{"id":75143,"date":"2022-09-15T06:00:39","date_gmt":"2022-09-14T20:00:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=75143"},"modified":"2022-09-14T17:22:04","modified_gmt":"2022-09-14T07:22:04","slug":"could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/","title":{"rendered":"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force\u2019s lethality in the context of China\u2019s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned with defence in the literal sense\u2014that is, the protection of Australian territory, life and property. A favourite notion of notable pundit Greg Sheridan, for example, is stationing thousands of missiles<\/a> in northern Australia. Other suggestions include laying smart sea mines<\/a> to block the choke points on Australia\u2019s approaches.<\/p>\n

These commentators are concerned with a scenario reminiscent of 1942 when we\u2019re faced with an enemy on our doorstep and our allies are on the back foot. Considering such a scenario is all well and good, but are we there yet? I suggest that the best way to deter a revisionist power from initiating conflict or, failing that, to win a war is to maximise the forces that can neutralise the adversary\u2019s ability to wage war.<\/p>\n

Here, history teaches important lessons in Australian strategy that the government\u2019s strategic review should consider. Since the late colonial era of the 1870s\u20131890s, Australia has had two broad defence objectives. The first was obviously to defend Australia (even if it was not yet a unified country). The second was less self-evident. It derived from Australia\u2019s position as a small dominion of the British Empire, dependent on maritime links for trade and access to British capital for its economic development. The problem was that Australia was dependent on a stable and friendly world order but didn\u2019t have the capacity to maintain such an order on its own. Historically, few countries ever do. Australia did, however, have the capacity to add substantial forces to those maintained by Britain and could assist it to defeat a revisionist power. The same conditions prevail today in our alliance with the United States.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s important to consider both of these historical objectives because it\u2019s hardly adequate to establish \u2018fortress Australia\u2019 if our strategic environment becomes hostile and impinges on the country\u2019s prosperity. As former minister and governor-general Paul Hasluck wrote, \u2018[To keep oneself from being overrun is not exactly the same as winning the war.\u2019<\/p>\n

So, the ADF needs to operate on two tiers. It needs the capability to defend Australia and expeditionary forces to assist its allies. That means the object of enhancing the ADF\u2019s lethality quickly and cost-effectively should also be applied to its offensive expeditionary capability. Some might argue that the nuclear submarines being acquired under AUKUS, the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and the Canberra-class landing helicopter docks, along with associated ground forces, have the expeditionary side of the equation well in hand. However, the AUKUS submarines in particular will only materialise in the long term. While the idea of additional destroyers has been floated, if approved, they will also take years to deliver.<\/p>\n

There are a multitude of options, but the one I want to focus on involves augmenting an existing platform: the stalwart Collins-class submarine. The Collins will be Australia\u2019s primary manned submarine capability for at least a decade. Analysts are still discussing the potential need for another conventional submarine<\/a> to plug a capability gap in the transition to nuclear submarines. So, relatively small investments into the conventional submarine fleet are not ill-advised.<\/p>\n

My argument is twofold. First, the government should equip the Royal Australian Navy with a dedicated submarine tender similar to USS Frank Cable<\/em><\/a>. <\/em>Second, it should equip the Collins with Tomahawk missiles, something the navy has said<\/a> it is looking into the feasibility of. Both of these moves could be made quickly and cost-effectively. The RAN\u2019s new replenishment ship, HMAS Supply<\/em>, was laid down and commissioned in less than three years.<\/p>\n

A tender would be a powerful force multiplier because it would permit the Collins to be forward-deployed to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas Island or Manus Island. Currently, the offensive utility of the Collins is limited by its slow transit speed and relatively short range. Forward-basing them at these locations would shave almost 2,000 nautical miles off the transit to the South China Sea, thus reducing the transit time to patrol areas and increasing the time the submarines can spend on mission. If this were done on a regular basis, it would save considerable wear and tear on the ageing submarines. Such a move would certainly require some diplomatic smoothing with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, however.<\/p>\n

Arming the Collins with Tomahawks is possible and would drastically enhance the submarines\u2019 offensive firepower. The Collins is equipped with 21-inch torpedo tubes for the Mk48 torpedo, similar to those that could launch earlier versions of the Tomahawk. Reports<\/a> suggest there would be few complications in equipping the Collins with Tomahawks. The Block V would be the best option since it has a range of more than 900 nautical miles\u2014likely around triple that of the planned long-range anti-ship missiles, or LRASMs\u2014and has an anti-ship<\/a> capability. Coupled with forward basing, Tomahawks will give the Collins the ability to project power into the South China Sea, providing a deterrent effect and the ability to add to allied offensive forces in a conflict.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force\u2019s lethality in the context of China\u2019s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1605,"featured_media":75148,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,114,664,223],"class_list":["post-75143","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia","tag-ran","tag-sea-power","tag-submarines"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nCould a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power? | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power? | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force\u2019s lethality in the context of China\u2019s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2022-09-14T20:00:39+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2022-09-14T07:22:04+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/5764367.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"666\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"James Garlick\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"James Garlick\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"4 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/5764367.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/5764367.jpg\",\"width\":1000,\"height\":666,\"caption\":\"FREMANTLE, Australia (Sept. 13, 2019) - Sailors assigned to the Australian Collins-class submarine HMAS Sheean (SSG 77) prepare to receive hotel services and supplies during bilateral training event with USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) Sept. 13. Land is deployed to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations to support theater security cooperation efforts in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jordyn Diomede\/Released)\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/\",\"name\":\"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power? | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2022-09-14T20:00:39+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-09-14T07:22:04+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a38b670af10dbeadff1f4c8622144087\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power?\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a38b670af10dbeadff1f4c8622144087\",\"name\":\"James Garlick\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7b49684b37c57ba6b37b52e75b0b12fa?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7b49684b37c57ba6b37b52e75b0b12fa?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"James Garlick\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/james-garlick\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power? | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power? | The Strategist","og_description":"A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force\u2019s lethality in the context of China\u2019s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2022-09-14T20:00:39+00:00","article_modified_time":"2022-09-14T07:22:04+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1000,"height":666,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/5764367.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"James Garlick","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"James Garlick","Est. reading time":"4 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/5764367.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/5764367.jpg","width":1000,"height":666,"caption":"FREMANTLE, Australia (Sept. 13, 2019) - Sailors assigned to the Australian Collins-class submarine HMAS Sheean (SSG 77) prepare to receive hotel services and supplies during bilateral training event with USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) Sept. 13. Land is deployed to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations to support theater security cooperation efforts in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jordyn Diomede\/Released)"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/","name":"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power? | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2022-09-14T20:00:39+00:00","dateModified":"2022-09-14T07:22:04+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a38b670af10dbeadff1f4c8622144087"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF\u2019s offensive power?"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/a38b670af10dbeadff1f4c8622144087","name":"James Garlick","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7b49684b37c57ba6b37b52e75b0b12fa?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/7b49684b37c57ba6b37b52e75b0b12fa?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"James Garlick"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/james-garlick\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75143"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1605"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75143"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75143\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":75151,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75143\/revisions\/75151"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/75148"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75143"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75143"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75143"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}