{"id":81039,"date":"2023-07-11T06:00:29","date_gmt":"2023-07-10T20:00:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=81039"},"modified":"2024-01-15T13:41:38","modified_gmt":"2024-01-15T02:41:38","slug":"winning-the-21st-century-intelligence-contest","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/winning-the-21st-century-intelligence-contest\/","title":{"rendered":"Winning the 21st-century intelligence contest"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The conduct of intelligence activities is inherently a strategic dynamic between rival actors simultaneously playing offence and defence. Analogies with war, sporting contests and competition abound. Action and reaction. Denial and deception. Or, in its Soviet incarnation, \u2018sword and shield\u2019\u2014the KGB\u2019s motto.<\/p>\n

The prize for a nation\u2019s leadership? Holding an advantage in decision-making and action. Knowing others better than they know you. And being able to use that advantage and that knowledge to the benefit of your interests and security.<\/p>\n

This essence is highlighted in two important and insightful new works on intelligence.<\/p>\n

Calder Walton\u2019s Spies: the epic intelligence war between East and West<\/em><\/a> charts the history of espionage and counterespionage through the 20th century and into the 21st, illuminating an ongoing shadow war between the UK and US (and their allies) on the one hand and the Soviet bloc (and later Russia) on the other.<\/p>\n

Walton, a historian at Harvard\u2019s Kennedy School of Government, through archival study and interviews with practitioners and defectors, finds that the struggle started in 1917 (and not after World War II). The resulting intelligence \u2018warfare\u2019 was at the bleeding edge of the next 75 years. What\u2019s more, it didn\u2019t end in 1991 despite the West\u2019s \u2018peace dividend\u2019. The Soviets\u2019 perceived humiliation is key to understanding Russian revanchism today\u2014seen not only in Vladimir Putin\u2019s invasion of Ukraine but in Russian intelligence outrages worldwide. Disturbingly\u2014especially in light of recent events<\/a>\u2014Walton concludes that the West has a Russia problem not a Putin problem.<\/p>\n

Spies<\/em> has a particularly contemporary resonance, illustrated by Walton\u2019s revelatory account<\/a> of attempts to assassinate Russian Foreign Intelligence Service defector Aleksandr Poteyev in Florida just three years ago. This links to earlier BBC reporting<\/a> of Russian efforts to track down Poteyev, including using disinformation about his \u2018death\u2019 to flush out those with knowledge of his whereabouts.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, Walton\u2019s reflections extend to an emergent China\u2013West confrontation. Espionage is once more at the front line of what he describes as a new cold war with Russia and China. Different, yes (how could it be otherwise in a globalised economy?), but a cold war nonetheless, and one that\u2019s critical to keep cold given the continuing threat of mutual nuclear destruction.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s changed are the phenomena that will determine who comes out on top: not least OSINT (open-source intelligence) and the race for artificial-intelligence-driven mastery of data. For Walton, a critical historical lesson is the importance of creativity, exemplified by the CIA\u2019s turn to technologically sophisticated satellite imagery to overcome the challenge of spying behind the Iron Curtain.<\/p>\n

Walton\u2019s chosen analogy is war. That\u2019s not uncontroversial. It captures the century-long nature of the dynamic and the sense of zero-sum results, but I\u2019m queasy about direct equation at a time when we have an actual war occurring on the plains of eastern Europe. \u2018Contest\u2019, albeit more bloodless and less evocative, is a safer harbour for more generalised accounts of intelligence. It also better accommodates multidirectional intelligence efforts in an increasingly multipolar world.<\/p>\n

For the writers in Deter, disrupt or deceive: assessing cyber conflict as an intelligence contest<\/em><\/a>, edited by Robert Chesney and Max Smeets, the question is whether the long-heralded idea of \u2018cyber war\u2019 is indeed actually better understood as \u2018intelligence contest\u2019. In doing so, the contributors also consider different national (including Chinese and Russian) perspectives on cyber issues and the role of non-state actors (including internet users, technology companies and cybersecurity firms).<\/p>\n

US scholar Josh Rovner\u2019s chapter dissecting what constitutes an intelligence contest is perceptive. In his words, participants endeavour to:<\/p>\n