{"id":77908,"date":"2023-02-16T14:30:41","date_gmt":"2023-02-16T03:30:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=77908"},"modified":"2023-02-16T13:41:11","modified_gmt":"2023-02-16T02:41:11","slug":"rearming-the-royal-australian-navy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/rearming-the-royal-australian-navy\/","title":{"rendered":"Rearming the Royal Australian Navy"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Much has been written on the importance of guided weapons and ensuring conflicts aren\u2019t lost through a shortage of ammunition. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles\u2019s observation about the need for \u2018impactful projection\u2019<\/a> implies that the Australian Defence Force\u2019s firepower will be increased, and the intent to manufacture advanced guided weapons in Australia is a welcome development.<\/p>\n

In 1995, the Royal Australian Navy possessed 368 missile cells on its major surface combatants. By 2020, that had reduced to 208, a 43% reduction in firepower. It will take until 2045 for the navy to get back up to its 1995 capacity. From 2050 it will plateau at 432, a net increase of 64 cells.<\/p>\n

How did this happen, and how many is enough?<\/p>\n

Figure 1: Number of missile cells on RAN major surface combatants, 1995 to 2060<\/strong><\/p>\n

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After World War II, guided missiles progressively became the primary armament of large warships and countering saturation attacks was a priority. From the late 1970s, the US Navy designed ships around the Aegis combat system<\/a>. The Arleigh Burke\u2013class<\/a> guided missile destroyer (DDG) reflects current best practice with 96 cells, and Japan and Korea have adopted the same philosophy. China has a slightly larger ship with 128 cells.<\/p>\n

The US Navy uses advanced modelling<\/a> to assess its needs against a changing<\/a> threat. That has led to it having more advanced combat systems and heavily armed ships with fast missile launch rates. Large warships in the European region are less well armed than their Pacific counterparts. That might be due to generally shorter transit requirements, timelier logistics support lines, and the proximity of land-based air cover. Conditions in the Pacific are much less accommodating and Australia can\u2019t ignore geographic realities.<\/p>\n

The RAN was fully aware of this evolution in naval warfare when the air warfare destroyer<\/a> program was announced in the 2000 defence white paper, producing the Aegis-equipped Hobart class. Plans for a new, larger frigate to replace the Anzac class<\/a> were incorporated in the 2009 defence white paper, which warned of increased regional security risks, a mantra repeated in the 2013 and 2016 policy papers. The 2018 decision to acquire a British-designed warship requiring a wholesale change of its combat system, sensors and weapons, and fitting it only with 32 missile cells, appears irrational<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Guided weapons continue to increase in lethality, speed, range and accuracy. Their evolution follows the classic cycle of matching, neutralising and further enhancing their features. It\u2019s an endless journey. It\u2019s imperative for naval guided weapons to contribute to joint \u2018all arms\u2019 warfare. The US Navy\u2019s soon-to-be-introduced hypersonic guided missile is being developed in concert with the US Army.<\/p>\n

Standardisation, where sensible, offers considerable operational and other benefits, not least of which are resupply availability and cost.<\/p>\n

Notwithstanding the desire for commonality and for a one-size-fits-all solution, that ambition remains out of reach. From announcements in the public domain, the RAN already operates or will acquire:<\/p>\n