{"id":746,"date":"2012-08-15T11:01:21","date_gmt":"2012-08-15T01:01:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=746"},"modified":"2012-08-31T09:49:35","modified_gmt":"2012-08-30T23:49:35","slug":"how-much-is-too-little-learning-to-live-with-a-smaller-force","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/how-much-is-too-little-learning-to-live-with-a-smaller-force\/","title":{"rendered":"How much is too little? Learning to live with a smaller force"},"content":{"rendered":"
Ever since the government slashed defence spending back in May, they\u2019ve copped a shellacking in the press. In case you haven\u2019t caught up, here\u2019s a selection of what\u2019s being said:<\/p>\n
And Greg Sheridan has railed against the government\u2019s decision, not once<\/a>, not twice<\/a>, but three<\/a> times, and has gone so far as to say that the cuts are \u2018the most radical, irresponsible and dangerous action Labor has taken in government\u2019.<\/p>\n These are serious professionals\u2014undoubted experts in their fields\u2014talking about a serious topic. Their views warrant close and careful attention. So the question must be asked: is the government making a colossal mistake that seriously threatens our security in the years ahead?<\/p>\n There\u2019s precious little reassurance to be found in the government\u2019s explanation<\/a> for cutting defence spending. Unless there is a subtlety I\u2019ve missed, the imperative to deliver a surplus has simply eclipsed defence as a political issue\u2014pure and simple. Worse still, by promising to both keep the so-called \u2018core capabilities\u2019 of the 2009 White Paper and maintain current ADF numbers, the government has created a mismatch between means and ends that can\u2019t be reconciled. The planners up on Russell Hill must be pulling out their hair trying to square the circle.<\/p>\n Nonetheless, despite the extraordinary mess that\u2019s been created, I believe that the current situation is retrievable. Mainly because I do not think that Australia needs a larger or stronger defence force than we have at present. So while I\u2019ve argued elsewhere<\/a> that we can afford to spend more on defence, I do not believe that we should.<\/p>\n My reasons are explained in this\u00a0Policy Analysis<\/a>. My argument rests on two propositions:<\/p>\n There\u2019s nothing radical about my two propositions; they\u2019re consonant with the force structuring criteria set out in the 2009 Defence White Paper, albeit stripped of verbiage and adornment. The problem with the 2009 White Paper is that it failed to build a coherent vision for a defence force consistent with its declared policy. Instead, we got Force 2030<\/em> which, among other failings, was heavily tainted by a costly undeclared but since made public<\/a> knee-jerk response to China\u2019s rise.<\/p>\n Even if my two propositions are accepted\u2014and I expect that there will be many who will demur on one or both of the points\u2014there remains much to be done to design, build and maintain the defence force implied. But that\u2019s a story for another day.<\/p>\n\n