{"id":7538,"date":"2013-07-11T13:30:51","date_gmt":"2013-07-11T03:30:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=7538"},"modified":"2013-07-12T08:54:06","modified_gmt":"2013-07-11T22:54:06","slug":"feeling-edgy-japans-new-defence-white-paper","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/feeling-edgy-japans-new-defence-white-paper\/","title":{"rendered":"Feeling edgy: Japan\u2019s new defence white paper"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>The Japanese government released its annual Defense White Paper<\/a> (DWP) on Tuesday. In comparison with last year\u2019s version<\/a> it displays a harsher attitude towards China, indicating that Japan\u2019s defence policy could shift further in coming years. Some shifts are already underway, such as increasing the Self-Defense Force\u2019s (SDF) amphibious capability<\/a> to defend its offshore islands in the face of China\u2019s increased maritime assertiveness.<\/p>\n Japan\u2019s 2013 assessment of its strategic environment is pessimistic. While the previous version \u2018observed\u2019 security developments such as China\u2019s ongoing military modernisation, the 2013 DWP starts by stating that \u2018Japan\u2019s security environment is encompassed by\u2026destabilizing factors, some of which are becoming increasingly tangible, acute and serious.\u2019 Unlike last year, the document also contains a subchapter on the \u2018Security Environment in the Vicinity of Japan\u2019; demonstrating Japan\u2019s growing concerns about direct threats to its national territory and integrity. Apart from North Korea\u2019s and (to a lesser extent) Russia\u2019s strategic behaviour, the chapter is particularly strong on China as a security threat. It notes that \u2018in the waters and airspace around Japan, [China] has engaged in dangerous acts that could give rise to a contingency situation, such as Chinese vessel\u2019s direction of its fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer.\u2019 It goes on to argue that \u2018[c]oupled with the lack of transparency in its military and security affairs these moves are a matter of concern for Japan.\u2019<\/p>\n The focus on China as a threat doesn\u2019t stop here. A new paragraph in its detailed assessment of China\u2019s strategic trajectory, which resembles the Pentagon\u2019s annual report<\/a> to the US Congress on PRC military development, couldn\u2019t be clearer. Gone is the 2012 statement that Japan \u2018welcomed\u2019 China\u2019s growing regional and global role. Instead, China \u2018is strongly expected to recognize its responsibility as a major power, accept and stick to the international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role in regional and global issues.\u2019 It even states that \u2018on conflicting interests with its surrounding countries, including Japan, China has attempted to change the status quo by force based on its assertion which is incompatible with the existing order of international law.\u2019<\/p>\n This brings Japan closer to the positions of Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines; the DWP specifically mentions growing maritime disputes between China and some ASEAN members. Analysts are speculating that the document might pave the way for deeper Japanese defence engagement in Southeast Asia<\/a>. Philippine defence officials<\/a> recently indicated an interest in much closer defence relations with Tokyo, which Manila perceives as a \u2018strategic partner\u2019 in its struggle with Beijing over maritime claims.<\/p>\n The new DWP also expresses greater alarm about specific Chinese capability developments. Unsurprisingly, the growing arsenal and accuracy of the PLA\u2019s nuclear and missile forces is of particular\u00a0 \u00a0concern. For example the paper notes the PLA\u2019s progress in deploying its DF-31A mobile, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It also stresses that once the PLA manages to operate its new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), its strategic nuclear capabilities will \u2018improve by a great margin.\u2019 One cannot help but wonder how long Japan\u2019s confidence in US nuclear security guarantees will last, given that Washington has deemphasised the role of nuclear weapons over recent years. And unlike its predecessor, the 2013 DWP points out that China\u2019s short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) cover \u2018a part of the Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan.\u2019<\/p>\n What to do? While the DWP argues for even closer defence cooperation with the US ally, it also appears to consider increased capabilities to respond to threats against its own territory without<\/i> turning first to its long-standing protector.\u00a0 The document also provides concrete details of the establishment of a National Security Council, most likely approved by the Japanese Parliament later this year, to facilitate the security and defence decision-making processes. It also states that \u2018Japan is striving to develop proper defense capabilities to protect the lives and assets of the public and defend the territorial land, sea and airspace of Japan.\u2019 And, its expected that Japan will shortly announce the creation of of the post of joint forces commander<\/a>, \u00a0to facilitate coordination (currently fairly limited) among the services.<\/p>\n Prime Minister Shinzo Abe\u2019s \u00a0government recognises the necessity to strengthen Japan\u2019s independent defence posture, making up for the possibility of reduced American commitment. While the DWP welcomes the US rebalance, it cautions that \u2018how its harsh financial situation will impact efforts to translate these policies into reality attracts attention.\u2019 Of course, it remains to be seen if Tokyo\u2019s \u00a0assertive rhetoric will translate into capability decisions: \u00a0issues of limited financial resources and insufficient military capabilities<\/a> have yet to be rectified. The new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), to be released later this year, will shed some light on the future balance between words and deeds.<\/p>\n What does this mean for Australia? It means first that the strategic assessments of the two countries are currently out of sync. From the perspective of Japanese defence experts, Australia\u2019s 2013 Defence White Paper is overly optimistic about China and the security environment. Kevin Rudd\u2019s 2009 DWP was more in line with Japanese strategic thinking, and the Abe government is no doubt eager to see if there will be a course correction under a future Labor or Coalition government. Secondly, Japan\u2019s DWP reflects how volatile the current strategic situation in East Asia has become. Japan and China increasingly perceive themselves as living in a permanent state of crisis, a \u2018grey zone\u2019 between war and peace, which could easily get out of hand. Finally, more than ever Japan will judge the value of defence cooperation with Australia in terms of how it contributes to a defence strategy to deter China \u2013 something to keep in mind for future Australia-Japan defence cooperation.<\/p>\n