{"id":78116,"date":"2023-02-28T14:30:41","date_gmt":"2023-02-28T03:30:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=78116"},"modified":"2023-02-28T14:13:03","modified_gmt":"2023-02-28T03:13:03","slug":"chinas-self-serving-ukraine-peace-plan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-self-serving-ukraine-peace-plan\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s self-serving Ukraine \u2018peace plan\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
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On 24 February, marking one year since Russia\u2019s all-out invasion of Ukraine began, China\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs\u00a0published\u00a0China\u2019s position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis<\/em><\/a>. In theory, its 12 points form the basis for peace negotiations that Beijing\u2014perhaps President Xi Jinping himself\u2014could broker. With this plan, Beijing is positioning itself as a peacemaker and neutral party to the conflict. Nothing could be further from the truth.<\/p>\n

The peace plan is a cynical attempt to help Russian President Vladimir Putin, hamper support for Ukraine, bolster Beijing\u2019s image in the global south, and distract from the reality of growing Chinese support to Moscow. That includes\u00a0economic<\/a> support as Russia\u2019s largest trading partner and concerns that Beijing may start\u00a0providing arms<\/a> to the Russian side. The organising principle throughout the plan is self-interest, notably leveraging war in Europe to support Beijing\u2019s aims for reshaping the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n

First, we must recognise that this plan is biased. Just as Putin visited Beijing to consult with Xi days before launching his offensive last year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was\u00a0in Moscow<\/a>\u00a0days before this plan was released. Despite Russian denials, it\u2019s probable that the plan was discussed, especially as its existence had already been\u00a0trailed<\/a>\u00a0by Wang at the Munich Security Conference. By contrast, we know that Beijing\u00a0didn\u2019t consult Kyiv<\/a> about this 12-point plan or its earlier\u00a0manifestation<\/a>\u00a0as four principles.<\/p>\n

The most glaring omission in Beijing\u2019s plan is the failure to mention Russian aggression. When quizzed on this point, China\u2019s foreign ministry spokesperson\u00a0said<\/a>, \u2018Our position is clear. We stand on the side of peace and dialogue, and on the right side of history.\u2019 Clear as mud, and consistent with Beijing\u2019s ongoing strategy of obfuscation.<\/p>\n

In fact, as ASPI research\u00a0shows<\/a>, Beijing has long amplified Russian disinformation blaming the West for the war. This is alluded to in the 12 points, which caution against a \u2018Cold War mentality\u2019 and \u2018expanding military blocs\u2019. The spokesperson was less veiled in pointing the finger: \u2018Stoking bloc confrontation leads to conflict and war \u2026 We have seen what NATO has done to Europe and it must not seek to sow chaos here in the Asia\u2013Pacific or elsewhere in the world.\u2019<\/p>\n

At first blush, there are attractive elements among the 12 points, such as respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law (point 1). But if we keep in mind Beijing\u2019s concealment of Russian responsibility for the war, then the whole shabby edifice crumbles point by point. If Beijing cared about the UN charter, why doesn\u2019t it call out Russia\u2019s blatant violation of it? Instead, China\u00a0abstained<\/a>\u00a0on the UN General Assembly resolution calling for Russian forces to leave Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Such duplicity lurks behind the espousal of laudable principles throughout the plan. If Beijing wants to alleviate suffering (point 5), why is it\u00a0failing<\/a>\u00a0to provide bilateral humanitarian aid to Ukraine? If Beijing cares about humanitarian law (point 6), why did it\u00a0vote against<\/a>\u00a0the Human Rights Council resolution that set up a commission of inquiry into war crimes in Ukraine? If Beijing supports nuclear safety (point 7), why is it undermining trust in the International Atomic Energy Agency by\u00a0challenging<\/a>\u00a0its objectivity in the context of the AUKUS agreement? And if Beijing is committed to reducing strategic risks around nuclear weapons (point 8), why has it\u00a0failed<\/a>\u00a0to condemn Russia\u2019s suspension of the New START Treaty<\/a>?<\/p>\n

The truth is that Beijing only observes the principles underpinning international order to the extent that they serve its interests. Kyiv and the community of countries helping Ukraine defend itself already uphold these principles, while Moscow patently doesn\u2019t. Beijing\u2019s plan overlooks this inconvenient truth and instead implies moral equivalence between the warring parties, seeking to bolster the myth that it could act as an honest, even-handed broker in peace negotiations.<\/p>\n

Throughout the plan, Beijing has sought to manipulate the war in Ukraine to maximum strategic advantage. The clearest example is point 10, which calls for a stop to sanctions not endorsed by the UN Security Council. Russia\u2019s veto on the council aside, Beijing\u2019s moral high ground over the lawfulness of unilateral sanctions is paper thin. It has equivalent\u00a0regimes<\/a>\u00a0and, as ASPI\u00a0research<\/a>\u00a0has shown, makes widespread use of non-transparent economic and other levers for \u2018coercive diplomacy\u2019\u2014a term that Beijing has\u00a0adopted<\/a>\u00a0to criticise the US. Beijing\u2019s sustained invective against sanctions is motivated largely by concern that the West could use similar measures against China, including to deter or punish attempts to forcibly change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s proposals for a ceasefire and peace talks (points 3 and 4) are also self-serving. Were the plan realised based on the current reality on the ground, Russian territorial gains would be crystallised. This provides no basis for a\u00a0just and durable<\/a>\u00a0peace. The result would be a frozen conflict, which Russia could restart at a time of its choosing, as we\u2019ve seen with its salami-slicing tactics since 2014. A simmering conflict suits China because a durable peace in Europe could allow the US and some NATO partners to focus more on maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific, potentially stymieing Beijing\u2019s ambitions for Taiwan.<\/p>\n

As Russia seemingly flounders, Beijing will fear that Ukraine might achieve its war aims, which are clearly\u00a0stated<\/a>\u00a0by President Volodymyr Zelensky in his 10-point \u2018formula for peace\u2019 and include the full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. Such an outcome would invigorate Western confidence and solidarity. The paranoid Chinese Communist Party may even fear that its grip on power could be threatened by precedence if Putin\u2019s failure in Ukraine precipitated a power transition that shifted Russia back towards the West and democracy.<\/p>\n

Despite its flawed plan, Beijing cannot be sidelined\u2014attempting to do so would be counterproductive and might exacerbate the risk of China arming Russia. Zelensky has every right to\u00a0seek<\/a>\u00a0a meeting with Xi, who has the means if not the intent to tell Putin some home truths about his failed gambit in Ukraine. It is telling that Xi has dodged a meeting or phone call so far. Western ministers will also continue to engage their Chinese counterparts, lobbying for Beijing to play a more responsible role.<\/p>\n

Xi has the means to help bring about peace in Ukraine. He could back Zelensky\u2019s 10-point plan. He could call out Russian aggression and use China\u2019s economic and political leverage to force Putin to call back his troops. Beijing\u2019s 12-point position is a cynical diversion from the task at hand.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On 24 February, marking one year since Russia\u2019s all-out invasion of Ukraine began, China\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs\u00a0published\u00a0China\u2019s position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. In theory, its 12 points form the basis …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1558,"featured_media":78118,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,294,325,806,163,714],"class_list":["post-78116","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-diplomacy","tag-europe","tag-peace","tag-russia","tag-ukraine","dinkus-russia-ukraine-war"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina\u2019s self-serving Ukraine \u2018peace plan\u2019 | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-self-serving-ukraine-peace-plan\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China\u2019s self-serving Ukraine \u2018peace plan\u2019 | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"On 24 February, marking one year since Russia\u2019s all-out invasion of Ukraine began, China\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs\u00a0published\u00a0China\u2019s position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. 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