{"id":7350,"date":"2013-07-02T12:15:09","date_gmt":"2013-07-02T02:15:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=7350"},"modified":"2014-04-10T13:14:06","modified_gmt":"2014-04-10T03:14:06","slug":"thinking-amphibiously","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/thinking-amphibiously\/","title":{"rendered":"Thinking amphibiously"},"content":{"rendered":"
Much of the concern about amphibious operations in Australian commentary has focused on the vulnerability of the associated task group and ships to attack, rather than the difficulty of the amphibious problem itself. It is good that recent debate (some in The Strategist<\/i><\/a>)<\/i> has begun to display a more sophisticated understanding of the spectrum of amphibious operations, particularly in the relationship between their utility and the significant demands that even activities in a benign environment place upon the personnel and equipment involved.<\/p>\n The employment of an amphibious group in a contested situation against sophisticated opposition remains not only one of the most risky activities that the ADF could undertake, but also one of the least likely. And, even in such high intensity conflicts, a landing would seek to be where the adversary is not, rather than where he is\u2014the opening scene of Saving Private Ryan <\/i>is not the way ahead for the Australian amphibious capability. The key vulnerability issues are thus ones of wider maritime concern and should be answered separately.<\/p>\n On the other hand, given opponents or potential opponents in lower intensity conflicts, the capacity of the ADF to rapidly achieve over-match in an amphibious entry will be vital. This will demand mastery by all involved of high intensity and closely coordinated operational amphibious techniques. It is this land-sea interface and the integration of the amphibious ships with their embarked forces that will require the management of a steep learning curve and which needs the ADF\u2019s close and continuing attention. The ships and their embarked forces should be capable of much even in the very short term, but there will be a long haul from achieving the basics to being able to exploit the full potential of the amphibious group. There are also matters of sustainment and readiness to be resolved, only some of which have been answered by the 2013 White Paper decision to retain the Choules <\/i>in service. The ship can lift large numbers of heavy vehicles, as well as substantial amounts of stores and munitions. Without her, the LHDs Canberra <\/i>and Adelaide <\/i>will <\/i>have the capacity to put very capable battalion groups ashore, but limited ability to provide the resources that such forces consume in their operations. One key question that remains is what follows, when\u2014and how\u2014in terms of an offshore deployment, particularly for its logistic requirements?<\/p>\n An additional argument for focusing on the amphibious capability itself is that one of the effects of sequestration<\/a> in the United States. Increasingly deep budget cuts to US forces will increase the importance of the Australian capability. US amphibious groups have been players in the vast majority of regional contingencies in recent decades but, if the reduction in forward deployments (one of the current major areas of USN cost reduction) is sustained, then despite the pivot to Asia, Australia may have to fill part of the gap. The White Paper\u2019s declaration that \u2018initially\u2019 the amphibious effort will be focused on ‘security, stabilisation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief\u2019 is thus perhaps as much a recognition of the strategic imperatives as it is a caution against expecting\u2014or fearing\u2014too much from the amphibious force.<\/p>\n Rear Admiral (ret\u2019d) James Goldrick is a fellow of the RAN\u2019s Sea Power Centre and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute.\u00a0<\/em>This article reflects on some of the issues raised in the author\u2019s chapter \u2018The Future of Maritime Forces\u2019 in the forthcoming White Paper issue of <\/em>Security Challenges<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Much of the concern about amphibious operations in Australian commentary has focused on the vulnerability of the associated task group and ships to attack, rather than the difficulty of the amphibious problem itself. It is …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":76,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[259,304],"class_list":["post-7350","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general","tag-amphibious-operations","tag-royal-australian-navy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n