{"id":77417,"date":"2023-01-05T06:00:55","date_gmt":"2023-01-04T19:00:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=77417"},"modified":"2023-01-05T14:54:23","modified_gmt":"2023-01-05T03:54:23","slug":"editors-picks-for-2022-australias-damn-the-torpedoes-path-to-nuclear-powered-submarines","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/editors-picks-for-2022-australias-damn-the-torpedoes-path-to-nuclear-powered-submarines\/","title":{"rendered":"Editors\u2019 picks for 2022: \u2018Australia\u2019s \u201cdamn the torpedoes\u201d path to nuclear-powered submarines\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Originally published 4 October 2022.<\/em><\/p>\n

I\u2019ve often thought that Australia\u2019s submarine transition is a wicked problem, perhaps one of the most wicked in the public policy arena. A wicked problem<\/a> is one that is difficult or even impossible to solve because key stakeholders have fundamentally different interests and requirements. No solution can satisfy them all. It\u2019s not just possible, but inevitable that intelligent people will be committed to very different solutions to wicked problems.<\/p>\n

I was reminded of this recently after my colleague Andrew Nicholls and I had written a series of articles in The Strategist<\/em> unpacking the schedule<\/a> of the transition from the Collins-class submarine to a future nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), examining the likelihood<\/a> of a capability gap<\/a> and considering whether a new conventional submarine<\/a> could fill that gap. After the last piece, I received lengthy responses from two retired senior naval officers. They agreed with each other that we were wrong in our analysis of the issues. That\u2019s not unusual; I\u2019m quite used to people pointing out my errors. What was more interesting is that the two officers took diametrically opposed positions to each other. But, of course, that is the nature of wicked problems: subject-matter experts will disagree.<\/p>\n

Officer 1 was strongly opposed to a new conventional submarine, arguing that the Royal Australian Navy couldn\u2019t sustain three classes of submarines (the Collins, the new boats and SSNs) and Australia couldn\u2019t simultaneously conduct three major submarine programs (the Collins life-of-type-extension, the new boats and SSNs). Instead, \u2018maximum effort must go into acquiring some SSNs as fast as possible, with the first few probably built overseas\u2019.<\/p>\n

Officer 2 agreed with the ultimate need for SSNs but argued that the days of the conventional submarine were far from over, although they may need to be used differently to remain relevant. The best way forward was to accept the long timelines involved in the transition to SSNs and fill the gap by building more Collins-class boats. They would include all the upgrades installed since the original build program plus those planned for the life-of-type-extension program.<\/p>\n

There are, of course, many subvariants of this second position, each advocating a different conventional submarine solution. Ultimately, the two positions are irreconcilable\u2014either you acquire a new conventional submarine or you don\u2019t. But they do set out the two broad pathways forward: go all-in on getting SSNs as fast as possible and live with the risks that arise, or embark on a deliberate, extended transition that is built around addressing the risks of that process.<\/p>\n

We\u2019ve looked at the second of these two approaches in previous work. That\u2019s because when you take a standard approach to capability acquisition, it looks like the safer one. But what if we accept that AUKUS is not the standard approach to capability acquisition? Moreover, if we accept the argument of proponents of SSNs that conventional submarines will become obsolete<\/a> in key areas in which Australia might want to operate, then the wicked problem looks somewhat different. No amount of conventional submarine capability will meet our requirements. And if we take the navy at its word that Australia can\u2019t manage three huge submarine programs and operate three distinct classes of submarine, a new conventional boat would simply add to our problems.<\/p>\n

So, what would a damn-the-torpedoes<\/a> accelerated development of SSN capability look like? Above all, it would need to embrace the fact that an Australian SSN capability isn\u2019t going to be a sovereign capability; Australia will always be dependent on our major partner for the acquisition, sustainment and, to a degree, operation of the capability. But once we accept that, several possibilities outside the traditional approach open up that embrace the concept of leveraging our AUKUS partners\u2019 capabilities.<\/p>\n

Various elements of this potential path have been suggested already, and, indeed, some are already getting underway. They include:<\/p>\n