{"id":77355,"date":"2022-12-26T06:00:34","date_gmt":"2022-12-25T19:00:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=77355"},"modified":"2022-12-25T20:09:41","modified_gmt":"2022-12-25T09:09:41","slug":"editors-picks-for-2022-how-firm-is-xi-jinpings-grip-on-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/editors-picks-for-2022-how-firm-is-xi-jinpings-grip-on-power\/","title":{"rendered":"Editors\u2019 picks for 2022: \u2018How firm is Xi Jinping\u2019s grip on power?\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Originally published 14 October 2022.<\/em><\/p>\n

Rumours that President Xi Jinping was under house arrest amid a military coup in China\u2014apparently driven by Falun Gong\u2013linked social media accounts known for spreading factually problematic information\u2014spread widely in late September. The available facts told most analysts that a coup probably hadn\u2019t occurred, so it wasn\u2019t surprising when Xi resurfaced<\/a> on 27 September. That said, analysts shouldn\u2019t be quick to deny that Xi\u2019s position in power is more precarious than it might appear. No one knows for sure the degree to which his position is absolute. And neither, perhaps, does Xi himself. He may have positioned himself as \u2018dictator for life\u2019, but the forces of control are dynamic and he has survived in part because he doesn\u2019t make that assumption himself.<\/p>\n

Ahead of the 20th National Party Congress<\/a>, kicking off on Sunday, we have been reminded that from the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s perspective, power isn\u2019t inevitable. We saw ramped-up prosecutions<\/a>, continued calls for loyalty<\/a> and warnings of colour revolutions<\/a>. None of this is necessarily a sign of weakness or strength. The constant cycle of crisis<\/a> or potential crisis is something the Chinese Communist Party also derives power from. It is a means for mobilising the party and the public, and for justifying intensified security measures and crackdowns. The threats are not imaginary.<\/p>\n

A good rule of thumb for assessing political rumours from China is to consider them based on the balance of probabilities. If we\u2019re going to talk about Xi\u2019s power, it\u2019s best to use the structure of power as a framework and shape the questions from there. As suggested to me by my colleague Peter Mattis, there are five main elements to being the foremost leader in the People\u2019s Republic of China: gun, paper, pen, knife and blood.<\/p>\n

The \u2018gun\u2019 is the People\u2019s Liberation Army. The PLA is the party\u2019s armed wing\u2014not the country\u2019s army\u2014and is the guarantor of the party\u2019s power. As Mao Zedong famously wrote<\/a>, \u2018Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.\u2019<\/p>\n

The \u2018paper\u2019 is handled by the central paper-pushers in the General Office of the Central Committee and the Organisation Department, which play an important role in the party\u2019s management of itself.<\/p>\n

The \u2018pen\u2019 is the propaganda apparatus. The gun defeats enemies, but the pen, as Mao noted<\/a>, unites the people (under the leadership of the party) and attacks and destroys the enemy. It also defines and interprets party orthodoxy.<\/p>\n

The \u2018knife\u2019 is the internal security apparatus (the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Public Security) responsible for social and political control.<\/p>\n

And finally, the \u2018blood\u2019, representing the core families of the party. They hold massive wealth, much of which sits outside of China, and command their own loyalists by extension.<\/p>\n

Mao controlled these elements as he rose to power and as he stayed in power after the forming of the PRC. As chronicled in Gao Hua\u2019s meticulous study of Mao\u2019s seizure of power<\/a>, he began with his base in the Red Army and steadily moved to control how the central party machinery functioned and the propaganda organs. Xi has gone after each of these areas, it would appear with great success.<\/p>\n

Early in his tenure, Xi began an anti-corruption campaign targeting the PLA. Two former vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission were singled out for particular scrutiny: General Xu Caihou<\/a>, who died of cancer in 2015 a year after being put under investigation, and General Guo Boxiong<\/a>, who was sentenced to life in prison. Another PLA officer, General Gu Junshan<\/a>, former deputy director of the PLA General Logistics Department (since rebranded as the Logistic Support Department), was given a suspended death sentence.<\/p>\n

As analyst Kevin McCauley wrote in 2015<\/a>, much of the early anti-corruption campaign and personnel changes focused on logistics and political officers responsible for money, personnel, materiel and construction projects. The significance of these posts is even more crucial in a political context, because the party\u2019s ability to rely on the PLA to mobilise<\/a> in a crisis requires political loyalty as well as preparedness for military action.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Xi put himself in charge of huge PLA reforms with the establishment of the Leading Small Group on Deepening Reform of National Defence and the Military<\/a> in 2014. He oversaw the establishment<\/a> of the PLA Ground Force headquarters, the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force in 2015, and directed a major PLA restructure that began in 2016<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Xi was quick to focus on ensuring that the propaganda apparatus was on his side. Propaganda controls party dogma and helps Xi to project an image of strength, domestically and internationally. Huang Kunming, a Xi ally, was appointed head<\/a> of the Central Propaganda Department, under the CCP\u2019s Central Committee, in 2017. During Xi\u2019s tenure, the department has tightened its control over media, with the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television being moved from the State Council to the Central Propaganda Department\u2019s control in 2018. This strengthened Xi\u2019s ability to define how the party\u2019s theory about achieving national rejuvenation suggested Beijing\u2019s direction in light of real-world events.<\/p>\n

Like every party general secretary, Xi has his supporters in key positions, like the person running the CCP General Office. He also has enough control of the party discipline and anti-corruption organisations to use them against political opponents\u2014as he clearly did in July with the sentencing of white-glove financiers for his political opponents and in September with the sentencing of a number of officials linked to the Ministry of Public Security.<\/p>\n

To control the knife, Xi launched a rectification campaign against the political\u2013legal apparatus last year. One of the most senior officials taken down in the anti-corruption campaign, Zhou Yongkang<\/a>, had most recently been head of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, an area of the party-state apparatus that had resisted Xi\u2019s efforts to politicise everything. Xi had either neutralised people or put his own in places of political power. Zhao Kezhi<\/a>, who held the post of minister of public security, was recently replaced by Xi ally Wang Xiaohong. Zhao had earlier been replaced by Wang in the concurrent role of party secretary in the Ministry of Public Security.<\/p>\n

Xi has generated the most resistance from the CCP\u2019s elite families. The question here is whether the old power-broker system continues to function and has enough influence to unseat someone like Xi. It\u2019s possible that the system has changed so fundamentally that the party elders can no longer act as a check on Xi.<\/p>\n

The video message of Song Ping<\/a>, the elderly representative of a significant PLA faction, is one of the most dramatic signs that the party\u2019s bloodlines may be opposed in the current moment. (It is worth noting that signs of such dissatisfaction<\/a> go back years.) As commentator Dimon Liu pointed out<\/a> in June, criticisms of Xi by individuals writing from within the PRC have been published. None of those people are known to have been arrested, which is only possible if they are being protected by someone powerful in the PRC.<\/p>\n

Yet, despite his consolidation of power, Xi has clearly made some mistakes.<\/p>\n

The dynamic zero-Covid policy has created widespread dissatisfaction and left a trail of economic damage. Its disruptions have encouraged companies to think more directly about diversifying supply chains and forced new conversations about quality of life.<\/p>\n

Xi\u2019s decision to enter a \u2018no limits\u2019 partnership with Russia on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine put the PRC on the other side of an issue that has united the US and Europe. Although European countries are grappling with the energy crisis brought about by their dependence on Russian gas, new conversations are beginning about dependence on PRC supply chains.<\/p>\n

Xi\u2019s pressure campaign on Taiwan has closed off pathways for peaceful unification and encouraged the US to more explicitly state its support for Taipei. Last month, President Joe Biden for the fourth time stated that America would defend Taiwan if the PRC launched an unprovoked attack.<\/p>\n

Xi also has doubled down on state-owned enterprises leading the economy, refusing to look at rebalancing the economy towards consumer demand. Now the headwinds are rising quickly and economic forecasts<\/a> look increasingly grim.<\/p>\n

So, the control solidified early on could be wearing down, and we are left to ask, by how much? At what point does dissatisfaction become opposition? Have generational change and Xi\u2019s anti-corruption drive disrupted the familial and patronage networks that gave party elders power in the past?<\/p>\n

For the CCP, the party congress is not when and where major political and personnel decisions are made. It is the platform<\/a> the party uses to formalise and announce what already has been decided in backrooms. It isn\u2019t always clear what those decisions might be until they become known to the world. It\u2019s even possible that a palace coup and political manoeuvre forcing Xi out could go unmarked until the party congress provides the opportunity to tell the world.<\/p>\n

In uncertain times when the rules have been cast out, regional specialists should be more open to possible discontinuities. As former director of US Central Intelligence Robert Gates noted<\/a>, \u2018Area experts, country experts, are sometimes the very last to see a revolutionary change coming, because the history of most countries is a history of continuity. In discontinuity, they find too many reasons why that won\u2019t happen.\u2019<\/p>\n

The history of the CCP is littered with political crises, the most dangerous of which involved\u00a0 questions of leadership succession and economic policy. Even if the coup rumours were a false alarm generated by wishful thinking, the current dynamics should have us systematically assessing potential discontinuities because of the potential for another crisis to emerge that tests the resilience of the CCP. Xi\u2019s behaviour shows that he knows that the struggle for power is never over. We should take note of this in our own thinking.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Originally published 14 October 2022. Rumours that President Xi Jinping was under house arrest amid a military coup in China\u2014apparently driven by Falun Gong\u2013linked social media accounts known for spreading factually problematic information\u2014spread widely in …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":742,"featured_media":75822,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1858,1383,52,204],"class_list":["post-77355","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-authoritarianism","tag-ccp","tag-china","tag-xi-jinping"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nEditors\u2019 picks for 2022: \u2018How firm is Xi Jinping\u2019s grip on power?\u2019 | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/editors-picks-for-2022-how-firm-is-xi-jinpings-grip-on-power\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Editors\u2019 picks for 2022: \u2018How firm is Xi Jinping\u2019s grip on power?\u2019 | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Originally published 14 October 2022. 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