{"id":77510,"date":"2023-01-16T06:00:37","date_gmt":"2023-01-15T19:00:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=77510"},"modified":"2023-01-15T22:15:58","modified_gmt":"2023-01-15T11:15:58","slug":"the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/","title":{"rendered":"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Indonesia shapes Australia\u2019s regional dreams and darkens its strategic nightmares.<\/p>\n

The only constant of the Indonesia effect is the constant shape-shifting of a roller-coaster relationship.<\/p>\n

A vivid version of the wild ride is the period 1999 to 2002: Indonesia and Australia went to the military brink in East Timor, wrangled over people smuggling, shared the horror of a terrorist attack, achieved unprecedented police cooperation, and established a new regional process that\u2019s still going.<\/p>\n

The release of the 2002 cabinet records<\/a> by the National Archives of Australia marks a shape-shifting moment. In 2002, the focus swung to terrorism and people smuggling after the bloody drama of East Timor\u2019s independence vote in 1999.<\/p>\n

In ASPI\u2019s podcast series on the evolution of the Australia\u2013Indonesia strategic partnership<\/a>, a former Indonesian presidential adviser, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, recalled that Jakarta was \u2018upset and angry\u2019 at Australia\u2019s role in Timor and that, for a time, \u2018Australia was actually seen as a threat\u2019.<\/p>\n

For Canberra, the Timor\u00a0outcome<\/a>\u00a0was unbidden and unintended. When\u00a0Prime Minister John Howard wrote to<\/a> Indonesia\u2019s President B.J. Habibie\u00a0in 1998 urging an \u2018act of self-determination\u2019, he emphasised that \u2018Australia\u2019s support for Indonesia\u2019s sovereignty is unchanged\u2019. Lots changed quickly after that.<\/p>\n

Canberra was anxious and amazed at the\u00a0role it had to play<\/a> in Timor\u2014proud at how it turned out, but mightily relieved it became a successful international mission and not war with Indonesia.<\/p>\n

Australia realised it had given a \u2018bilateral security guarantee\u2019<\/a> to a new nation that would forever share a land border with Indonesia.<\/p>\n

Pondering the drawdown of Australia\u2019s military in East Timor in October 2002, the National Security Committee of cabinet fretted that if the proportion of Australians in the UN peacekeeping force grew too significant, it would \u2018risk becoming an irritant in the development of a new Australia\u2013Indonesia relationship\u2019 and \u2018promote an attitude in East Timor that Australia is willing to underwrite East Timorese security\u2019. By 2002, the Timor security guarantee was the reality, whatever the risk.<\/p>\n

Two events in Bali are the 2002 landmarks of the post-Timor era: the Bali ministerial conference in February on people smuggling, and in October the Kuta terrorist bombings that killed 202 people, including 88 Australians.<\/p>\n

The Bali conference transformed the terms of the Jakarta\u2013Canberra fight over Indonesian people smugglers dispatching \u2018boat people\u2019 to Australia. In 2001, the boat-people stoush saw Indonesia\u2019s foreign minister attack Howard\u2019s government for \u2018megaphone diplomacy\u2019<\/a> and Indonesia\u2019s president refuse to take a phone call from Howard.<\/p>\n

The Bali meeting co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia created the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime<\/a>. The process has had seven ministerial meetings over two decades (still chaired by Australia and Indonesia); its website<\/a> (funded by Australia, Japan and New Zealand) proclaims its purpose as \u2018policy dialogue, information sharing and practical cooperation\u2019.<\/p>\n

Instead of doing bipolar bilateral battle over people trafficking, Australia and Indonesia stood together in a larger regional effort. The diplomacy started desperate but ended deft.<\/p>\n

By the end of 2002, Australia was preparing to co-host a second conference in the Bali Process in 2003. A cabinet minute in November 2002 noted the success \u2018in galvanising regional attention\u2019, the \u2018framework setting out longer term strategy\u2019 and \u2018the wider benefits of closer engagement with Indonesia\u2019.<\/p>\n

Covering that Bali ministerial in Nusa Dua in February 2002, one of my reporting asides had been that this was the natural place for Australia and Indonesia to come together. Bali, after all, was where Australians felt most welcome. I thought of that line when the bombs exploded<\/a> in Kuta.<\/p>\n

Amid tragedy, a change in the Indonesia\u2013Australia relationship became even clearer. Australia embraced Indonesia as a fellow democracy, sharing the grief and sharing the fight against the extremists.<\/p>\n

Under the Suharto regime, Indonesia\u2019s response to the bombings would have been to draw the secrecy curtain, to crack down and shut out. The Bali bombings marked the moment when Australia\u2019s security relationship with Indonesia broadened from military to police, and moved from stand-off to cooperation.<\/p>\n

In October 1999, Australian and Indonesian forces exchanged fire across the border between East and West Timor, and one Indonesian officer was killed. Jakarta had torn up its security treaty with Canberra over the Australian-led intervention, and military conflict was a possibility. Almost exactly three years later, the Bali bombings changed the security dynamic.<\/p>\n

Forensic work by Australian police at a Bali bombsite identified the registration of the truck that carried the explosives. Australian police worked beside Indonesian police in every step that followed, leading to the capture and conviction of the Bali bombers.<\/p>\n

The Australian Defence Force had ownership of any security connection with Indonesia during the decades of Suharto\u2019s rule. The moral peril of Suharto\u2019s regime had been dealing with an Indonesian army that functioned as both mafia and military. In the new democratic Indonesia, the frontline role could be held by the Australian Federal Police, partnering with an Indonesian police force that was no longer part of the military.<\/p>\n

A 2014 ASPI study based on interviews with 60 Australian and Indonesian police<\/a> described a valued \u2018relationship based on trust, mutual benefit and shared concern for fighting crime\u2019, able to withstand \u2018most of the fluctuations in the broader bilateral relationship\u2019.<\/p>\n

The partnership became a target for the extremists when they exploded a one-tonne car bomb outside Australia\u2019s Jakarta embassy in 2004, killing nine people and injuring 160. The damaged embassy coat of arms<\/a> is now at the National Museum of Australia.<\/p>\n

The potency of the history is shown by what Canberra still keeps secret. In the release of the 2002 cabinet archives, only eight documents were \u2018wholly exempt from public access because their disclosure would damage Australia\u2019s security, defence or international relations\u2019. Two of these were a cabinet submission and decision on \u2018The Australia\u2013Indonesia defence relationship\u2014next steps\u2019 and a decision on a \u2018Review of counter-terrorism cooperation between Australia and Indonesia\u2019.<\/p>\n

The dramatic history of Australia\u2013Indonesia relations is of two vastly different neighbours compelled to find a destiny together\u2014how little the two have in common, how much they must share.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Indonesia shapes Australia\u2019s regional dreams and darkens its strategic nightmares. The only constant of the Indonesia effect is the constant shape-shifting of a roller-coaster relationship. A vivid version of the wild ride is the period …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":79,"featured_media":77513,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,1337,285,8,509,2109],"class_list":["post-77510","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia","tag-bali-process","tag-foreign-policy","tag-indonesia","tag-john-howard","tag-national-archives"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nThe Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Indonesia shapes Australia\u2019s regional dreams and darkens its strategic nightmares. The only constant of the Indonesia effect is the constant shape-shifting of a roller-coaster relationship. A vivid version of the wild ride is the period ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2023-01-15T19:00:37+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-01-15T11:15:58+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1618198.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"678\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Graeme Dobell\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Graeme Dobell\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1618198.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1618198.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":678,\"caption\":\"DENPASAR, BALI, INDONESIA - NOVEMBER 13: Visitors look at the site of a Bali nightclub that was destroyed in a bombing blast last month November 13, 2002 in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia. Indonesia police investigating October's Bali bombings named four new suspects in the case, bringing the number of official suspects to seven. (Photo by Edy Purnomo\/Getty Images)\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/\",\"name\":\"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2023-01-15T19:00:37+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-01-15T11:15:58+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f\",\"name\":\"Graeme Dobell\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Graeme Dobell\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/graeme-dobell\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings | The Strategist","og_description":"Indonesia shapes Australia\u2019s regional dreams and darkens its strategic nightmares. The only constant of the Indonesia effect is the constant shape-shifting of a roller-coaster relationship. A vivid version of the wild ride is the period ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2023-01-15T19:00:37+00:00","article_modified_time":"2023-01-15T11:15:58+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1024,"height":678,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1618198.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Graeme Dobell","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Graeme Dobell","Est. reading time":"5 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1618198.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/GettyImages-1618198.jpg","width":1024,"height":678,"caption":"DENPASAR, BALI, INDONESIA - NOVEMBER 13: Visitors look at the site of a Bali nightclub that was destroyed in a bombing blast last month November 13, 2002 in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia. Indonesia police investigating October's Bali bombings named four new suspects in the case, bringing the number of official suspects to seven. (Photo by Edy Purnomo\/Getty Images)"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/","name":"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2023-01-15T19:00:37+00:00","dateModified":"2023-01-15T11:15:58+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-indonesia-effect-the-bali-process-and-bali-bombings\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The Indonesia effect: the Bali Process and Bali bombings"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/ed3342cd61abc65c1532f3cc46bdf96f","name":"Graeme Dobell","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dff56734d4df784248f63058b7b6900a?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Graeme Dobell"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/graeme-dobell\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77510"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/79"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77510"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77510\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":77516,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77510\/revisions\/77516"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/77513"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77510"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=77510"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=77510"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}