{"id":7027,"date":"2013-06-17T06:00:37","date_gmt":"2013-06-16T20:00:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=7027"},"modified":"2013-06-23T20:27:23","modified_gmt":"2013-06-23T10:27:23","slug":"asian-gazing-8-aseans-usual-crisis-and-looming-triumph","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/asian-gazing-8-aseans-usual-crisis-and-looming-triumph\/","title":{"rendered":"Asian gazing (8): ASEAN\u2019s usual crisis and looming triumph"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>ASEAN is ever in crisis or on the verge of calamity. The role of crisis in giving ASEAN a purpose, or even an identity, is part of the abiding mystery of Southeast Asian regionalism. The trick is to pick the moments when ASEAN is offering substance, as against those many occasions when ASEAN is only playing with shadows.<\/p>\n During this bout of Asian strategic star gazing, I heard quite a few people arguing that this time it\u2019s different. This time, they argue, ASEAN truly-rooly is in crisis. Well, perhaps\u2014certainly both the externally-generated pressure and the internal ASEAN divisions are palpable. Yet, for all the immediate problems of trust and strategic uncertainty, it\u2019s also possible to take a few steps back from the anger and angst and glimpse a looming ASEAN triumph.<\/p>\n More on the triumph in a moment; first, obeying the traditions of hackdom (if it bleeds, it leads), consider the credentials of the current mood of crisis. I confess that as a hack who’s written about ASEAN for decades, I’ve produced many an ‘ASEAN-in-crisis’ yarn. Some headlines have an eternal allure. And any regional institution that gathers ten countries together for a thousand meetings a year needs something to produce movement.<\/p>\n A sense of crisis is almost the minimum requirement for an \u2018ASEAN way\u2019 which glorifies the idea that the meeting is indeed the message. If just meeting is a triumph of active regionalism\u2014serving the glorious quest for consensus\u2014then a looming calamity is vital to get the ten nation juggernaut to focus and even think about acting.<\/p>\n ASEAN is trying to focus. The claims of looming disaster have been as prevalent around here recently as the lingering odour of a ripe durian<\/a>. The external pressure exerted by China\u2014especially in the South China Sea\u2014is feeding into the centrifugal forces within ASEAN. The great symbol of ASEAN division was the failure even to issue a communique<\/a> at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers\u2019 meeting last year.<\/p>\n The way this is being translated in ASEAN-speak at the moment is through a discussion of the need for trust. Here is Vietnam\u2019s Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dun, at the Shangri-La dialogue<\/a>:<\/p>\n Without trust, there would be no success and harder work asks for bigger trust. In Vietnam, there is a saying that \u2018if trust is lost, all is lost.\u2019 Trust is the beginning of all friendships and cooperation, the remedy that works to prevent calculations that could risk conflicts. Trust must be treasured and nurtured constantly by concrete, consistent actions in accordance with the common norms and with a sincere attitude.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Launching the Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia\u2019s Prime Minister, Najib Razak, was offering a classic bit of crisis caution: \u2018Under the surface of growth and development in Asia lie dangerous currents of nationalism, aggression and discord. Unchecked, they threaten to undo decades of peace and progress\u2019.<\/p>\n When Indonesia\u2019s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, addressed the Roundtable, the first of his big three issues facing the region was the \u2018trust deficit\u2019 (the other two being territorial disputes in the South China and East China seas and managing change).<\/p>\n For me, though, the sharpest definition of the ASEAN dilemma was offered by a senior Chinese diplomat who said Beijing wanted ASEAN unity, but not if it was directed against China:<\/p>\n China will not support ASEAN to unite against China. And ASEAN is not going to agree to be against China. And the same is true if ASEAN is asked to be against the US; ASEAN countries will be split. This is a group of small and medium-sized countries that does not want to be against anybody.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Mark that as a spot on analysis, equally useful as description and prescription. ASEAN has no more ability to line up against China than it could line up for the US. ASEAN can never be unanimous in going against the big beasts. The institutional aim is always to get some internal levels of consensus within Southeast Asia, and that’s where the trust deficit really hurts.<\/p>\n The central crisis for ASEAN is always the problem of internal split among the ten members. Cracks in the facade of unity let in all sorts of dangers. China is greatly amplifying the fundamental centrifugal tensions ever-present within ASEAN. No surprise in this: the core of the ASEAN being is to act as a confidence building and reassurance mechanism for the ten states of Southeast Asia in dealing with each other. In that foundational mode, ASEAN has had its greatest success. Grafting on to that core role the much larger ambition of leading the whole of Asia (ASEAN in the driver\u2019s seat) is where large amounts of shadow envelop the ASEAN substance.<\/p>\n ASEAN isn\u2019t going to be able to do much about the external pressures. The best hope is that the two simultaneous electoral cycles in the US and China have now run their course and perhaps normal business can resume. The first summit of the US-China g2<\/a> might produce an easing of tensions. And, if the g2 does deliver some degree of condominium concert, ASEAN can segue from crisis to an unusual moment of success.<\/p>\n