{"id":7163,"date":"2013-06-24T12:30:22","date_gmt":"2013-06-24T02:30:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=7163"},"modified":"2013-06-28T13:55:24","modified_gmt":"2013-06-28T03:55:24","slug":"australian-intelligence-organisations-the-limits-of-oversight","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australian-intelligence-organisations-the-limits-of-oversight\/","title":{"rendered":"Australian intelligence organisations: the limits of oversight"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Limited<\/a><\/figure>\n

Andrew Davies valuable post calls attention to<\/a> the range of watchdog mechanisms holding Australia\u2019s intelligence agencies to account. It also asks why Australians don\u2019t know much about these checks and balances. I would suggest that\u2019s partly because of Australia\u2019s unusually high<\/a> level of secrecy on intelligence matters, and also because our watchdog mechanisms fall short when compared to some other liberal democracies.<\/p>\n

For example, the US Congress has multiple committees<\/a> (PDF) overseeing intelligence agencies and scrutinising their operations, and these committees require notification of all covert actions<\/a> (PDF). Our sole comparable committee, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security<\/a>, has a much more limited role. It has no oversight of actual operations, and in fact has a lengthy list of things it can\u2019t do (see footnote).<\/p>\n

As a result, our Parliament rarely has the sort of media-friendly confrontations over intelligence matters that the US Congress sometimes has, which contributes to the lack of public awareness about intelligence oversight. It also calls into question whether, as Andrew argues, \u2018Australians are pretty well served by the watchdog mechanisms in place\u2019. I\u2019m less confident than him that we are, because there\u2019s a limited amount of publically available information on which to base such a judgment.<\/p>\n

Intelligence agencies of course have to be more secretive than other parts of the public service, but Australia\u2019s agencies have a level of secrecy that exceeds those in similar countries. For example, ASIO<\/a> and other agencies have blanket 20\u201330 year exemptions from Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation, which the Australian Information Commissioner, John McMillan, currently opposes<\/a>. In a submission to a review of FOI laws he pointed out that<\/a> (PDF) in \u2018other jurisdictions, including New Zealand and the United States, intelligence agencies are covered by FOI legislation\u2019.<\/p>\n

This difference allows journalists and academics in such other jurisdictions to obtain much more information about what their intelligence services do. For example, terrorism researcher J. M. Berger has written detailed accounts of the CIA\u2019s investigations into al Qaeda<\/a> from 1991 to 2003 and the FBI\u2019s infiltration of far-right extremist groups<\/a> (PDF) in the 1990s, based substantially on documents acquired through America\u2019s FOI legislation. Comparable research into Australian agencies is almost impossible.<\/p>\n

The problem goes beyond the intelligence services, as Australia generally has excessive secrecy on national security matters. For example, Australia\u2019s military secrecy<\/a> goes well beyond<\/a> that of our allies. Lowy Military Fellow James Brown has noted<\/a> (PDF) that Defence’s annual reports are \u2018less transparent and detailed than similar defence reporting in the UK, US, Canada, and New Zealand\u2019.<\/p>\n

The limited transparency contributes to the lack of well-informed debate. Whenever a public controversy breaks out (such as on Julian Assange, Ben Zygier, Mamdouh Habib, possible spying on anti-coal activists, data retention proposals, and now whether Australia receives PRISM data), the lack of publicly available information means that neither side\u2019s claims can be critically assessed. Instead, each side becomes entrenched in their positions, the media publish with what they have and move on, and much of the public remains indifferent.<\/p>\n

So while Andrew rightly calls for well-informed debate, the current excessive secrecy works against this. As he points out, Australian intelligence agencies do indeed have plenty of accountability mechanisms; see the comprehensive list on pages 302-317 of this report<\/a> (PDF). However, they have fewer teeth than they could have, and our agencies enjoy more secrecy than national security requirements appear to justify. As former ONA<\/a> analyst Ken Ward has said<\/a>, \u2018it would be better if the Australian public were better informed. If America can do it without damaging its national security, why can\u2019t Australia\u2019?<\/p>\n

Andrew Zammit is a research fellow at Monash University\u2019s Global Terrorism Research Centre and blogs at\u00a0<\/i>The<\/i> Murphy<\/em> Raid<\/i><\/a>. Image courtesy of Flickr user\u00a0Jon D\u00edez Supat<\/a>.<\/i><\/p>\n

<\/i>___<\/p>\n

Footnote: <\/b>The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security\u2019s website states<\/a> that:<\/p>\n

The IS Act limits the inquiry powers of the Committee by providing that the functions of the Committee do not include:<\/p>\n