{"id":77492,"date":"2023-01-16T12:00:46","date_gmt":"2023-01-16T01:00:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=77492"},"modified":"2023-01-16T11:48:55","modified_gmt":"2023-01-16T00:48:55","slug":"how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone\/","title":{"rendered":"How China\u2019s maritime militia takes advantage of the grey zone"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

At the end of last year, Japan\u2019s National Institute for Defense Studies released the 2023 edition of its annual China security report<\/a>, which focuses on China\u2019s quest for control of the cognitive domain and grey-zone situations. I, as one of the report\u2019s authors, analyse how China uses its maritime militia and coastguard and what it aims to achieve.<\/p>\n

In recent years, China has used paramilitary forces to put pressure on neighbouring countries that have conflicting claims with Beijing. Japan has been one of the targets over which China seeks to gain dominance by deliberately creating grey-zone situations at sea. For example, in 2016, shortly after China\u2019s then defence minister, Chang Wanquan, visited<\/a> the maritime militia of Zhejiang, hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels swarmed<\/a> into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, which Japan effectively controls, and made repeated incursions into Japan\u2019s territorial waters. Australia, too, has been a target. During Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019, helicopters taking off from the Royal Australian Navy flagship HMAS Canberra<\/em> were reportedly<\/a>\u00a0hit with lasers from Chinese fishing vessels.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s no conclusive evidence that China\u2019s maritime militia were involved in these incidents. However, the Chinese government is clearly putting an emphasis on the militia to expand its maritime interests. Neighbouring countries therefore need to accurately understand China\u2019s intention in its use of maritime militias.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s maritime militia is under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, the government and the military. The cadres of the local militia often hold positions in local governments and party organisations. For example, Wang Shumao<\/a>, deputy commander of the maritime militia in Tanmen in Hainan province, who also serves as secretary of the CCP\u2019s Tanmen branch, was elected as a delegate to the party\u2019s 20th national congress. The maritime militia is not simply a group of fishermen; it is composed of personnel with various backgrounds, including fishery processors, shipbuilders, port builders, medical workers, veterans, local government officials and members of the CCP.<\/p>\n

The Chinese maritime militia have a variety of missions, such as daily fishery production activities; maritime guerrilla operations; cooperation with and support for maritime operations forces; and engagement in grey-zone activities at sea.<\/p>\n

The organisations with which the maritime militia collaborates are likely to vary depending on the situation. It coordinates with official government vessels for asserting maritime rights and interests in relatively low-intensity grey-zone areas, such as communications operations in disputed areas and surveillance of foreign fishing and research vessels. It also works with military organisations to conduct intelligence operations in grey-zone areas and interdiction activities against foreign military vessels, as well as relatively intense paramilitary operations, such as support and replenishment for the military in wartime and participation in military operations. The Chinese government may believe that mobilising the maritime militia can control the escalation of a crisis, rein in the adversary, avoid military skirmishes and expand China\u2019s effective control of certain areas.<\/p>\n

Following Xi\u2019s 2013 visit to a maritime militia force in Hainan province, the Chinese government stepped up its support for maritime militia units operating in the South China Sea. Government authorities provide<\/a> fuel subsidies and subsidies for the construction and repair of fishing vessels operating in disputed waters. The number of vessels dedicated to maritime militia has increased significantly in recent years. Installation of the BeiDou satellite navigation system is well underway, with 70,000 Chinese fishing vessels equipped<\/a> with the system as of 2020.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s increasing control over the maritime militia will allow the central government\u2019s intentions to be reflected at the grassroots. This may give two policy options to the Chinese government. Against a strong opponent, such as the US military, the maritime militia can be deployed to obstruct and check its actions and communicate China\u2019s intentions while avoiding military escalation. For example, in the 2009 USNS Impeccable<\/em> incident<\/a> in the South China Sea, the Chinese side reportedly interfered with US operations not with its navy but by mobilising nearby Chinese fishing boats.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, if a small country is the adversary, the maritime militia can carry out extreme provocations to lure the adversary\u2019s armed forces to take military action and justify its own military retaliation, which could result in heightening overall tensions. Indeed, in the so-called Battle of the Paracel Islands<\/a> in January 1974, when China seized the islands from South Vietnam, which until then had effectively controlled and occupied them, Chinese fishing boats suspected to be part of the maritime militia repeatedly engaged in provocative behaviour in the nearby waters even before military skirmishes began.<\/p>\n

Which policy the Chinese government chooses will depend on its relationship with the opponent country. If it feels that inadvertent friction would be disadvantageous to it, it will not use the maritime militia to climb the escalation ladder. However, if it feels that using the maritime militia could expand China\u2019s interests or deter the other side, it will be proactive in its use.<\/p>\n

Given these policy implications, Australia and Japan need to signal to China that use of the maritime militia will be disadvantageous because it will increase distrust and weaken China\u2019s relations with neighbouring countries. The Australian and Japanese governments have already expressed their concerns about China\u2019s \u2018dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia\u2019 in joint<\/a> statements<\/a>. It is also important to nullify the use of maritime militias and deal with dangerous activities by fishing vessels by deepening practical cooperation, such as expanding cooperation between Australian and Japanese maritime law enforcement agencies and joint military exercises.<\/p>\n

In order to coexist with China, which is expanding its interests backed by military power, Australia and Japan need to communicate their interests and threat perception and avoid unnecessary accidents. At the same time, it is important to make China realise that in a conflict in which Australia and Japan are actors, it will not gain any advantage from using its maritime militia. This is a way for Australia and Japan to seek stable relationships with China at sea in the long term.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

At the end of last year, Japan\u2019s National Institute for Defense Studies released the 2023 edition of its annual China security report, which focuses on China\u2019s quest for control of the cognitive domain and grey-zone …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1620,"featured_media":77497,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,2338,3430,471],"class_list":["post-77492","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-grey-zone","tag-maritime-militia","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nHow China\u2019s maritime militia takes advantage of the grey zone | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"How China\u2019s maritime militia takes advantage of the grey zone | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"At the end of last year, Japan\u2019s National Institute for Defense Studies released the 2023 edition of its annual China security report, which focuses on China\u2019s quest for control of the cognitive domain and grey-zone ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2023-01-16T01:00:46+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-01-16T00:48:55+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1334449272.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"677\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Masaaki Yatsuzuka\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Masaaki Yatsuzuka\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1334449272.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1334449272.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":677,\"caption\":\"YANGJIANG, CHINA - AUGUST 16: Aerial view of fishing boats setting sail for fishing on August 16, 2021 in Yangjiang, Guangdong Province of China. 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