0personality cult<\/a> used by Xi to signal his technological vision to reinforce the party\u2019s hold on power. His interest in \u2018studying\u2019\u00a0emerging technologies shouldn\u2019t be taken simply as an acknowledgement of their economic gravity; it\u2019s also a recognition of their central function in China\u2019s strategic development.<\/p>\n

The CCP holds between one (2002) and 10 (2006, 2015) \u2018collective study sessions\u2019 for its top ranks every year. In 2017, the head of the party ordered that a new emerging technology must be studied by the leadership every year. In contrast, Xi only put the overall development of science and technology on the agenda once between 2012 and 2016.<\/p>\n

CCP collective study sessions by topic, 2002 to 2021<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/figure>\n

Source: <\/em>CCP database of collective study sessions<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

Xi declared in 2019 that\u00a0blockchain<\/a>\u00a0would not only reduce cross-departmental and cross-sectoral data islands, but also help China exert \u2018normative, discursive and rulemaking power\u2019 through the application of the \u2018rule of law\u2019. His words caused a redirection of Chinese blockchain projects towards\u00a0government services<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Similarly, in 2020 Xi identified\u00a0quantum technology<\/a>\u00a0as an \u2018emerging sector of strategic importance\u2019 for ensuring \u2018national security\u2019 in which China needed to \u2018seize commanding heights of international competition\u2019. Two years before that, he declared\u00a0AI<\/a>\u00a0important to China winning the global science and technology race by \u2018becoming the pack leader\u2019\u00a0(\u5934\u96c1).<\/p>\n

China\u2019s increased governmental steering of the economy has to be seen as inseparable from Xi\u2019s vision for emerging technologies and will continue to have global implications. HarmonyOS\u2019s strict registration requirements could soon include every user of the operating system, not just developers. Given Huawei\u2019s strong and briefly world-leading share in the mobile phone market and China\u2019s integral role in 5G mobile technology and the development of the internet of things, this could soon have an impact on a significant part of the global digital economy.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, China\u2019s efforts to standardise emerging technologies should be eyed with caution. That includes Beijing\u2019s growing influence over the\u00a0governance<\/a>\u00a0structures themselves (at Europe’s expense<\/a>) and over efforts towards\u00a0regional cooperation on standardisation<\/a>, including the standardisation of technologies such as\u00a05G<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0autonomous vehicles<\/a>. Otherwise, tech standards will be developed rather disharmoniously to meet the primary political interests of the Chinese party-state.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Chinese Communist Party leaders use \u2018collective study sessions\u2019 to identify emerging technologies that they can harness politically. 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