{"id":77359,"date":"2022-12-27T06:00:10","date_gmt":"2022-12-26T19:00:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=77359"},"modified":"2023-04-04T11:01:58","modified_gmt":"2023-04-04T01:01:58","slug":"editors-picks-for-2022-whats-happened-to-russias-much-vaunted-battlefield-ai","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/editors-picks-for-2022-whats-happened-to-russias-much-vaunted-battlefield-ai\/","title":{"rendered":"Editors\u2019 picks for 2022: \u2018What\u2019s happened to Russia\u2019s much-vaunted battlefield AI?\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Originally published 31 March 2022.<\/em><\/p>\n

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the poorer than expected performance of the Russian army have prompted fierce debate among military commentators on why Russia\u2019s much-vaunted military reforms of the past decade\u2014particularly the integration of artificial intelligence technologies that were supposed to enhance Russia\u2019s joint operations capability\u2014seem to have been unsuccessful.<\/p>\n

So far, Russia\u2019s deployment in Ukraine has been a demonstration of some of the limitations and vulnerabilities of AI-enabled systems. It has also exposed some longer-term strategic weaknesses in Russia\u2019s development of AI for military and economic purposes.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s use of AI-enabled technologies in the invasion reportedly includes disinformation operations<\/a>, deep fakes<\/a> and open-source intelligence gathering<\/a>. But information operations are not the sum total of Russia\u2019s AI capabilities. AI is embedded across the military spectrum, from information management, training, logistics, maintenance and manufacturing, to early warning and air-defence systems.<\/p>\n

Since at least 2014, Russia has deployed multiple aerial, ground and maritime uncrewed systems and robotic platforms, electronic warfare systems, and new and experimental<\/a> weapons in both Syria and Ukraine.<\/p>\n

The AI elements in these systems include image recognition and image stitching in Orion combat drones<\/a>, radio signal recognition in Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft systems, AI-enabled situational understanding and jamming capability <\/a>in the Bylina<\/a> electronic warfare system, and navigation support in the Kamaz truck<\/a>. So-called kamikaze drones<\/a> (developed by the Kalashnikov Group, the maker of the famous assault weapon) appear to use a mix of manual and automated<\/a> target acquisition.<\/p>\n

One of the earliest images that circulated online <\/a>in the current conflict was of a Russian Pantsir-S1 stuck in the mud in a field in southern Ukraine. The Pantsir is a component of the early warning and air-defence system that features both short-range surface-to-air missiles and 30-millimetre automatic cannon.<\/p>\n

If we look under the hood at the purported AI technologies of the Pantsir, Russian state media Izvestia reported<\/a> two years ago that it<\/p>\n

is capable of detecting, classifying and firing at air targets without the participation of an operator. The developed algorithms instantly determine the importance of objects and arrange the order of their destruction depending on the danger they represent \u2026<\/p>\n

Its software takes into account the tactical situation, the location of targets, their degree of danger, and other parameters and selects the optimal tactics for repelling a raid.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It\u2019s wise to be wary of Russian claims of full autonomy, both because the capacities of AI-enabled systems tend to be overblown and because deliberately fabricated information<\/a> is a component of Russia\u2019s approach to new-generation warfare<\/a>.<\/p>\n

There are reasons to be concerned about the individual systems and their AI components, but it\u2019s important to consider Russia\u2019s grander AI vision.<\/p>\n

The Pantsir-S1 is just one node of an interconnected system that includes airborne radar systems, satellites and reconnaissance drones, and panoptic information-management systems.<\/p>\n

Just as the West has been pursuing a vision of an interconnected battlefield in the form of a \u2018joint all-domain command and control centre\u2019 (JADC2) concept, Russia has its \u2018national defence management centre\u2019 (NDMC), which aims for the same. The goal is to build systems in which \u2018data can move seamlessly<\/a> between air, land, maritime, space, and cyber forces in real time\u2019.<\/p>\n

According to researchers at CNA, a US think tank, \u2018NDMC was designed <\/a>to receive information from the lowest military unit levels, and, following analysis and evaluation, feed the data directly to those at the strategic level.\u2019 This defines the battlefield in multiple dimensions and makes shared situational understanding contingent on information from the edge<\/a> of the battlespace.<\/p>\n

There has been some speculation that poor-quality tyres<\/a> or failure to account for local <\/a>conditions indicate vulnerabilities in Russian forward planning. While these physical aspects are important, in a battlespace that\u2019s dependent on information it\u2019s also important to consider the extent of interoperability of systems, any bandwidth constraints, and the tendency in computer-assisted decision-making to equate a map with territory. Expanding a military\u2019s capacity to use so-called real-time information requires analyst teams to interpret and leadership to prioritise the information.<\/p>\n

The critical human element was hindered because Russia\u2019s planning seems to have been tightly held within President Vladimir Putin\u2019s inner circle (which does not include the army) until just before the invasion.<\/p>\n

Putin said in 2017<\/a>, \u2018Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere [artificial intelligence] will become the ruler of the world.\u2019 Since then, he has pushed the use of defence sector spending and defence acquisition<\/a> to generate national economic growth and drive national technological innovation.<\/p>\n

With few reasons to adhere to international norms on ethical AI development, including regulation of data harvesting, as well as a ready supply of programming talent, Russia could be perhaps seen as having some advantages in AI developments, and the ability to quickly deploy innovations into its asymmetric warfare programs.<\/p>\n

However, the two directions<\/a> in which the Kremlin is steering<\/a> the Russian defence sector\u2014increasing civilian and dual-use goods and import substitution\u2014carry some distinct vulnerabilities for Russia. Despite pushes by Putin in recent years towards economic self-sufficiency, the interconnected nature of global trade means that there are key technology choke points that affect Russia\u2019s AI development.<\/p>\n

The main barrier to Moscow\u2019s vision of AI supremacy is microchips. Russian media has claimed<\/a> that NDMC\u2019s information management runs on \u2018Russian-made\u2019 Elbrus microprocessors<\/a>. However, Russia lacks the ability to produce these microchips. The production of Elbrus chips is outsourced to Taiwan, to the company TSMC, which has now suspended<\/a> its production and export to Russia.<\/p>\n

At a broader level, at least 1,300 Russian defence enterprises<\/a> have shortages in human capital, particularly in process engineering, and the exodus of tech talent from Russia<\/a> has been accelerated by the war. A range of Western sanctions in key technologies and commodities will hit the Russian economy hard<\/a>, even if it tries to substitute with imports from China.<\/p>\n

Some analysts<\/a> have claimed that Russian underinvestment in technology modernisation has hampered the army\u2019s ability to \u2018see\u2019 the battlefield, forcing it to rely on the brute force of tanks and artillery. For those Ukrainians now under siege in cities around the country, the apparent modernisation of Russia\u2019s war apparatus will be perhaps a moot point as artillery rains down. But AI is a critical technology<\/a> that will be increasingly important for both economic development and national defence. It\u2019s important to understand both the way it is embedded in technologies and the international supply-chain interdependencies that are crucial for its development.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Originally published 31 March 2022. 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