{"id":78093,"date":"2023-02-28T06:00:03","date_gmt":"2023-02-27T19:00:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=78093"},"modified":"2023-02-27T18:44:25","modified_gmt":"2023-02-27T07:44:25","slug":"whats-the-future-for-crewed-aircraft-in-combat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/whats-the-future-for-crewed-aircraft-in-combat\/","title":{"rendered":"What\u2019s the future for crewed aircraft in combat?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine, with its images of helicopters trailing flames, has demonstrated their vulnerability to effective air defences and triggered debate on the future of crewed aircraft sent to penetrate enemy airspace.<\/p>\n

Former Australian Army major general Mick Ryan, who has studied the conflict closely since Moscow\u2019s 2014 invasion, says Russia is no longer flying crewed aircraft over Ukraine because of its potent air- and missile-defence regime.<\/p>\n

\u2018I think attack helicopters are very vulnerable and have an uncertain future,\u2019 Ryan says.<\/p>\n

\u2018Crewed fighter aircraft are unlikely to penetrate enemy airspace and complex air-defence regimes in the future. That\u2019s an important conversation to have.\u2019<\/p>\n

The Russians have a sophisticated air force, he says, but unlike the Americans, they\u2019ve never undertaken a large-scale air campaign. \u2018We\u2019ve seen the Americans from World War II onwards conduct these major campaigns, and they learn. After Vietnam, you saw a much greater focus on suppression of air defences.\u2019<\/p>\n

The Russians have not got this right, says Ryan. They tried it in the first days of the war, striking air-defence radars and missile sites.<\/p>\n

The Ukrainians were able, with a much smaller and less sophisticated air force and air-defence framework, to outfox the Russians and bought their country time. \u2018If the Russians had been able to suppress Ukraine\u2019s air-defence system, they\u2019d have better supported their ground forces, and we could be in a very different war now.\u2019<\/p>\n

Ryan says it\u2019s likely that only the US Air Force could mount an integrated air suppression regime on the scale required in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

While the Royal Australian Air Force has very sophisticated capabilities like its Growler electronic attack aircraft and stealthy F-35 joint strike fighters, they\u2019d be operating in an environment where adversaries have seen how to integrate military and non-military sensors into a secure network.<\/p>\n

\u2018The Ukrainians have, for instance, enabled civilians to report missiles or aircraft much more rapidly than we\u2019ve seen before,\u2019 Ryan adds.<\/p>\n

\u2018Regardless of how sophisticated crewed aircraft are, they\u2019re going to find it much more difficult to penetrate enemy airspace, and if they can, it will be a much more lethal environment for them.\u2019<\/p>\n

Ryan finds it hard to believe systems such as attack helicopters will be survivable in the future.<\/p>\n

\u2018The Ukrainians and the Russians now use them to lob rockets from long range. That\u2019s the only way they can survive. We\u2019ve seen massive losses of Russian and Ukrainian attack helicopters, even the most sophisticated Ka-52 Russian helicopters. They\u2019re slow and easy to detect.\u2019<\/p>\n

So, what replaces the crewed attack helicopter?<\/p>\n

\u2018A system of things,\u2019 says Ryan. \u2018Different forms of ground reconnaissance, crewed and uncrewed ground combat systems with uncrewed aerial systems, loitering munitions and ground-based loitering munitions. Uncrewed ground vehicles can carry munitions. This is a question of imagination, rather than technology.\u2019<\/p>\n

Uncrewed aircraft are likely to have a role if they are smaller with lower profiles and are harder to detect. But it\u2019s also about loitering munitions that are very small and expendable and can be procured in large numbers quickly.<\/p>\n

\u2018Companies in Australia make those things, but we\u2019re just not buying them. The Ukrainians certainly are, so you can operate over an enemy ground force that doesn\u2019t involve crewed aircraft or even large uncrewed aircraft.\u2019<\/p>\n

It has been demonstrated often that ground and naval forces need air support and air cover to survive. Has that changed?<\/p>\n

\u2018I don\u2019t think that\u2019s changed at all,\u2019 Ryan says. \u2018We need to be able to operate across all domains at the same time. If an enemy has an air force, you want your own air force and an air-defence regime to allow you freedom of movement and to deny the enemy freedom of movement. It\u2019s how you affect control of the air in a modern environment.\u2019<\/p>\n

Most of the fighting and dying in Ukraine involves soldiers on the ground and civilians. But Ryan says air campaigns are critical, whether they involve helicopters providing resupply and casualty evacuation, attack helicopters or crewed aircraft from Ukraine operating defensive missions or Russian crewed aircraft flying over Belarus and Russia to launch long-range missiles.<\/p>\n

He says the role of autonomous systems should not be overemphasised because over the past two decades investment has gone into autonomy and not counter-autonomy. \u2018Smart countries will acquire counter-autonomy systems cheaper than the autonomous systems being used against them.\u2019<\/p>\n

The world\u2019s air forces need the capabilities to support naval and ground forces with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and with transport, and the RAAF may well be part of a strategic strike capability, Ryan says. \u2018But as other countries have done, you may allocate that to an independent long-range missile command instead of giving it to an air force.\u2019<\/p>\n

Ryan says the opportunity to act on lessons from Ukraine will be in implementing the recommendations of the defence strategic review by former defence minister Stephen Smith and former Australian Defence Force chief Angus Houston, now with the government.<\/p>\n

\u2018I hope they do so quickly,\u2019 Ryan says. \u2018There\u2019s little point in running a review and then having the Department of Defence spend a year or two mulling it over before they take any action.\u2019<\/p>\n

Ryan says the review will be the first indication of what Australia might have learned from Ukraine.<\/p>\n

\u2018I hope it has incorporated those lessons\u2014profound ones for strategy, for air forces, for naval forces and for ground forces, as well as the logistics and national indigenous defence industry that we should heed. We should be looking at how we develop strategies, and if they\u2019re based on good assumptions. We\u2019ve seen the Russians perform very poorly at the strategic level with bad assumptions about Ukraine.\u2019<\/p>\n

Ukraine, a technologically sophisticated nation, is performing magnificently, he says. As part of the USSR, Ukraine built Russia\u2019s Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva<\/em>, and Ukrainian missiles sank it.<\/p>\n

Also important, Ryan says, will be the capacity to take risks.<\/p>\n

\u2018Some things in the review may seem like good ideas but won\u2019t work out. We need to learn even from failures. And we must ensure we have an ADF postured to learn and adapt once a conflict begins.\u2019<\/p>\n

Ryan says the ADF can\u2019t put all of its eggs into one basket, as with long-range strike.<\/p>\n

\u2018Combat is now conducted at longer range but, once you\u2019ve run out of missiles, is the enemy deterred? History shows that\u2019s unlikely. We must be able to engage in combat on the ground, in the air, on the surface of the ocean and under the ocean, in space and with cyber. We need balance.\u2019<\/p>\n

The Ukrainians manufacture munitions and equipment that allowed them to survive until Western support kicked in.<\/p>\n

\u2018Australia does not have that capability. We don\u2019t produce weapons or munitions in the quantities we\u2019d need in any significant conflict.\u2019<\/p>\n

Ryan says those implementing the defence review must consider survivability of land forces and air forces and the need to integrate air and ground operations in a way the Russians have found difficult.<\/p>\n

\u2018There\u2019s a lot in the non-kinetic realm, like cyber operations, strategic influence operations, and the need for good leaders at every level knowledgeable about their profession and their people.<\/p>\n

\u2018These are not new lessons, but whether we learn them or not is another question.\u2019 Ryan identified early in this war a Ukrainian strategy he calls \u2018corrosion\u2019. \u2018They\u2019ve targeted the key elements of Russian fighting power, the physical means with which they fight, the intellectual means such as their tactics and techniques, and their morale and unit cohesion. They\u2019ve corroded the Russian military from within, collapsed its capability, morale and cohesion.<\/p>\n

\u2018When the Ukrainians are not attacking the Russians directly, they corrode them with long-range strikes to deny them their logistics, break down unit cohesion and destroy morale. Then they attack.\u2019<\/p>\n

ASPI senior analyst Marcus Hellyer agrees with Ryan on these issues.<\/p>\n

\u2018We need to be cautious about extrapolating directly from Ukraine to our own situation since our geographies are very different, but there are valuable lessons to be learned,\u2019 he says.<\/p>\n

The extremely vulnerability of helicopters on the modern battlefield was demonstrated in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the threats have proliferated greatly since then. Hellyer advocated long ago for replacing the Australian Army\u2019s Tiger helicopter with a combination of systems such as uncrewed aerial vessels and long-range rockets rather than another crewed helicopter. He\u2019s not convinced that the planned Apache replacement is the way to go.<\/p>\n

\u2018We can imagine situations where an aircraft like the Apache is useful, but is it a value-for-money solution? At a certain point, the cost outweighs the benefits compared to other solutions.\u2019<\/p>\n

Another lesson, Hellyer says, is that very deep magazines will be needed for munitions, from bullets to long-range missiles. \u2018We need to back Australian industry to provide this. Setting up local production lines for US missiles here is part of the solution, but Australian companies can also design and build their own.\u2019<\/p>\n

Is the day of the crewed combat aircraft over? It\u2019s likely to be a similar situation to armoured vehicles, Hellyer says.<\/p>\n

\u2018If you use armoured vehicles and fighters as the Russians have in Ukraine, you will suffer losses at a rate that Australia will not be able to endure or replace. But as part of an integrated system of systems that leverages the advantages of each component to mitigate their vulnerabilities, then they will likely remain survivable and effective. That means integrating cheaper, disposable uncrewed systems with crewed systems to provide greater mass, firepower and resilience.\u2019<\/p>\n

In some ways Australia is ahead of the game, Hellyer says. The RAAF has a fifth-generation mindset, integrating advanced systems across the air and space domains. \u2018It will not send fighters on a doomed, Charge of the Light Brigade mission without the support of sophisticated enablers.<\/p>\n

\u2018In other ways, we are well behind. We will run out of munitions in days, if not hours, and our main combat systems have limited range\u2014and are significantly out-ranged by adversary systems.\u2019<\/p>\n

Robust, contestable analysis is needed to determine whether the solution is longer range crewed aircraft like the B-21 bomber, longer range strike drones or large numbers of strike missiles.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, this is as much a matter of cost as of capability. It doesn\u2019t matter how good your $50 million aircraft is if runs out of $1 million missiles in a few missions or is destroyed by swarms of $100,000 missiles.<\/p>\n

At present, by pursuing small numbers of exquisitely expensive crewed platforms, we are losing the cost calculus, Hellyer says.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine, with its images of helicopters trailing flames, has demonstrated their vulnerability to effective air defences and triggered debate on the future of crewed aircraft sent to penetrate enemy airspace. Former Australian …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":587,"featured_media":72192,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[743,1512,726,163,714,2406],"class_list":["post-78093","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-airpower","tag-combat-systems","tag-raaf","tag-russia","tag-ukraine","tag-war"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nWhat\u2019s the future for crewed aircraft in combat? | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/whats-the-future-for-crewed-aircraft-in-combat\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"What\u2019s the future for crewed aircraft in combat? | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine, with its images of helicopters trailing flames, has demonstrated their vulnerability to effective air defences and triggered debate on the future of crewed aircraft sent to penetrate enemy airspace. 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